Interdisciplinary Workshops on Politics and Policy

2017-2018 Series

September October November December January
February March April May June

September

A Russian Hegemony in the Russki Mir? A War of Position on Ukrainian Social Media

September 13, 2017
Jesse Driscoll (University of California - San Diego)

Abstract  
The Russian state is regularly assumed to have a competitive advantage in the production of hegemonic knowledge in the Russki mir — but does it? Analysis of a large sample of social media behaviors by Russian-speaking Ukrainians in the Spring of 2014 reveals competitive attempts to interpret ongoing high-stakes events: a classic Gramscian war of position. Twitter behaviors demonstrate that the Russian government’s effort to advance a counter-hegemonic narrative was more likely to succeed among Russian-speakers living in Ukrainian oblasts historically associated with the Russian empire. Even in these areas, however, a pro-West pro-maiden narrative was dominant among Russian-speaking Ukrainians on Twitter. We argue that the absence of irregular warfare in Ukraine, despite very weak central state capacity during the time of the study, is attributable to Russia’s failure to recruit local allies in this war of position.

Terrorism, Gender, and the 2016 Presidential Election

September 20, 2017
Jennifer Merolla (University of California - Riverside)

Abstract  
The 2016 U.S. presidential election was unusual in many ways, including the fact that it featured Hillary Clinton as the first woman major party nominee and Donald Trump as the first modern day major party candidate without extensive political experience. It was also an election in which terrorism was more salient than it has been in recent. U.S. presidential contests. These factors combing to offer the opportunity to evaluate the degree to which gender, experience, and a heightened context of terrorism shape candidate evaluations. Of particular interest are evaluations of the candidates’ leadership capacities given objective differences in their foreign policy experiences. We use ANES data and two experimental studies to examine how conditions of terrorist threat affected evaluations of Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. We first document via survey and experimental data that potential voters in the 2016 election who were worried about terrorism were less likely to support Clinton and more likely to support Trump. We then ask whether highlighting Clinton’s national security experience mitigates this disadvantage when terrorism is salient. We explore this question using data from a national experiment, conducted online in October 2016; in which we randomly assigned participants to read (or not) media coverage of Clinton’s national security experience, Trump’s rhetoric around terrorism, or some combination of the two. We find that reading about national security experience improves evaluations of Clinton, and these effects are more pronounced among males, and particularly those most resistant to her candidacy. (With Mirya Holman, Tulane University; Elizabeth Zechmeister, Vanderbilt University and Ding Wang, University of California-Riverside)

E Pluribus Unum? Clarifying How Elites Discourage (Non-)Immigrants from a Political Ideal

September 27, 2017
Efren Perez (Vanderbilt University)

Abstract  
Preserving national unity in light of ethnic diversity—e pluribus unum—is a challenge in immigrant-receiving countries. We claim that elite rhetoric about the proper balance between ethnic and national identity motivates individual relations to this idea. Study 1 centers on U.S. Latino adults and shows that rhetoric posting Latino and American identity as incompatible prompts them to voice weaker patriotism, fainter support for a common English language, and stronger pro-Latino preferences, with ethnic identity mediating each effect. Study 2 examines Latino and White reactions to elite rhetoric about ethnic and national identity, without targeting Latinos. We find that rhetoric posing ethnic and national identity as compatible also leads Latinos to express less patriotism, dimmer support for a common language, and stronger co-ethnic preferences, with ethnic identity mediating each effect. In sharp contrast, however, the same rhetoric motivates Whites to insist on e pluribus unum based on their American identity.

October

Hanes Walton Memorial Lecture

Thursday, October 12, 2017
Hanes Walton Lecture - Cathy Cohen (University of Chicago) and Michael Dawson (University of Chicago)

The Connection (?) Between Turnout And Partisan Vote Choice

October 18, 2017
Daron Shaw (University of Texas—Austin)

Abstract  
One of the enduring conventional wisdoms of American electoral politics is the belief that higher levels of turnout benefit the Democratic Party because Democrats have lower turnout rates than their Republican counterparts. Indeed, the “bias” of turnout is the most common explanation for the wild oscillations in Democratic fortunes from 2008 to 2010 and from 2012 to 2014. Based on an analysis of presidential, congressional, and gubernatorial election data from the 1940s through today, we suggest that changes in turnout from one election to another fail to predict changes in the party vote. We believe this occurs because the irregular voters whose participation drives turnout rates tend to be weaker partisans or independents who are inattentive to politics and strongly influenced by the political environment of the election. The short-term forms that define the political environment are as likely to benefit Republicans as Democrats, and this fact mitigates any systematic relationship between turnout and party preference.

