CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN AMERICAN POLITICS:
PARTIES AND ISSUES IN THE 1968 ELECTION

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Without much question, the third-party movement of George C. Wallace consti-
tuted the most unusual feature of the 1968 presidential election. While this
movement failed by a substantial margin in its audacious attempt to throw the
presidential contest into the House of Representatives, in any other terms it was
a striking success. It represented the first noteworthy intrusion on a two-party
election in twenty years. The Wallace ticket drew a larger proportion of the
popular vote than any third presidential slate since 1924, and a greater propor-
tion of electoral votes than any such movement for more than a century, back to
the curiously divided election of 1860. Indeed, the spectre of an electoral col-
lege stalemate loomed sufficiently large that serious efforts at reform have since
taken root.

At the same time, the Wallace candidacy was but one more dramatic addition
to an unusually crowded rostrum of contenders, who throughout the spring season
of primary elections were entering and leaving the lists under circumstances that
ranged from the comic through the astonishing to the starkly tragic. Six months
before the nominating conventions, Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon had been the
expected 1968 protagonists, with some greater degree of uncertainty, as usual,
within the ranks of the party out of power. The nominating process for the Repub-
licans followed this most-probable script rather closely, with the only excitement
being provided by the spectacle of Governors Romney and Rockefeller proceeding as
through revolving doors in an ineffectual set of moves aimed at providing a Repub-
lican alternative to the Nixon candidacy. Where things were supposed to be most
routine on the Democratic side, however, surprises were legion, including the
early enthusiasm for Eugene McCarthy, President Johnson's shocking announcement
that he would not run, the assassination of Robert Kennedy in the flush of his
first electoral successes, and the dark turmoil in and around the Chicago nomi-
nating convention, with new figures like Senators George McGovern and Edward
Kennedy coming into focus as challengers to the heir apparent, Vice President
Hubert Humphrey.

No recent presidential election has had such a lengthy cast of central charac-
ters, nor one that was kept for so long in flux. And under such circumstances,
there is an inevitable proliferation of "what ifs?" What if Lyndon Johnson had
decided to run again? What if Robert Kennedy had not been shot? What if George
Wallace had been dissuaded from running, or had remained simply a regional states-
rights candidate? What if Eugene McCarthy had accepted party discipline and
closed ranks with Humphrey at the Chicago convention? What if Hubert Humphrey
had handled the interaction with Mayor Daley and the Chicago demonstrators dif-
ferently?

Strictly speaking, of course, there is no sure answer to questions of this type. If the attempt on Kennedy's life had failed, for example, an enormous complex of parameters and event sequences would have been different over the course of the campaign. One can never be entirely confident about what would have happened without the opportunity to live that particular sequence out in all its complexity. Nonetheless, given sufficient information as to the state of mind of the electorate during the period in question, plausible reconstructions can be developed which do not even assume that all other things remained constant, but only that they remained sufficiently constant that other processes might stay within predictable bounds. And answers of this sort, if not sacrosanct, carry substantial satisfaction.

One of our purposes in this paper will be to address some of these questions, as illuminated by preliminary analyses from the sixth national presidential election survey carried out by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan.[1] An effort to develop answers gives a vehicle for what is frankly descriptive coverage of the 1968 election as seen by the electorate. At the same time, we would hope not to miss along the way some of the more theoretical insights which the peculiar circumstances of the 1968 election help to reveal. In particular, we shall pay close attention to the Wallace campaign, and to the more generic lessons that may be drawn from this example of interplay between a pair of traditional parties, potent new issues, and a protest movement.

THE SETTING OF THE ELECTION

The simplest expectation for the 1968 election, and one held widely until March of that year, was that President Johnson would exercise his option to run for a second full term, and that with the advantages of incumbency and the support of the majority party in the land, he would stand a very good chance of winning, although with a margin visibly reduced from his landslide victory over Barry Goldwater in 1964.

