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CONTINUITIES IN POPULAR POLITICAL CULTURE: FRENCH
AND ANGLO-SAXON CONTRASTS IN CANADA^a

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Few countries in the western world offer as rich a laboratory for the examination of social and political phenomena as Canada. While it shares with other nations of the New World the marked ethnic diversity that prompts study of migration and cultural assimilation, Canada has come increasingly to discard the "melting-pot" assumptions of nation-building even where its two largest ethnic ingredients--the British and the French--are concerned, and is now considering what accommodations are necessary for minimal national unity on one hand if biculturalism is encouraged on the other. The growth of its giant neighbor to the south has merely complicated the situation, by placing Canada within a triangle of cultural and political forces defined by three of the major nations of the West: Britain, France and the United States. Under these circumstances, it is little wonder that the country seems to suffer frequent crises of self-identity, being forced to manufacture and insist self-consciously upon answers to such basic questions as "What is a Canadian?"

Geographically, the vast bulk of the Canadian population operates in a domain strangely lacking in two of the four conventional points of the compass.

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There is a great deal of East and West, but little North or South: the main corridor of activity stretches nearly 4,000 miles, but is rarely as much as 100 miles wide. A nation thus set, so to speak, on a single dimension rather than lying in a two-dimensional plane, encounters peculiar conditions of communication and cultural diffusion, and as Canadian history has shown, is more subject to lingering regionalism than most.

Politically speaking, the superstructure of Canada's national government follows more closely the British than the French or United States pattern. Yet the term "superstructure" is deliberately chosen, for Canada is a federation of provinces in which provincial governments are accorded a substantial degree of power and autonomy. Similarly, of course, the federal government sits athwart the French and Anglo-Saxon pieces of the nation, and the delicacy of power relationships between these pieces is a pervasive consideration in the composition of government and the execution of public policy.

If the Canadian polity is more nearly a two-party system than the French has ever been, it is at the same time more nearly a multi-party system than either the British or United States cases. There are indeed two principal parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, and these parties have dominated national politics from the time of the modern organization of the Dominion of Canada in 1867. Where the two ethnic cultures are concerned, the Liberal Party is the "French" party. It is not exclusively the French party, and could not be so if it hoped to control the federal government, a goal it has in fact achieved with only three interruptions since 1921. It is instead an ethnic coalition party, historically dominant to the point of one-party government in the main French province of Quebec, and drawing disproportionate strength elsewhere among Catholics in other ethnic minorities as well, yet vitally dependent on Anglo-Saxon elements for nearly half of its popular

support. The Conservative Party is more purely Protestant and English, and has had its traditional center of gravity in Ontario, the largest and most prosperous of the ten Canadian provinces.

Although dominated by the two major parties which in past decades have shared 70-85 percent of the popular vote in national elections, Canada remains more prolific in spawning minor parties and nurturing them with votes than any of her Anglo-Saxon sister nations. Over recent elections third and fourth parties have quite consistently maintained blocs of legislative seats, and still other formations have captured sizeable numbers of votes as well. While the wellsprings of these minor parties have been various, both ideologically and geographically, they are not too inaccurately associated with two principal homes, one in French Quebec and the other in the prairie provinces. The latter birthplace seems to have close affinities with the rural minor-party movements of the United States plains, long since muted, which alternately attacked the affluent status quo of the Eastern urban establishment from the left, and the modern secular liberalism of the cities from the provincial and God-fearing right.¹ Both trends have produced minor parties on the Canadian prairies as well. The French birthplace, however, lacks any counterpart in the United States.

From the rich array of subjects that might be illuminated by data on Canadian electoral behavior, we shall for purposes of this paper focus upon a single rather obvious one: the question of continuities from the Old World to the New in the differentiation of popular political culture between the

¹One of the most successful of the prairie minor parties, the socialist C.C.F. born in the Great Depression of the 1930s, was the subject of detailed examination in S. M. Lipset, Agrarian Socialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950).

French and Anglo-Saxon groupings. Important though it is, we shall pay a minimum of attention to the direct political confrontation of these groups in current Canada, for tensions raised by French-Canadian nationalism are well known and the juxtaposition of partisan and ethnic cleavages quite well documented. Instead, our attention will be directed toward differences in style or basic approach to democratic politics on the part of the French and Anglo-Saxon mass publics, in the measure they may be discerned in sample survey material. Such differentiation has also been the subject of a substantial journalistic literature, although accounts have always been impressionistic, enjoying little systematic empirical base even in Canada, to say nothing of corresponding bases for France or the Anglo-Saxon democracies.²

As a plan of attack, we propose to summarize the main points at which material in mass electoral surveys from France appears to differ consistently from that in the United States or, for that matter, other democracies of northwestern Europe where comparable information is available. Then we shall consider the most noteworthy signs of ethnic differentiation that emerge in the most ambitious national survey of a Canadian election to date.³

²The major use of sample-survey electoral data from Canada in a cross-national vein is devoted to religious, regional and social class differentiation in voting across the four largest Anglo-Saxon democracies (Britain, Canada, the United States and Australia), and thus pays relatively slight attention to French Canada as an ethnic community. See Robert A. Alford, Party and Society (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1963). Other recent and useful works on electoral behavior within Canada include John C. Courtney (Ed.), Voting in Canada (Toronto: Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1967); John Meisel, Papers on the 1962 Election (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964); and Peter Regenstreif, The Diefenbaker Interlude (Toronto: Longmans Canada Ltd., 1965).

³This survey was carried out by a team of five principal investigators, including two of the current authors (Meisel and Converse), after the federal parliamentary elections in November, 1965. We wish to acknowledge the indispensable roles played in this collaboration by Professors Mildred Schwartz of the University of Illinois (Chicago Circle); Maurice Pinard of McGill University; and Peter Regenstreif of the University of Rochester.

This will permit a straightforward assessment of the degree of fit between Old and New World pieces of the puzzle, in order to address the problem of continuity in popular political culture.

Before proceeding, however, a certain amount of prefatory description will be useful to us. In particular, since the primary "independent variables" with which we shall work in the body of the paper are based upon the lines of ethnic differentiation currently found in Canada, it is important to provide some brief exposition of these ethnic ingredients, their spatial distribution and historical roots.

THE ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF CANADA

According to the Canadian Census of 1961, the national origins of the Canadian population were distributed as shown in Table 1. Somewhat comparable estimates from the election sample survey in Canada are included, since it is on these materials that subsequent analyses in this paper rest. While the United States Census Bureau does not attempt to ascertain national origin save for foreign-born and children of foreign-born, a contrasting ethnic distribution has been reconstructed in a very approximate way from sample survey material.