TBA

October 25, 2017
Jamila Michener (Cornell University) *ROOM 1430 ISR

November

Norms and Women’s Political Participation: A Field Experiment in Ghana

November 1, 2017
Nahomi Ichino and Noah Nathan (University of Michigan)

Abstract  

Gender gaps in participation and representation are common in new democracies, both at the elite level and at the grassroots. We investigate the grassroots gender gap in parties in rural Ghana, a patronage-based new democracy in which a dense network of local party branches provides the main avenue for local participation. We show that patriarchal social norms are associate with lower women’s participation in party branches and report results from a randomized field experiment aimed at addressing these norms and encouraging women’s participation ahead of Ghana’s December 2016 elections. The treatment is a large community meeting presided over by the traditional chief (known locally as a durbar), held by Ghana’s National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE). We find null results, hampered in part by selective non-compliance with the treatment by local party leaders. Party leaders appear to have prevented full implementation because they did not value the recruitment of new female members and because being associated with a controversial social message may have been too electorally risky in competitive communities. We will also present our plans for follow-up work in Ghana on further understanding how social norms influence women’s political participation.

The Silent Revolution in Reverse: The Rise of Trump and the Xenophobic Authoritarian Parties

November 8, 2017
Ronald Inglehart (University of Michigan)

Abstract  

Being able to take survival for granted makes people more open to new ideas and more tolerant of outgroups. Insecurity has the opposite effect, encouraging an Authoritarian Reflex in which people close ranks behind strong leaders, with strong in-group solidarity, rigid conformity to group norms and rejection of outsiders. The three decades of exceptional security experienced by developed democracies after World War II brought pervasive cultural changes, including the rise of Green parties and the spread of democracy. Economic growth has continued since 1975, but in high-income countries virtually all of the gains have gone to those at the top. Most of the population, especially the less-educated, have experienced sharply declining existential security, fueling support for xenophobic populist authoritarian movements such as British Exit from the European Union, France’s National Front and Donald Trump’s election. This raises two questions: (1) “What motivates people to support xenophobic authoritarian movements in high-income countries?” And (2) “Why is the xenophobic vote in these countries much higher now than it was several decades ago?” The two questions have different answers.

Support for xenophobic populist authoritarian movements is motivated by a backlash against cultural change. From the start, the younger Postmaterialist birth cohorts disproportionately supported environmentalist parties, while older, less secure people supported xenophobic authoritarian parties, in an enduring intergenerational value clash. But during the past three decades, strong period effects have been working to increase support for xenophobic parties: a large share of the population has experienced declining real income and job security, along with a massive influx of immigrants and refugees. Cultural backlash explains why given individuals support xenophobic populist authoritarian movements-- but declining existential security explains why support for these movements is greater now than it was thirty years ago.

Pocketbook Populists?: Class and the Sociotropic Foundations of Populist Attitudes in the United States

November 15, 2017
Brian Rathbun (University of Southern California)

Abstract  

[With Evgeniia Iakhnis (USC) and Kathleen Powers (Dartmouth)]

Conventional wisdom has a ready explanation for populism’s success: the declining economic fortunes of the working class. As the story goes, the “losers of globalization: take out their frustrations on the political establishment. Populism is the cry of the financially forgotten. However, this argument has not been systematically tested and also neglects a more likely alternative: that populism— the goodness of ordinary people, hostility to self-serving elites, and support for direct democracy — is strongly predicted by a belief that the rich are doing very well financially compared to the past, while the working class and middle class are in decline. Personal economic circumstances matter little in explaining populism per se, measured separate from other substantive concerns like immigration with which it is often conflated.

No Talk Scheduled

November 29, 2017
TBA

December

TBA

December 6 2017
John Zaller (UCLA)

January

TBA

January 10, 2018
Mara Ostfeld and Nicole Yadon (University of Michigan)

TBA

January 17, 2018
TBA

TBA

January 24, 2018
TBA

February

TBA

February 7, 2018
Jennifer Lawless (American University)

TBA

February 14, 2018
TBA

TBA

February 21, 2018
Monika McDermott (Fordham University)

March

TBA

March 7, 2018
Tarek Masoud (Harvard University)

TBA

March 14, 2018
Andra Gillespie (Emory University)

TBA

March 21, 2018
TBA

TBA

March 28, 2018
Ted Brader (University of Michigan)

April

Henry Brady (University of California, Berkeley

Thursday, April 12, 2018
Miller Converse Lecture

TBA

April 18, 2018
Karen Jusko (Stanford University)

TBA

April 25, 2018
Evan Lieberman (MIT)

May

TBA

May 2, 2018
Brian Weeks (University of Michigan)

TBA

May 9, 2018
TBA

 

Resources

All workshops take place on Wednesdays from noon-1:30pm in 6080* ISR

Unless otherwise noted all presentations are brown bag lunch.

*please note room change from previous years.

Past Series

2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008