We will probably never know what role public opinion may have actually played in his decision to retire. But there is ample evidence that the mood of the electorate had become increasingly surly toward his Administration in the months preceding his announcement. When queried in September and October of 1968, barely 40% of the electorate thought that he had handled his job well, the rest adjudging the performance to have been fair to poor. A majority of Democratic and independent voters, asked if they would have favored President Johnson as the Democratic nominee had he decided to run, said they would not have.

Affective ratings elicited just after the election for all the prominent politi-
cal figures of the 1968 campaign showed Johnson trailing Robert Kennedy in average
popularity by a wide margin, and lagging somewhat behind Humphrey and Muskie as
well among other Democrats (see Table 2). Given the normal headstart that a sit-
ting president usually enjoys in such assays of opinion, Johnson completed his
term amid a public bad humor matched only in recent elections by the cloud under
which Harry Truman retired from the presidency in 1952. It is correspondingly
dubious that Lyndon Johnson could have avoided the embarrassment of defeat had he
set his sails for another term.

Indeed, the pattern of concerns exercising the voters and turnover in the
players on the presidential stage combined to produce a shift in popular prefer-
ences between 1964 and 1968 which was truly massive. It is likely that the pro-
portion of voters casting presidential ballots for the same party in these two
successive elections was lower than at any time in recent American history. Among
whites who voted in both elections, a full third switched their party. Almost
one Goldwater voter out of every five turned either to Humphrey or to Wallace four
years later (dividing almost 3 to 1 for Wallace over Humphrey); at the same time,
three in every ten white Johnson voters switched to Nixon or Wallace, with Nixon
the favorite by a 4-to-1 ratio. A full 40 percent of Nixon's votes came from
citizens who had supported Lyndon Johnson in 1964! Much of this flood, of course,
came from Republicans who were returning home after their desertions from Goldwater.

Nevertheless, Democrats and Independents who had voted for Johnson and then
turned to Nixon four years later made up nearly half of all the remaining vote
switches, more than matching the combined flow of Johnson and Goldwater voters
who supported Wallace, and almost equalling the total Wallace vote. The Johnson-
Nixon switchers easily outweighed the flow away from Goldwater to Humphrey and
Wallace, and the Republican presidential vote rose from 39% to 43% in 1968 as a
consequence. At the same time, the loss of more than a quarter of the total Johnson
vote to Wallace and Nixon was scarcely offset by the trickle of votes from Goldwater
to Humphrey, and the Democratic proportion of the vote across the land dropped a
shattering 19 percentage points from more than 61 percent to less than 43 percent.

Such a massive drain from the Democratic ranks establishes a broader parallel
with 1952, for in both cases an electorate professing to be of Democratic alle-
giance by a considerable majority, had arrived at a sufficient accumulation of
grievances with a Democratic administration as to wish it out of office, thereby
producing what we have labelled elsewhere a "deviating election."[2] Indeed, the
frantic motion of the electorate in its presidential votes between 1964 and 1968
may be ironically juxtaposed against the serene stability of party identifications
in the country, for the overall proportions of self-proclaimed Democrats, Independ-
dents and Republicans have scarcely changed over the past twenty years, much less
in the past four. Of course this juxtaposition calls into question the predictive
value of party identification, relative to other kinds of determinants of the vote,
and we shall undertake a more intensive discussion of this matter presently. For

[2] A deviating election is one in which the party commanding the identifications of
a majority of the electorate is nonetheless voted out of power temporarily. See
A. Campbell, P. Converse, W. Miller, and D. Stokes, The American Voter. New
York: John Wiley, 1960, Chapter 19.