It should be noted immediately, of course, that only comparisons of the grossest sort can be made from the three distributions, both because of differences in coding and because of differences in the sizes of residual categories (excluded from the major content percentages in the upper portion of the table). Even the Canadian Census data cannot be very adequately taken as parameters for the sample survey estimates, since all children under voting age, non-registered adults as well as the northern reaches of Canada were defined out of the sample universe from the outset. Moreover, the response "North American" was accepted in the sample survey and attracted some eight

Table 1. The Ethnic Composition of Canada, Compared with
That of the United States

	<u>CANADA</u> <u>Census</u> <u>(1961)</u>	<u>CANADA</u> <u>Survey</u> <u>(1966)</u>	<u>USA</u> <u>Survey Research</u> <u>Center Est. (1960)</u>
British Isles.	46.3%	51.3%	41.1%
England, Scotland			26.8
Ireland			14.3
Germany.	6.1	4.3	21.1
Scandinavia.	2.2	2.1	4.6
Italy.	2.6	2.3	3.4
Other West Europe.			8.5
France	32.0	27.0	
Netherlands	2.5	1.5	
East Europe.			
Poland	1.9	2.7	1.8
Hungary	0.7	0.7	Other
Russia (& Ukr.)	3.4	3.6	E. Eur. 4.7
Jewish	1.0	(1.9)*	(3.2)*
Other European		4.0	
Asiatic.		0.5	
Native (Indian, Eskimo). .	1.3		
Negro.			11.6
Other.	_____	_____	<u>3.2</u>
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
"North American"		7.6	
Unidentified	5.0	2.5	
"Don't Know"	_____	_____	<u>19.9</u>
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

*Percent Jewish is actually distributed by national origin--heavily German and East European--in these columns.

percent of the responses. Initially we assumed that the only North American source of population apart from Canada itself was the United States, and since there has been some exchange of population between the two neighbors, considered this to be a non-French ethnic category. However, behavior of this group on political variables aroused sufficient suspicion that spot checks of the interviews were made, and these indicated that "North America" was meant to include "Canada" as a response, and that this response was given quite frequently in the French-speaking population. Indeed, nearly half of this group reported speaking French in their homes, and not surprisingly, every one of these was Catholic. Hence it seems reasonable to surmise that some of the apparently missing French Canadians lie in this row. Why French Canadians in particular should so disproportionately report themselves to be of Canadian rather than French ancestry may become clearer below.

The important point for the moment is that somewhat less than half of the adult Canadian population is British in origin, and slightly less than one-third is French. The remaining quarter is heterogeneous, with fair German and East European representation.

As might be expected from the preservation of the French language, the population of French ancestry is extremely segregated in those eastern portions of Canada which first represented the Nouvelle France of the seventeenth century. By 1961 Census estimates, over 80 percent of the province of Quebec is French and about 11 percent British in origin. The French community extends eastward somewhat into the adjacent province of New Brunswick, although the British hold a 55-39 majority there, and 16 percent of Prince Edward Island is accounted French, as opposed to 80 percent British. In the other two maritime provinces (Nova Scotia and Newfoundland) the French population is less than 10 percent. Moving westward, only about 10 percent of

Ontario is French, and the proportion is a mere 6 percent in the vast expanses beyond Ontario to the Pacific. With the exception of New Brunswick, then, the French either find themselves in an 80-20 provincial majority or a 10-90 minority.

The British themselves are somewhat maldistributed even outside Quebec. The eastern maritime provinces are almost entirely populated either by British or French. In Ontario, however, where the British hold a 60 percent majority, 30 percent of the population is neither French nor British, and with the exception of British Columbia on the Pacific, the British find themselves in turn outnumbered--often considerably--by non-French stock in the western provinces.

According to estimates from our sample survey, about 29 percent of Canadian respondents report speaking French as the primary language in the home. Sixty-seven percent speak English, and 4 percent a variety of other languages, the latter occurring mainly in ethnic enclaves in Toronto (Ontario) or in the prairie provinces. Eighty-two percent of our Quebec respondents speak French in the home, including visible proportions of people of non-French ancestry. One person in seven in the maritime provinces speaks French at home; for the remainder of Canada, the proportion is barely over 3 percent. Thus while there is strong regional segregation by French ancestry, the linguistic segregation is sharper still.

Since we are interested in the polar French and British communities in Canada, such segregation and linguistic distinctiveness is useful to us, for we shall enjoy very large numbers of "pure" types: people of French ancestry speaking French as a mother tongue and living in the French milieu of Quebec; and people of British ancestry speaking English and living in an English milieu outside Quebec. At the same time, as we wish to focus further

on questions of political culture, we will profit from attention to other classes of persons as well, including most obviously people of neither French nor British ancestry, but also the ethnic hybrids who lie between the French and British poles, such as the people of French ancestry living outside the French milieu of Quebec and in many cases speaking English in the home, or the people of British or non-French origin immersed in Quebec and speaking French primarily in the family.

Table 2 summarizes much of what we have been describing, by providing distributions of our Canadian sample within cross-partitions defined by language, ancestry and region. The table is so organized that the groups of relative cultural purity are located in the upper left and lower right corners of the table, and here cases abound. Between these corners there are numerous empty cells, and only occasional clusters of population.

Table 2 represents the primary analytic sorting of the population that we have used for subsequent portions of this paper. Because of the paucity of cases at many points in the table, as well as the rather limited unique interest of some of the cells, we shall quite generally display a more collapsed version of the partitioning. In particular, for example, we shall play upon the very high correlation between language and ancestry to assign an ancestry to those respondents who were coded "North American" or whose ancestry simply was not ascertained. If they speak French, they are assumed to be of French ancestry; if English, they are assumed to be at least Anglo-Saxon if not British. This decision is massively reinforced by examination of other characteristics, such as religion and residence: we are confident that it entails almost no misclassification, and it reduces the 40 cells of

Table 2. Language and Ancestry by Region, Canadian Sample^a

<u>Ancestry:</u>	<u>FRENCH LANGUAGE</u>				<u>OTHER LANG.</u>		<u>ENGLISH LANGUAGE</u>			
	<u>French</u>	<u>No.Amer. DK or NA</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>British</u>	<u>French</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>French</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>No.Amer. DK or NA</u>	<u>British</u>
Quebec	19.9%	3.6%	1.3%	0.5%	0.0%	0.2%	0.4%	1.8%	0.4%	2.5%
Maritimes	0.4	0.6	0.0	0.3	0.0	*	0.5	0.4	0.6	6.0
West	0.3	*	*	*	0.0	1.3	0.5	5.8	1.3	10.6
Ontario	0.7	0.7	0.1	0.1	0.1	2.5	1.5	2.7	6.2	26.0

*Less than .05 of one percent.