now, however, let us simply point out that while the inert distribution of party
loyalties cannot by definition explain the complex flows of the presidential vote
between 1964 and 1968, it was handsomely reflected in the 1968 congressional elec-
tions, as it has been in virtually all of the biennial congressional contests of
the current era. Despite widespread dissatisfaction with democratic performance,
the Republican proportion of seats in the House rose only a minute 2 percent,
from 43 in 1966 to 45 percent on the strength of the Nixon victory. Even at more
local levels, the continuing dominance of Democratic partisanship across the na-
tion is documented by the results of thousands of races for state legislative
seats. Prior to the election, Democrats controlled 57.7 percent of all legisla-
tive seats. After the election, which saw contests for some or all seats in 43
states, Democratic control had dropped from 4,269 seats (or 57.7%) to 4,250 seats
(57.5%).[3]

In view of such continued stability of partisanship, it is clear we must
turn elsewhere to account for the remarkable changes in voting at the presidential
level between 1964 and 1968. The classic assumption is, of course, that such
change must spring from some flux in "short-term forces"--the impact of the most
salient current issues, and the way in which these issues interlock with the lead-
ership options, or the cast of potential presidential figures in the specific year
of 1968. These terms obviously best define the setting of the 1968 election.

When asked on the eve of the presidential election to identify the most im-
portant problem facing the government in Washington, over 40% of the electorate
cited the war in Vietnam. The salience of this issue provided another striking
parallel with 1952. In both presidential elections, widespread public discourage-
ment with the progress of a "bleeding war" in the Far East seen as initiated by
a Democratic administration was a major source of indignation.

But the Vietnam issue did not, of course, stand alone. Offering vivid tes-
timony to another bitter current of controversy was a simple, though little noted,
pattern in the popular presidential vote itself: while some 97% of black voters
in the nation cast their ballots for Hubert Humphrey, less than 35% of white voters
did so. Thus the presidential vote must have been as sharply polarized along
racial lines as at any time during American history.[4] One major irony surrounding
this cleavage was the fact that it was the comfortable white majority that was
agitating to overturn control of the White House, while the aggrieved black minor-
ity was casting its vote as one in an effort to preserve the partisan status quo.

Indeed, this irony is compounded when the role of the Vietnam issue is jointly
taken into account. We have indicated above that the public was deeply impatient
with the Johnson administration, in part because of the handling of the war. Blacks
stood out as the major demographic grouping most exercised about the entanglement
in Vietnam. They were more likely than whites to opine that the government should

[3] Congressional Quarterly, November 22, 1968, p. 3177.

[4] The percentage difference of 62% in candidate preference between blacks and
whites is substantially larger than class differentiation or other social cleav-
ages in partisanship within the United States in recent history or for democracies
of Western Europe.

never have undertaken the military commitment there. They also were more likely to feel that American troops should be brought home immediately, a position not generally associated with the Johnson administration. Nonetheless, as Table 2 (below) will document, Negro enthusiasm not only for Hubert Humphrey but for Lyndon Johnson as well remained high to the very end. It seems quite evident that when black citizens were making decisions about their vote, Vietnam attitudes paled into relative insignificance by contrast with attitudes toward progress on civil rights within the country; and that where such progress was concerned, the Johnson-Humphrey administration was seen as much more friendly than the other 1968 alternatives.

Because of the near-unanimity of the black vote, many of our analyses below have been focussed on differences within the white vote taken alone.[5] At the same time, this treatment must not be allowed to obscure in any way the deep imprint of racial cleavage on the election outcome. The additional "between-race" variance in the vote, concealed when data are presented only for whites, remains extreme, and a faithful reflection of the crescendo to which civil rights tumult had risen over the four preceding years. It should be kept in mind.

To say that Vietnam and civil rights were dominant issues for the public in 1968 is not equivalent, however, to saying that voter positions on these issues can account for the large-scale voting change we have observed for whites between 1964 and 1968. As the comparisons provided by Table 1 suggest, changes in public

Table 1 goes here

thinking about strategic alternatives in Vietnam or civil rights outcomes over this period were rather limited. Where Vietnam was concerned, opinion was somewhat more crystallized in 1968 than in 1964 but there had been no sweeping shift of sentiment from hawk to dove in mass feeling. On civil rights, the drift of white opinion had been if anything toward a more liberal stance, and hence can hardly explain a vote which seemed to vibrate with "backlash." Thus public positioning on these two central issues taken alone seems no more capable of illuminating vote change from 1964 to 1968 than the inert partisan identifications.

What had changed, of course, was the public view of the success of Administration performance in these areas. As we have discussed elsewhere, throughout the 1950's citizens who felt the Republicans were better at keeping the country out of war outnumbered those who had more confidence in Democrats by a consistently wide margin, much as the Democratic Party tended to be seen as better at keeping the country out of economic depression. In 1964, however, the pleas of Barry Goldwater for an escalation of the Vietnam War in order to produce a

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[5]Such segregation is indicated simply because of the fact that within the black vote in 1968 there is next to no meaningful "variance" to be "accounted for." When categories of "Nixon voters" and "Wallace voters" are presented, they are necessarily "lily-white" in composition. Therefore when "Humphrey voters" are contrasted with them, it is confusing if differences may be totally a function of the large admixtures of blacks in the Humphrey support, as opposed to differences which would stand up even with comparisons limited to whites.

Table 1

Comparison of Attitudes on Current Vietnam Policy and
Racial Desegregation, 1964 and 1968,
for Whites Only

"Which of the following do you think we should do <u>now</u> in Vietnam?

      1. Pull out of Vietnam entirely.
      2. Keep our soldiers in Vietnam but try to end the fighting.
      3. Take a stronger stand even if it means invading North Vietnam.

	Pull Out	Status Quo	Stronger Stand	Don't Know, Other	Total
Northern Democrats					
1964	8%	25	29	38	100%
1968	20%	39	35	6	100%
Northern Republicans					
1964	8%	19	38	35	100%
1968	20%	39	36	5	100%
Southern Democrats					
1964	8%	25	28	39	100%
1968	17%	36	38	9	100%
Southern Republicans					
1964	10%	18	42	30	100%
1968	15%	29	48	8	100%

Table 1

(continued)

"What about you? Are you in favor of desegregation, strict segregation, or something in between?" (This was the fourth question in a series asking about others' attitudes toward racial desegregation.)

Northern Democrats

	Desegregation	Mixed Feelings	Strict Segregation	Other	Total
1964	31%	50	17	2	100%
1968	38%	45	14	3	100%

Northern Republicans

	Desegregation	Mixed Feelings	Strict Segregation	Other	Total
1964	32%	51	13	4	100%
1968	35%	50	10	5	100%

Southern Democrats

	Desegregation	Mixed Feelings	Strict Segregation	Other	Total
1964	12%	35	52	1	100%
1968	18%	45	30	7	100%

Southern Republicans

	Desegregation	Mixed Feelings	Strict Segregation	Other	Total
1964	15%	44	40	1	100%
1968	15%	60	20	5	100%

military victory served to frighten the public, and rapidly reversed the standing
perception: by the time of the November election more people felt the Democrats
were better able to avert a large war.[6] But this novel perception was transient.
President Johnson himself saw fit to authorize an escalation of bombing in Viet-
nam almost immediately after the 1964 election. By the time of the 1966 congres-
sional election, the balance in popular assessments had already shifted back to
the point where a slight majority chose the Republicans as more adept in avoiding
war. By 1968, exasperation at the handling of the war had increased sufficiently
that among people who felt there was a difference in the capacity of the two par-
ties to avoid a larger war, the Republicans were favored once again by a margin
of two to one.

To the bungled war in Vietnam, the white majority could readily add a sense
of frustration at a racial confrontation that had taken on increasingly ugly di-
mensions between 1964 and 1968. Although national opinion had evolved in a direc-
tion somewhat more favorable to desegregation, largely through the swelling pro-
portions of college-educated young, some persistently grim facts had been under-
scored by the Kerner Commission report in the spring of the year: forbidding
proportions of the white citizenry outside of the South as well as within it had
little enthusiasm for the redressment of Negro grievances to begin with. And
even among whites with some genuine sympathy for the plight of blacks, the spec-
tacle of city centers aflame had scarcely contributed to a sense of confidence in
the Administration handling of the problem.