^aThe table as a whole sums to 100 percent aside from rounding error.

Table 2 to 32.⁴ The fifth column in the table contains one raw case and is simply discarded. The sixth column--people of neither French nor British ancestry who speak neither of the major languages in their homes--we shall treat as a whole. The vast majority of these are foreign-born, and almost two-thirds have arrived in Canada since World War II. As people who have not yet become members of one of the major language groups themselves, they are of interest to preserve as a separate category. However, 94 percent of them live in Ontario or the western provinces and are not of central relevance to the main French Canadian community; hence, we drop any regional differentiation for them.

Otherwise, we shall maintain the distinction between residence in Quebec and residence elsewhere as scrupulously as possible. Where it seems conceptually important and case numbers permit, we shall maintain some regional differentiation outside Quebec as well; however, numerous regional mergings within ethnic and linguistic groups are necessary.

Table 3 utilizes this sorting of the sample, and provides an array of background information on each classification. We shall not explore this table in detail, although a glance will suffice to ensure the reader that it is important for reference, since the ethnic classifications are remarkably heterogeneous with respect to many of the characteristics. Some of the apparent heterogeneity may trace to the instabilities of small case numbers, and the reader should note that several of the columns are too sparsely

⁴Ancillary information suggests that whatever risk of misclassification may occur lies on English and not the French side. Possibly some of these respondents are of other non-French stock, although most are likely to be early arrivals, 93 percent live outside Quebec, and appear thoroughly assimilated into the English culture. In point of fact we have examined these categories separately in prior work, and are assured that their addition to the English side introduces no distortion.

Table 3. Demographic Characteristic by Ethnic Categories

ANCESTRY:	FRENCH			OTHER				BRITISH ISLES				
LANGUAGE:	French		English	French	Other	English		French	English			
PROVINCE:	Que.	Rest.	All	Que.	All	Que.	Rest	Que. Mar.	Que.	Mar.	West	Ont.
% Male	49	45	45	64	60	62	46	40	53	44	56	46
% 50 years of age and older	33	35	35	56	32	30	28	35	55	40	42	34
% 10 yrs and more of education	36	32	45	42	30	77	54	25	72	54	68	68
% Professional	10	7	0	3	1	24	9	5	22	5	9	8
% Blue Collar	46	56	44	76	58	40	42	45	22	46	34	45
% Farmer	7	3	6	0	10	0	10	0	0	11	9	7
% \$6,000 or more income	26	22	27	24	28	51	46	25	54	11	48	40
% Catholic	99	100	71	91	41	17	30	75	24	26	7	15
% Anglican	*	0	10	0	1	2	6	5	28	17	20	24
% Jewish	*	0	0	6	0	64	5	0	0	0	0	0
% Foreign-born	1	3	6	24	84	60	35	0	14	9	24	16
% Grew up, farm	28	42	29	6	34	6	35	20	11	30	34	24
% Lived in another province	12	40	38	21	22	19	36	20	54	29	57	22
Raw N	521	64	62	27	80	26	271	18	47	171	312	511

populated for more than cursory attention. However, our primary interest lies in the first column and the last few, and here case numbers are ample indeed.

One major source of heterogeneity in the table warrants brief comment. It is apparent that English-speaking persons of British or other extraction residing in the French milieu of Quebec are a very distinctive group of people, a managerial class of high education, occupation status and income. Members of this group of "other" extraction are heavily Jewish: indeed, the bulk of Canada's Jewish population involves relatively recent migrants who have chosen to settle mainly in the urban centers of Quebec. The existence of this English-speaking managerial class in the French province is of course a fundamental and continuing irritant to the French Canadian population. One may note moreover that across the table as a whole, there is an English education level and an inferior French one. And of greatest interest is the fact that these repetitive differences are much more closely associated with current language than with ancestry.

This will suffice, then, as a brief sketch of the current ethnic composition of Canada. Our account would be quite incomplete, however, without adding something of a time dimension. For most of our purposes, this can be quite simply done. In brief, the main stream of migration into Canada is and has been for centuries from Anglo-Saxon sources, primarily England, Scotland and Wales, although the United States has been a prominent secondary source. Toward the middle of the nineteenth century, Ireland and Germany became important contributors of population as well.⁵ The Eastern

⁵It should be pointed out that the data provide no means of distinguishing Irish immigrants from others whose ancestors come from the British Isles. This is unfortunate, and not simply because our Irish respondents might feel affronted to be dubbed with a "British" ancestry. It is the Irish Catholic

European stock is relatively new, having begun to arrive in Canada only at the end of the 19th century. Further migrations from Eastern Europe and Italy have constituted the major sources of new population aside from the Anglo-Saxon contributions in the twentieth century.

Historical Background of the French Canadian Community. Where the French Canadian community is concerned, however, the history of immigration is utterly astonishing, and its peculiarities are so germane to the questions addressed in this paper that it warrants more detailed treatment.

Since our focus is upon cultural continuities between related but geographically remote populations, the factor of time is clearly a critical one. If a subpopulation splits away from its parent population, migrating to another locale out of contact with it, it can be assumed that its language and manners will begin to evolve in independent directions. At any subsequent point, therefore, the degree of dissimilarity between the two cultures could be expected to depend primarily upon the dissimilarity of the new environment from the old, and the sheer amount of time the two populations have been out of contact.

Now where the migrant population is not totally out of communication with the parent population, and indeed is being replenished by further migration from it, any model for the evolution of dissimilar cultural traits would necessarily become more complex. For example, one would certainly need to take into account the timing of subsequent waves of migration, the size of

migrants who, among all non-French arrivals, have been most likely to select and become somewhat assimilated into the French areas of Canada. For example, the chances are excellent that the majority of cases in the tenth column of Table 3 (French-speaking persons originating in the British Isles, now residing in Quebec or the Maritime provinces) are Irish.

the new migrant groups relative to that of the branch population they are entering, and the like.

If we can assume that these are the basic parameters which would affect our expectations as to presence of noteworthy continuities, then it can immediately be observed that the French Canadian case would seem to warrant few positive expectations at all, particularly with respect to popular responses to democratic politics. For this French community represents without question the most ancient and unreplenished colony of Europeans of comparable size which could be found today in the New World. Indeed, it might be noted that none of the authors expected to find much in the way of continuity, and began the examination almost routinely because it contained a few obvious questions which might be laid to rest. The fact that there seem to be traces of interesting continuity, as we shall see, is therefore almost more puzzling than if none had been found at all.