From Vietnam and the racial crisis a corollary discontent crystallized that
might be treated as a third towering issue of the 1968 campaign, or as nothing
more than a restatement of the other two issues. This was the cry for "law and
order" and against "crime in the streets." While Goldwater had talked in these
terms somewhat in 1964, events had conspired to raise their salience very con-
siderably for the public by 1968. For some, these slogans may have had no con-
notations involving either the black race or Vietnam, signifying instead a con-
cern over rising crime rates and the alleged "coddling" of criminal offenders by
the courts. More commonly by 1968, however, the connection was very close:
there were rallying cries for more severe police suppression of black rioting
in the urban ghettos, and of public political dissent of the type represented
by the Vietnam peace demonstrations at Chicago during the Democratic convention.

In view of these latter connotations, it is not surprising that people re-
sponsive to the "law and order" theme tended, like George Wallace, to be upset
at the same time by civil rights gains and the lack of a more aggressive policy
in Vietnam. Therefore it might seem redundant to treat "law and order" as a
third major issue in its own right. Nevertheless, we have found it important to
do so, even where the "order" being imposed is on black militants or peace demon-
strators, for the simple reason that many members of the electorate reacted as
though the control of dissent was quite an independent issue. This becomes very
clear where support for blacks and opposition to the war are accompanied with a

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[6]See "Voting and Foreign Policy," by Warren E. Miller, Chapter 7 in James N.
Rosenau (ed.), Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, New York: The Free Press,
1967.

strong revulsion against street protest and other forms of active dissent. And
this combination occurs more frequently than an academic audience may believe.

One would expect, for example, to find support for peace demonstrations
among the set of people in the sample who said (a) that we made a mistake in
getting involved in the Vietnam War; and (b) that the preferable course of ac-
tion at the moment would be to "pull out" of that country entirely. Such ex-
pectations are clearly fulfilled among the numerous blacks matching these
specifications. Among whites, however, the picture is different. First, a
smaller proportion of whites--about one in six or seven--expressed this combina-
tion of feelings about Vietnam. Among those who expressed such feelings it re-
mains true that there is relatively less disfavor vented about some of the active
forms of peace dissent that had become customary by 1968. What is striking, how-
ever, is the absolute division of evaluative attitudes toward peace dissenters
among those who were themselves relative "doves," and this is probably the more
politically significant fact as well. Asked to rate "Vietnam war protestors" on
the same kind of scale as used in Table 2, for example, a clear majority of these
whites who themselves were opposed to the Administration's Vietnam policy located
their reactions on the negative side of the scale, and nearly one-quarter (23%)
placed them at the point of most extreme hostility.

Even more telling, perhaps, are the attitudes of these same whites toward
the peace demonstrations surrounding the Democratic convention at Chicago, for
in this case the protestors were given undeniably sympathetic coverage by the
television networks. Keeping in mind that we are dealing here with only those
whites who took clear "dove" positions on Vietnam policy, it is noteworthy in-
deed that almost 70% of those giving an opinion rejected the suggestion that "too
much force" was used by Chicago police against the peace demonstrators, and the
modal opinion (almost 40%) was that "not enough force" had been used to suppress
the demonstration.[7]