The peculiarities of the original French migration stem from what seems to be an abiding and deep-seated reluctance of the population of France to depart from its shores. Whether this reluctance is to be interpreted as a singular timidity or a recognition that they, more than any other Europeans, were already in the Promised Land, we shall leave to others to debate. What is important for our purposes is that the progenitors of the current French Canadian population left France at a remarkably early time and in miniscule numbers.

Although France had had its reasonable share of citizens exploring the New World and developing the rich fur trade in Canada during the sixteenth century, permanent French settlement on the St. Lawrence in the Quebec area is usually dated at about 1628, or just a few years after the founding of the Pilgrim colony in what is now Massachusetts. Yet the subsequent demographic

histories of the two colonies could not have been more diametrically opposed. It is estimated that between 1630 and 1640, Britain dispatched some fifteen to twenty thousand settlers to the Massachusetts Bay Colony alone. Meanwhile, during roughly the same period, it seems that in addition to some soldiers of the French garrison who decided to remain for settlement in the New World, all of one male and eleven women made the voyage of migration from France to help develop the Canadian colony, and this contingent was all that a parent population three times the size of Britain's was able to yield in a decade. By 1662, some 35 years later, the sum of women arriving for settlement had reached the robust total of 228. "While Englishmen in thousands were flocking to New England," notes A. R. M. Lower, "it was only by ones and twos that Frenchmen were coaxed out to New France."⁶

The "great" wave of migration from France to Canada occurred in the decade after royal government was established in Quebec in 1663. This wave amounted to a grand total of about 2,000 souls over the ten-year period, many of them soldiers lured by handsome concessions established for immigration by a home government increasingly concerned by the floodtide of Anglo-Saxon migration a few hundred miles to the south. This influx roughly doubled the size of the colony during the decade.

While migration from France did not cease abruptly in 1673, it rapidly returned to its earlier trickle of twos and threes, maintaining this rate until the final British conquest of French Canada in 1763. The population of New France at that latter date was approximately 65,000, although the grand total of immigrants from France over the 130 years since the initial settlement is estimated at about 10,000, of which only 500 are believed to

⁶ A. R. M. Lower, Canadians in the Making (Toronto: Longmans, Green, 1958), p. 21.

have come "freely and at their own expense,"⁷ with the remainder being soldiers, deportees, indentured servants and the like.

If only 10,000 came in 130 years, from whence arose a population of 65,000? This is the other amazing half of the French Canadian story. Apparently aware from the outset that few of their compatriots would leave France to expand the colony, the French Canadians set out to expand it by sheer diligence from within. Boys were to be married by 18 or 19; girls by 13 or 14. Sustained widowhood and bachelorhood were penalized. "Les femmes y portent presque tous les ans," an astounded traveller from the homeland reported. The record is captured more objectively by detailed and frequent censuses of the population by age, sex, occupation and chattels. According to the Census of 1698, 46 percent of the total population was less than 15 years of age. The birthrate attained levels not rivalled in the history of any monogamous country, and maintained them for some eighty years. The rate of natural increase was such that the known growth of the colony is virtually accounted for after 1680 without need to add in immigration at all. Never have so few accomplished so much.⁸

After the British Conquest was completed in 1763, the French Canadian birth rate continued, but the previous dribble of migration ceased almost altogether. In the national census some hundred years later (1871), the tally of national origins of the foreign-born then in Canada showed less than half of one percent were from France, despite the French ancestry of one-quarter to one-third of the native population.⁹

⁷Ibid., p. 36.

⁸Ibid., pp. 33-36.

⁹M. C. Urquhart and K. A. H. Buckley, Historical Statistics of Canada (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada, 1965).

Thus it may be no exaggeration whatever to suggest that at the time the great majority of current French Canadians had their last direct ancestral contact with France, Colbert had just become Minister of Finance and the Sun King, Louis XIV, had about finished his on-the-job training and was settling down for the last fifty years of his reign. If one asks to know the main lines of "political culture" the migrants carried to the New World, they were those of the absolute monarchy, and yet scarcely that, for Bossuet had not yet propounded his central doctrine of the divine right of kings before their departure. The French Revolution lay more than a century in the future, and the advent of routine democratic politics two centuries. Hence it borders on the absurd to imagine that the response to democratic process of French Canadians in the 1960s would have anything in common with the idiosyncrasies of the French masses in the Fourth and Fifth Republics.

To be sure, the absence of migration does not in itself mean absence of communication, and up to 1763 elite positions in the government and the church were undoubtedly filled largely by personages enjoying fresher contact with the homeland. However, the completion of the British Conquest effectively cut off this channel of communication, and while events in France have undoubtedly always had an unusual salience for French Canadians, there is evidence that horror among the devout populace at the blasphemies of the French Revolution helped to extinguish a waning sense of kinship and leave it moribund until very recent years.

Although most characteristics of current French Canada would lead to little expectation of continuity in popular political culture, one "trait"--itself a major continuity with the French past--has worked for the preservation of original culture. This characteristic is reflected in the relatively closed and immobile character of the French Canadian community. The French

disinterest in migration, that so vitally shaped the history of North America, was not lost in mid-Atlantic by the few who ventured forth. Once implanted along the St. Lawrence, there were many trading forays in other directions, but no onward migration movements to match those of the Yankee outpourings from New England homesteads to populate the midwest. And this population immobility remained characteristic despite the remarkable surplus of births, precisely the demographic condition that predisposes most peoples to unusual out-migration.

It is true that after 1763, and to some extent before, French migration westward was in a figurative sense "blocked" by the development of the Anglo-Saxon community in "Upper Canada" (Ontario), although such a barricade was hardly seen as impermeable by other migrants. In any event, the French community became firmly rooted in its initial domain in the New World, and rapidly closed in upon itself, a cultural island suspicious of foreign intrusion, and hence more likely to preserve initial cultural traits than mobile or culturally heterogeneous communities.

It is likely that some of this relative parochialism is captured even in some of the more factual responses to our sample survey questionnaire. Thus, for example, the proportion of persons of British ancestry who report having lived for at least six months in some other province than that in which they are interviewed is essentially the same as that found for the newer arrivals of other, non-French ancestry. But the comparable proportion for French Canadians is only half as great (17 percent, compared with 30-33 percent).

REPORTING THE VOTE

Let us then turn our attention from demographic description to more nearly political matters. One which is perhaps the first to catch the eye in dealing with electoral surveys from Canada may seem more methodological than political, yet the overtones in important aspects of political culture undoubtedly exist. This is the simple question of the ability and willingness of sample survey respondents to indicate to an interviewer under assurances of anonymity how they have cast their votes.