It should be abundantly clear from this description that the white minority
who by the autumn of 1968 felt our intervention in Vietnam was a mistake and was
opting for a withdrawal of troops turns out to fit the campus image of peace sen-
timent rather poorly. Such a disjuncture between stereotypes developed from the
mass media and cross-section survey data are not at all uncommon. However, as
certain other aspects of the election may be quite unintelligible unless this
fact has been absorbed by the reader, it is worth underscoring here. This is not
to say that the more familiar Vietnam dissent cannot be detected in a national
sample. Among whites resenting Vietnam and wishing to get out, for example, a
unique and telltale bulge of 12% gave ratings of the most extreme sympathy to
the stimulus "Vietnam war protestors." Now this fragment of the electorate shows
all of the characteristics expected of McCarthy workers or the New Left: its
members are very young, are disproportionately college-educated, Jewish, and
metropolitan in background, and register extreme sympathy with civil rights and
the Chicago convention demonstrations. The problem is that this group represents

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[7]A separate analysis, carried out by a colleague in the Survey Research Center
Political Behavior Program and using the same body of data from the SRC 1968
election study, suggests, moreover, that many voters who thought the police used
too little force deserted Humphrey in the course of the campaign while the minor-
ity who objected that too much force was used voted more heavily for the Demo-
cratic nominee. See John P. Robinson, "Voter Reaction to Chicago 1968," Survey
Research Center (1969), mimeo.

such a small component (one-eighth) of the 1968 dove sentiment on Vietnam being singled out here that its attitudes on other issues are very nearly obscured by rather different viewpoints held by the other 88% of the dove contingent.   On the larger national scene, in turn, those who opposed Vietnam policy and were sympathetic to Vietnam war protestors make up less than 3% of the electorate-- even if we add comparable blacks to the group--and law and order were not un-popular with the 97 percent.

In the broad American public, then, there was a widespread sense of breakdown in authority and discipline that fed as readily on militant political dissent as on race riots and more conventional crime.   This disenchantment registered even among citizens who apparently were sympathetic to the goals of the dissent on pure policy grounds, and everywhere added to a sense of cumulative grievance with the party in possession of the White House.   Thus the "law and order" phrase, ambigu- ous though it might be, had considerable resonance among the voters, and deserves to be catalogued along with Vietnam and the racial crisis among major issue in-fluences on the election.

While the 1968 situation bore a number of resemblances to the basic ingredi- ents and outcome of the 1952 election, the analogy is far from perfect.   In 1952, the public turned out to vote in proportions that were quite unusual for the im-mediate period, a phenomenon generally taken to reflect the intensity of frustra-tions over the trends of government.   It is easy to argue that aggravations were fully as intense in 1968 as they had been in 1952, and more intense than for any of the elections inbetween.   Yet the proportion turning out to vote in 1968 fell off somewhat from its 1964 level.[8]

Of course any equation between indignation and turning out to vote does pre-suppose the offering of satisfactory alternatives, and there was somewhat greater talk than usual in 1968 that the personnel options in November were inadequate. Certainly the array of potential candidates was lengthy, whatever the actual nomi-nees, and our account of the short-term forces affecting the electorate would be quite incomplete without consideration of the emotions with which the public re-garded the dramatis personae in 1968.   Just after the election, respondents in

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[8] The decline was only on the order of 1 1/2 percent nationally, but the overall figures are somewhat misleading.   Enormous efforts devoted to voter registration projects among Southern blacks between 1964 and 1968 appear to have paid off by increasing voter participation in that sector from 44% to 51%.   Perhaps in coun-terpoint, Southern whites increased their turnout by 2%, thereby inching ever closer to the national norm.   Thus the decline in turnout was concentrated out-side the South, and there approached the more substantial drop of 4%.   Even this figure is misleading, since whites outside the South showed a 3% loss in percent-age points of turnout, while nonwhites declined by almost 11 percentage points! See Current Population Reports, "Voter Participation in November 1968," Series P-20, No. 177, December 27, 1968.   Although such turnout figures, apart from the more general mobilizing of Southern blacks, are consistent with a proposition that whites were more eager to "throw the rascals out" than blacks, and that among whites, Southerners had the fiercest grievances of all, there is no hiding the fact of anemic turnout in most of the country in 1968.   Interestingly enough, the decline from 1964 was uniformly distributed across the entire spectrum of party allegiances from loyal Democrats to strong Republicans.

our national sample were asked to locate each of twelve political figures on a "feeling thermometer" running from zero (cold) to 100° (warm), with a response of 50° representing the indifference point. Table 1 summarizes the mean values for the total sample, as well as those within relevant regional and racial partitions.