For researchers in the United States or most northern European countries, the problem of refusal to account for one's vote occurs so rarely as to be of trivial concern. In the United States, the refusal to report a presidential vote in a post-election survey arises for only about one voter in a hundred, although in occasional elections it may mount to three or four in a hundred. To the best of our knowledge, this experience is not atypical for the democracies of northern Europe quite generally speaking. For the researcher in France, however, the gross inadequacy of vote reporting is a major cross to bear which affects in unknown ways almost every move he makes. Instead of the few content-less vote reports per hundred found elsewhere, he must cope with anywhere from twenty to fifty such reports per hundred, varying according to partially known conditions.

For such a researcher, sadly inured to these problems in France, there is bound to be a sigh of overfamiliarity as he begins to examine survey data from Canada and discovers that the French there distinguish themselves as well in their unusual resistance to revealing how they have voted. The effect is less dramatic than in France itself, but incontrovertibly present.

There are roughly four classes of "explanation" concerning the difficulty in ascertaining the vote in a French sample: (1) a culturally strong

sense of resistance to such invasions of privacy; (2) concealment of Communist voting; (3) concealment of confusion over how indeed one has voted; and (4) inadequate interviewing practices. None of these four logically excludes any of the others, and some may be interactive, as when a poorly explained interview may put a hesitant respondent into a more acutely defensive frame of mind.

There seems to be no question whatever but that some French refusal to indicate a vote reflects an awareness of a strong social stigma attached to a Communist vote. Other mild distortions of vote report when compared with election outcomes are irregular in direction, and usually within reasonable sampling error. The size of the Communist vote, however, is always grossly underrepresented, and must make up a disproportionate number of the evasive responses. At the same time, it is equally clear that not all evasive responses conceal Communist votes, for refusals tend to outnumber greatly what would be necessary to account for the missing Communists. A study of the 1958 French legislative election directed by one of the authors showed one percent "Don't remember" and 23 percent refusal in reporting the vote. Eleven percent of the official vote won by the Communist Party was not reported. Thus refusals amounting to some 12 percent of the total vote, or more than half of all refusals, must have come from other sources than Communist concealment.

It is risky to compare refusal rates across studies within a country or across countries without care being taken to match type of interview and interviewing quality, because both can vitally affect the rates. A ten-item poll on a doorstep which includes a vote question will almost inevitably show a higher refusal rate than a vote question imbedded in a much longer "sit-down" interview where considerable rapport between interviewer and respondent usually develops. All of the rates cited here are from longer interviews and

hence are assured some rough comparability. Nonetheless, other variations in the calibre of interviewing can affect refusals as well. Intensive examination of the 1958 French interview protocols made clear, for example, that some refusals arose where cafe owners or commerçants were being interviewed in front of their clients. Guarantees of anonymity are obviously not very meaningful under these circumstances, and if interviewers in the United States were permitted to take interviews in such inappropriate settings, it is likely the refusal rate would be higher there as well. Moreover, the 1958 French study also showed sufficiently wide variation from interviewer to interviewer in eliciting a vote report to suggest that an admixture of very mediocre interviewers was in part responsible for the high refusal rates.

Nevertheless, defects in interviewing procedure certainly do not explain away the 12 percent refusal rate left after the Communist problem is set aside, and probably cannot account for more than a third of the difficulties. In other words, there is still a refusal rate of 8-10 percent which is difficult to account for save as a more intrinsic regularity of French political culture, and this rate is from two to eight times greater than that found in the other North European or American settings.

The Canadian case is reminiscent. Where the report of the 1965 legislative vote is concerned, the highest rate of refusal (over 9 percent) occurs for French-speaking people of French ancestry living in Quebec. The lowest rate of any of the other six sizeable ethnic categories is one of less than 2 percent, and occurs within the largest segment of the sample: English-speaking people of British ancestry living in Ontario. Of the smaller fragments between these ethnic poles, only one approaches the pure-French refusal rate: the new arrivals still speaking some other language than English or French in the home, who refuse to reveal their vote at almost

comparable rates (8 1/2 percent). The next most recalcitrant group are the English-speaking French (7 percent refusal); and then come the French-speaking English (6 percent refusal). The remaining intermediate categories, mainly British persons outside of Ontario, show rates between 2 and 5 percent. Except for the small group of French living outside Quebec, none of whom refused, the pattern is perfect along the pure-French through hybrid to pure-English axis.¹⁰

Although it might be suggested that resentment of such intrusions upon privacy is perhaps more Latin than merely French, the Italians in the sample, while not numerous (raw N of 35), show a refusal rate lower than the sample as a whole, and much lower than other recent non-Anglo-Saxon arrivals or the French. Nor has any particular resistance to disclosing the vote been noted among citizens of Italian extraction in the United States.

However, it is probably appropriate to speak more generally of resistance to intrusions upon privacy, for something of the same reserve characterizes the French population in the disclosure of income as well. In the United States, flat refusal to disclose income in sample surveys is relatively rare and seems to occur principally in high-income strata. There is a similar phenomenon in the Canadian sample, with the highest refusal rates occurring

¹⁰As there was a procedural difference in the handling of the vote question in Quebec in order to permit a more direct query as to whether or not respondents had voted for Caouette's Creditiste splinter party, it seemed possible that the resistance to a vote report, especially among the Quebec habitants, might have stemmed from this procedure, or from the existence of the somewhat stigmatized Creditiste party which has typically been underrepresented in sample surveys in much the same fashion as the Communist Party in France. However, examination of data from polls not using such a special procedure, and generated in some instances in the 1950s before the Creditiste party arose, show the rate of null response (refusals, don't-knows) running at least 25 percent higher, and usually 50-80 percent higher among French-speaking than among English-speaking respondents. The average differential across these surveys is therefore only slightly weaker than that found in the 1965 survey.

in the English-speaking managerial class in Quebec. Aside from this familiar departure, the uniqueness of the French response, when compared with the British or other ethnic groups, is clear. Almost 6 percent of the pure French in Quebec refuse to give income figures; then come English-speaking persons of French ancestry (4.8 percent), and "pure" French living outside Quebec (3.2 percent). Save for the small managerial group in Quebec, all of our other British and residual categories show lower rates than these. Over the total sample, 5.4 percent of persons of French ancestry refuse to divulge income, whereas only 2.7 percent of British and 2.2 percent of other extraction choose to resist.

Over and above these differences in levels of refusal, there are further intriguing parities and disparities in what one might call the "dynamics" of vote reporting: the conditions under which the same individuals are more or less likely to be willing and/or able to report their vote. For example, the more minor the election, or the more remote any election in time, the higher the rate of failures to recall the direction of the vote among those who believe that they did in fact participate. This is all very obvious and reasonable, and the effects can be equally well found in French or Anglo-Saxon data.