Table 2 goes here

Numerous well-chronicled features of the 1968 campaign are raised into quantitative relief by this tabulation, including Wallace's sharply regional and racial appeal, Muskie's instant popularity and near upstaging of Humphrey, and the limited interest that McCarthy seemed to hold for Negroes compared to other Democratic candidates. At the same time, other less evident comparisons can be culled from these materials, although the reader is cautioned to keep in mind that these scores refer to the period just after the election, and not necesarily to the period of the spring primaries or the summer conventions.[9] This may be of particular importance in the case of the ratings of Eugene McCarthy. When respondents were asked before the election which candidate from the spring they had hoped would win nomination, over 20 percent of Democrats and Independents recalling some preference mentioned McCarthy. However, many of these citizens gave quite negative ratings to McCarthy by November, so it appears that some disenchantment set in between the primaries and the election.

The question of timing poses itself acutely as well where Robert Kennedy is concerned. Taken at face value, the data of Table 2 imply that aside from the tragedy at Los Angeles, Kennedy should have been given the Democratic nomination and would have won the presidential election rather handily. Yet how much of this massive popularity is due to some posthumous halo of martyrdom? It seems almost certain that at least some small increment is of this sort, and that the harsh realities of a tough campaign would have eroded the bright edges of Kennedy appeal.

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[9]The reader should also keep in mind several other things about Table 2. The "South" here refers, as it will throughout this paper, to the Census Bureau definition of the region that includes 15 states and the District of Columbia. Hence such border states as Maryland or West Virginia are included along with the deeper southern states of the old confederacy. Presumably, for example, George Wallace's rating among whites of a more hard-core South would be correspondingly higher. Secondly, it should be remembered for some of the lesser candidates that respondents knowing so little about a candidate as to be indifferent to him would end up rating him "50°." Thus it would be questionable to conclude from Table 2 that LeMay was more popular than George Wallace, except in a very limited sense. Actually, three times as many respondents (nearly one-third) left LeMay at the indifference point as did so for Wallace. Thus lack of visibility helped to make him less unpopular. But among those who reacted to both men, LeMay was less popular than Wallace. Similarly, Wallace's low rating must be understood as a compound of an admiring minority and a hostile majority: the variance of Wallace ratings is much greater than those for other candidates, even in the South.

Table 2

AVERAGE RATINGS OF MAJOR 1968 POLITICAL FIGURES BY A
NATIONAL SAMPLE, NOVEMBER-DECEMBER, 1968

	TOTAL SAMPLE	NON-SOUTH		SOUTH	
		White (N's of 785-843)	Black (N's of 554-64)	White (N's of 315-340)	Black (N's of 55-66)
Robert Kennedy	69.4	69.8	92.1	60.2	89.1
Richard Nixon	66.0	67.3	53.0	67.4	56.5
Hubert Humphrey	61.3	61.0	84.9	53.1	84.4
Lyndon Johnson	58.1	56.4	81.0	53.5	81.7
Eugene McCarthy	54.7	56.4	58.9	49.7	53.9
Nelson Rockefeller	53.7	54.3	61.3	50.7	53.2
Ronald Reagan	49.0	49.6	42.9	50.0	41.8
George Romney	49.0	50.3	48.3	45.6	50.1
George Wallace	31.2	27.6	9.4	47.8	13.2
Edmund Muskie	61.1	62.4	70.7	54.6	68.5
Spiro Agnew	50.3	50.8	37.7	52.8	42.3
Curtis LeMay	35.1	33.6	21.1	43.7	22.8