We have, however, built up a similar stock of expectations where refusal rates are concerned. In most bodies of data we have seen, the refusal rate declines quite clearly--often as much as 50 percent--as the same respondents are asked to report votes for earlier elections or for elections at less important levels of office. Clearly the passage of time builds in a safety factor for the respondent who may imagine some danger in revealing his vote, and similarly, risks seem less for more minor, routine elections. However, the 1958 French election data fail to fit these "rules." The refusal rate,

which was very high where the 1958 vote report was concerned, remained essentially at the same level when vote for 1956 was asked (while the "don't know" rate moved from one percent to 18 percent), although the respondents refusing were not by any means identical sets in the two instances. And when the respondent was asked about his father's vote in an earlier generation, the proportion of refusals nearly doubled.

Therefore, it is intriguing to discover in the Canadian data that while refusals to report votes for more remote elections or contests at lower levels of office behave in standard fashion both for persons of British and other non-French ancestry, they move in the opposite direction for French Canadians:

Percent refusal in report of vote for....				
	Most Recent National Election <u>(1965)</u>	Earlier National Election <u>(1963)</u>	Earlier Provincial Election <u>(various)</u>	<u>Raw N</u>
French Ancestry or Language or Both	7.9%	8.4%	10.8%	(718)
Non-French in Ancestry or Language	3.8	2.7	3.2	(1392)

We are in a position here, as at numerous points below, of being able to suggest interesting similarities between French responses in the New World and the Old without being able to marshal anything like definitive proof of organic continuity. It could be cogently argued, for example, that in view of the centuries that French Canadians have felt economically exploited and administratively badgered by the British, it is not surprising that they would "go underground," a minor symptom of which would be an inordinate premium on privacy in matters of personal politics or family income. Such an explanation

would however need to be extended to account for the absence of comparable response in other Canadian minorities, equally if not more out of their cultural element; and would be obliged to write off comparable French responses in the Old World as coincidence.

It seems worthwhile, therefore, to take survey of more of these similarities, for as the compilation increases, the protest of coincidence at least loses force progressively. Therefore, let us proceed to some further comparisons, this time not at all methodological in character.

THE PARTY OR THE PERSONAGE AS POLITICAL CYNOSURE

In an earlier article, two of the current authors reported a detailed comparative analysis of electoral surveys conducted in France and the United States.¹¹ Two gross classes of findings seemed to emerge from these comparisons. First, there was a verdict of very little difference between the two mass populations across a wide range of indicators reflecting public involvement in politics and rates of political activity. Except for voting turnout itself, various forms of political interest seemed if anything higher in the United States, although the differences largely vanished once education was controlled.

However, in matters of political partisanship, dramatic differences opened up between the two populations. In the United States, it was clear that the two political parties were accepted as primary points of orientation in public evaluation of the ongoing political scene, and that the vast majority of the population had developed significant affective ties to one party or the other. Whereas comparable attachments to various parties were certainly present

¹¹Philip E. Converse and Georges Dupeux, "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 26 (1962), 1-24.

in the French sample, their prevalence was very much lower, and a good half of the population appeared to deny much interest in political parties as points of orientation aiding the individual to relate himself to the democratic political process. Other data, most notably from Scandinavia where psychological ties to particular parties seemed to serve as points of departure for political evaluation as widely and as potently as in the United States,¹² helped to indicate that limited French interest in political parties was not a routine accompaniment of a multi-party system, but rather some more uniquely French approach to mass politics.¹³

Although it will ultimately be possible to do so, we shall not here provide any full replication on Canadian materials of the earlier Franco-United States analyses. In particular, we shall set aside the question of differential political involvement and participation. It is apparent from initial glimpses of the data that some interesting regional gradients in participation are present. Thus, for example, lower participation seems associated with more rural regions, so that British Columbia (an almost entirely urban sample) is favored and the neighboring prairie provinces disfavored. Similarly, participation of at least some kinds seems penalized where the population is relatively new and mobile, a factor disfavoring the West generally and favoring the Maritimes and to some extent Quebec. At first glance, the

¹² See, for example, Angus Campbell and Henry Valen, "Party Identification in Norway and the United States," Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 25 (1961), 505-525.

¹³ It may be important to recognize that the French leg of the comparative study rested on a single sample survey from the critical year of 1958, when political parties in France were at low ebb in public repute. However, both subsequent sample survey data and analyses of aggregate historical voting statistics stretching back to 1870 seem to lead to similar conclusions about the limited development of party attachments in France. See Philip E. Converse, "Survey Research and the Decoding of Patterns in Ecological Data," paper read at the Symposium on Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social Sciences, September 1966 (in press).

Quebec population in general and the French population in particular seem to take their logical positions on these gradients, without a need to introduce ethnicity as a special factor. However, there are some puzzling variations in some of the involvement indicators that will deserve further attention. In view of the fact that one critical control variable for any such work has not yet been coded--the urban-rural nature of the specific sampling point--we are postponing closer inspection for a time.

There are however perhaps a dozen items in the Canadian questionnaire which reflect in one way or another the salience of political parties as orienting objects for the individual, or the value placed on the maintenance of party fidelity. And while the French contingent in the sample is not particularly distinctive on many types of items elsewhere in the questionnaire, on this particular set they distinguish themselves repetitively. The differences are once again not as sharp as those originally found in the comparisons between France and the United States. Moreover, one of our small hybrid groups--the same set of French living outside Quebec that failed to show high vote or income refusal rates--consistently breaks the expected pattern. But for the pure French and most of the other French-related hybrid groups the direction of difference is clear and the magnitudes of difference are not trivial.

We cannot discuss all of the relevant items here. Instead we shall focus on about three that are fairly central to the argument and provide a reasonable sample of different aspects of party salience or fidelity.

The first is the familiar question of party identification. Table 4 presents the data organized by our standard ethnic categories. As usual, our primary attention should be given to the large pure-French column at the left, in comparison with the three or four pure-English columns at the right. The distributions in this latter set are quite homogeneous, suggesting comparable

Table 4. Party Identification by Ethnic Categories

ANCESTRY:	FRENCH			OTHER				BRITISH ISLES				
LANGUAGE:	French		English	French	Other	English		French	English			
PROVINCE:	Que.	Rest	All	Que.	All	Que.	Rest	Que. Mar.	Que.	Mar.	West	Ont.
Clear identification	53%	76%	62%	64%	77%	64%	64%	70%	67%	68%	70%	70%
Marginal identification	28	19	20	24	13	28	25	15	17	23	22	21
None whatever	19	5	18	12	10	8	11	15	16	9	8	9
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Raw N	521	64	62	27	80	26	271	18	47	171	312	511

identification levels among the British irrespective of region of residence. And these levels are distinctly higher than those represented in the "pure-French" column, where identifications are the most limited in the table. The intervening hybrid groups are somewhat various in their responses, although with the exception of the English-speaking French, they tend to vary around the English norm more than around the French.

It might be argued that Table 4 does not advance the argument much beyond the vote refusal data already cited, since if the pure-French tend to refuse to confess what party they voted for, they can surely be expected to resist any other kind of question that links them to a party. There is a sense in which this is true, although this sense is much more limited than meets the eye. First, it should be made clear that the data in Table 4 do draw upon a different question than the vote solicitation, and one which attempts to tap more generalized identifications with a party. More important, however, is the fact that differences in refusal rates refer to a rather extreme fringe of each category, while the cutting points in Table 4 lie more toward modal members of the various categories. That this difference is more than hypothetical is readily shown from Table 4 itself. It may be recalled that the only category of non-French respondent showing vote refusal rates approaching those of the pure French were the new arrivals still speaking neither French nor English in the home. Yet in Table 4 this group as a whole confesses to higher levels of party identification than any of the other categories. Hence the fact that among the pure French the vast majority who are willing to report their vote still express the most tentative feelings of party attachment in the sample is not a redundant observation.

In addition to the statement of party identification, respondents were asked to establish a preference order across the four main parties, to include

next and least-preferred parties. The French respondents got off to a bad start, as we have seen, since eight to ten percent fewer of them provided even the first choice. However, among the more than 80 percent who did make a first choice and passed on to subsequent steps of the rank-order task, there were again disproportionate inabilities to provide these further affective discriminations, so that in summary form the outcome was as follows:

<u>ANCESTRY</u>	<u>LANGUAGE</u>	Proportion giving complete rank orders of the four parties:
French	French	43%
French	Non-French	42
Non-French	French	43
Other ^a	Other ^a	60
Other ^a	English	64
British	English	62

^a"Other" here means neither Anglo-Saxon nor French.

In a small measure, the lower French education levels contribute to these differences. However, the discrimination is nearly as sharp with education controlled, and the chief implication seems to be that the array of political parties in the system are simply less salient organizing dimensions with which to relate oneself to the political process in a French milieu than elsewhere.

Let us proceed to quite a different type of item, and one which does not evoke refusals on the part of respondents who resist revealing their personal political location. If weak levels of party identification have any behavioral significance, then we would certainly expect weaker identifiers to show more variation in party choice over time. Voters were asked whether they had voted for the same or different parties over past national elections and, as an

independent question, in the course of past provincial elections as well. The identity of parties voted for was not at issue; and there were no refusals to respond.

The overall division of responses to the two questions was visibly different. For national elections, a majority of 54 percent in the sample as a whole reported having voted for different parties; for provincial elections the division was just reversed, with a minority of 46 percent reporting having varied their vote. Hence it is desirable to treat the two batches of data independently, although the ethnic variations around the two grand proportions are very nearly identical. Where national elections are concerned, the group recording the highest proportion of "different-party" responses are English-speaking persons of French ancestry, with our pure French category a close second and both quite distinct from the other groups, which express greater party fidelity in voting (see Table 5). The situation is nearly duplicated for the provincial election reports, although here the pure French category reports least party constancy and English-speaking persons of French ancestry are in second place.

It should be mentioned that Table 5 tends in some measure to underestimate the magnitude of ethnic differences, since there is quite a marked East-West gradient in rates of reported fidelity, with the highest party constancy being reported in the old and rooted populations of the maritime provinces and diminishing for each westward step--Quebec excepted--to the highly mobile population of British Columbia. Since the French population lies near the eastern end of this continuum, it is somewhat misleading to compare it with the sample as a whole. While the following summary array, indicating the proportion who report voting for different parties in provincial elections in various regions, sacrifices some of the clarity of discrimination on the ethnic side, it helps to make the general regional point:

Table 5. Partisan Variability in Voting by Ethnic Categories

ANCESTRY:	FRENCH			OTHER				BRITISH ISLES				
LANGUAGE:	French		English	French	Other	English		French	English			
PROVINCE.	Que.	Rest	All	Que.	All	Que.	Rest	Que. Mar.	Que.	Mar.	West	Ont.
'Have you voted for same or different parties in:												
National elections: % "Different"	61	43	65	39	44	27	57	53	51	42	58	52
Provincial elections: % "Different"	55	41	53	32	33	28	44	53	30	34	52	43

	<u>Marit.</u>	<u>Quebec</u>	<u>Ontario</u>	<u>West</u>
French ancestry	39%	55%	45%	67%
Non-French ancestry	35	33	42	50

A final indicator is in one sense even more direct, and helps to suggest, moreover, what evaluative criteria tend to replace attitudes toward the political parties. Respondents were asked

"On the whole, which of the following is most important to you when you vote? The candidate running in your riding, the party itself, or the party's leader?"

About 2 percent of the respondents, including a goodly share of French, insisted on broadening the response by saying that the "program" alone was of primary importance. Some others mentioned "program" also as coupled with one of the alternatives offered. And some respondents were anxious to mention two of the three alternatives offered as being of equal importance.

In Table 6 we have set aside the stray "program" responses, and have given half-credit to any of the standard alternatives presented as pairs of equal importance. The variations in choice of "candidate" or "party leader" are considerable and have a specific interest of their own. Our main attention, however, is focused on the weight given to the political party as an entity, compared with the weight accorded either of the "personage" elements.

Once again, the table fits expectations rather closely. The least weight is given to the political party as criterion among the pure French. The rest of the table has a slightly different "shape" than its predecessors, in that the most potent effects diminishing party importance seem associated with location in the French-speaking portions of the Quebec community. And the importance accorded the party seems particularly marked among voters of neither French nor British extraction who have not fallen into any French cultural orbit.

Table 6. Most Important Element in Voting Choice, by Ethnic Category

ANCESTRY:	FRENCH			OTHER				BRITISH ISLES				
LANGUAGE:	French		English	French	Other	English		French	English			
PROVINCE:	<u>Que.</u>	<u>Rest</u>	<u>All</u>	<u>Que.</u>	<u>All</u>	<u>Que.</u>	<u>Rest</u>	<u>Que.</u> <u>Mar.</u>	<u>Que.</u>	<u>Mar.</u>	<u>West</u>	<u>Ont.</u>
Party	24%	36%	33%	28%	54%	56%	40%	25%	40%	42%	43%	36%
Leader	36	32	28	23	19	27	28	35	40	25	19	26
Candidate	<u>40</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>33</u>	<u>38</u>	<u>39</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

INTERPRETATIONS AND CONCLUSION

It may seem that the several sets of data we have displayed are somewhat redundant, as all of the tables make nearly the same point. Yet it is of value here as elsewhere to show that general findings are not the artifact of a particular way of wording an item, but rest stable under differing measurement approaches. And indeed, from table to table various of our ethnic hybrid groups have looked momentarily rather "French," only to become among the most discrepant from the French pole on other tables. What is constant here is the position of the "pure French," and across all tables the syndrome seems verified beyond dispute.

In sum, the image created by the data is one of a distinctively French-Canadian set of assumptions relegating political parties to a secondary role behind the specific personages who may employ them as vehicles. One is vividly reminded of the sequence of minor parties that have arisen in Quebec in the past century, and the frequency with which they have come to be referred to with some personal name as a prefix. It was not simply the Parti National, but Honoré Mercier's Parti National. It was less the Union Nationale, than the Duplessis Union Nationale. And more recently, when the relatively faceless Social Credit Party was transplanted (and transmuted) from the prairies to the milieu of Quebec, it became R  al Caouette's Creditistes.

Where a political party remains a social abstraction--a collective force pursuing group goals over a lengthy period of time, and topped by a structure of good gray bureaucratic roles--the individual occupants of the more prominent party roles are far from unimportant in the bystander's evaluation. But these personages are typically seen as "improving the image of the party" through their good works, or detracting from it with their errors. Thus the personalities themselves are treated as secondary, contributory at

best. The opposing political style, and the one that seems assumed more prevalently among the French, is that of the party as personal vehicle, where the life of the party is the half-life of the successful chef, and the party apparatus is essentially that coterie of politicians brought together by a common acceptance of his charismatic appeal (or control of patronage). And of course, where the party is no more than the lengthened shadow of such a chef, it is obviously a secondary concept for any rational observer: it makes far more sense to bypass it and proceed directly with an evaluation of the personal calibre of the figure or figures who lend the abstract "party" its only reality.

While hopefully this is a fair statement of the cultural differences in political style which emerge from the data, it leaves several of the most important questions unanswered. What, for example, is the causal status of the public attitudes recorded here? The materials suggest that the distinctive effects register most clearly in the province of Quebec, at least for those of French background, and while present in some degree among persons elsewhere who partake of French cultural elements, they are much weaker in form. Hence it could readily be argued that the attitudes examined are in no sense preconditions or stimulants to a particular style of democratic politics, but rather are like a faithful mirror, reflecting the flavor of politics that the habitants of Quebec have had set before them consistently for several generations.

It is at this point, however, that it is fair to introduce the further evidence of apparent cultural continuities. For whereas the attitudes of the current French-Canadian populace can certainly be understood in part as a simple reflection of democratic politics as they have known it, it seems to pass well beyond the accidental that the population of the French homeland

has something of the same style of politics frequently set before it. After all, how many major western democracies include even in official vote tabulations party denotations based on personal names, such as "gaulliste" or "poujadiste"? Clearly neither the specific respondents we have interviewed nor the mass public they represent have caused this style of politics in the sense of creating it out of fresh clay. But there is reason to suppose that cultural assumptions of the sort represented have at earlier times determined the channels which subsequent politics have followed. And the best evidence lies in the antiquity of those attitudes, and the fact that they appear to have been present in some communicable form long before the structural innovations of democratic politics which they were to shape had developed. Hence a potent causal role of attitudes of this type seems indicated.

Yet the assignment of such a role does hinge upon the assumption that there is some organic continuity between the parent French population of 1650 and its two current branches (or trunk and branch, to be more exact). Thus the most important question of all has to do with the nature of this continuity.

As indicated earlier, we are thoroughly aware that the several parallels we have drawn between the two French populations do not by themselves constitute any proof of organic continuity. Perhaps "organic continuity" is an inept phrase, for the bodies crossing the Atlantic from Old France to New were as organic as one could wish, and their biological link with the current generation of French Canadians is a fact of unequivocal genealogical history.

What is missing, however, and seriously so, is any clear sense on our part of the intervening mechanisms necessary to account for such a continuity, if so it be. As one contemplates a map of the Western world, any fool can plainly see that the American continents must have split off at some primordial

time from the European and African land masses. And yet this hypothesis was for many years banished from scientific respectability not for any lack of compelling quality about the prima facie evidence, but because all theories which attempted to fill in those intervening mechanisms that might account for the initial split and subsequent continental drift were so thoroughly ridiculous in the light of geologic knowledge. Only as the catalogue of coincidental "fits" between the two continental shelves has become very lengthy and remarkably detailed has it seemed worth renewing the search for plausible intervening mechanisms.

It is in somewhat the same vein that we are attempting to reconstruct intervening mechanisms, for it is only when plausible "carrier" mechanisms are located that we will become more convinced that these parallels are continuities in a true sense of the word.. And it seems that most of the obvious mechanisms that might account for the intergenerational transmission of these specific attitudes are every bit as ridiculous as erstwhile attempts at accounting for continental drift. Certainly we do not imagine that French-Canadian mothers of the eighteenth century, in the measure that they had time out from child-bearing to dandle maturing youngsters on their knees, told them: "If ever sample surveys are invented, guard your clattering tongue"; or "if anybody comes to take Rousseau seriously, my child, you must remember to vote the man, not the party."

The first step in developing plausible mechanisms is to arrive at a sense of the more generic attitudes toward the world from which the attitudes treated here are phenotypic though reliable offshoots. The second step is to suggest what institutional structures might have protected and facilitated transmission.

One cluster of possibilities that we have considered is represented by

the Catholic Church, for no social institution from the Old World was transplanted to New France as enthusiastically or as completely as the Church. In part because Protestants were prohibited from migrating to Canada at the very outset by royal edict, the colony came to approximate a stern theocracy, with great political influence exercised by members of the ecclesiastic hierarchy, an education system dominated by the church, and a population noted for its piety. It would not take unusual ingenuity, working from the noteworthy features of Catholicism, to imagine a set of presuppositions about authority relations and social power being preserved over the centuries in a cultural form that would have distinctive applicability in both old and new France upon the development of democratic politics. Such an hypothesis would have the virtue of fitting the themes of personalismo in Latin American politics as well. If there be such Catholic predispositions, however, they are invisible among Italians in Canada, who stand out as strong party identifiers and give inordinately heavy weight to the political party in voting decisions. They are also invisible among Italian and Irish Catholics in the United States as well, where these groups are again noteworthy for the rapid development of party loyalties.

At this reading, therefore, we have not arrived at even a vague sense of the intervening mechanisms that could account for true continuities of this order. We have become convinced, however, that unlike some historical riddles, there is indeed something here worth trying to explain.

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