Nevertheless, both in contested primaries and poll data of the spring period,[10]
as well as in the retrospective glances of our autumn respondents, one cannot
fail to be impressed by the reverberations of Kennedy charisma even in the least
likely quarters, such as among Southern whites or among Republicans elsewhere.
And rank-and-file Democrats outside the South reported themselves to have favored
Kennedy for the nomination over Humphrey by two-to-one margins, and over McCarthy
by nearly three-to-one. Clearly a Kennedy candidacy could not have drawn a much
greater proportion of the black vote than Humphrey received, although it might
have encouraged higher turnout there. But there is evidence of enough edge else-
where to suggest that Robert Kennedy might have won an election over Richard
Nixon, and perhaps even with greater ease than he would have won his own party's
nomination.

As it was, Humphrey received the mantle of party power from Lyndon Johnson
and, with Robert Kennedy missing, captured the Democratic nomination without seri-
ous challenge. At that point he faced much the same dilemma as Adlai Stevenson
had suffered in 1952: without gracelessly biting the hand that fed him, how could
he dissociate himself from the unpopular record of the preceding administration?
In 1952, Stevenson did not escape public disgust with the Truman administration,
and was punished for its shortcomings. The 1968 data make clear in a similar
manner that Humphrey was closely linked to Lyndon Johnson in the public eye through
the period of the election. For example, the matrix of intercorrelations of the
candidate ratings presented in Table 2 shows, as one would expect, rather high as-
sociations in attitudes toward presidential and vice presidential candidates on
the same ticket. Thus the Humphrey-Muskie intercorrelation is .58, the Nixon-
Agnew figure is .59, and the Wallace-LeMay figure is .69. But the highest inter-
correlation in the whole matrix, a coefficient of .70, links public attitudes
toward Lyndon Johnson and those toward Hubert Humphrey. Humphrey was highly as-
similated to the Johnson image, and his support came largely from sectors of the
population for which the administration had not "worn thin."

When we consider the relative strength of Kennedy enthusiasts as opposed to
loyal Humphrey-Johnson supporters among identifiers with the Democratic Party within
the mass public, the line of differentiation that most quickly strikes the eye is
the noteworthy generation gap. As we have seen above, Kennedy supporters enjoy a
marked overall plurality. However, this margin comes entirely from the young.
For Democrats under thirty, only about one in five giving a pre-convention nomina-
tion preference picks Humphrey or Johnson, and Kennedy partisans outnumber them
by nearly three to one. Among Democrats over fifty, however, Humphrey-Johnson
supporters can claim a clear plurality.[11] The "wings" of the Democratic Party

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[10]Just after the decision of Robert Kennedy to run and before Lyndon Johnson's
withdrawal, the Gallup poll showed Democrats favoring Kennedy as the party's
nominee by a 44-41 margin.

[11]Interestingly enough, the same generational cleavages among Southern white Demo-
crats occur at an earlier age than those elsewhere. In that region, Humphrey-
Johnson preferences hold a plurality in all age cohorts over 30, despite the fact
that Kennedy support has an edge of better than three to one among those under 30
(N of 34), perhaps because the latter group has less of a memory of the fury in
the deep South at the Kennedy family prior to the assassination of the president
in Dallas in 1963.

that emerged in the struggle for the nomination had an "old guard" and "young
Turk" flavor, even as reflected in a cross-section sample of party sympathizers.[12]

. . This completes our summary of the setting in which the 1968 election took place.
We have seen that despite great continuity in party loyalties and a surprising
constancy in policy positions of the public, there was an unusual degree of change
in partisan preference at the presidential level by comparison with 1964. This
change occurred in part as a response to increased salience of some issues, such
as the question of "law and order," and in part because of the way in which con-
tending leadership cadres had come to be identified with certain policies or past
performance. The Democratic Party lost, as quickly as it had won, its perceived
capacity to cope with international affairs and the exacerbating war in Vietnam.
Hubert Humphrey, long a major figure in his own right, could not move swiftly
enough to escape his links with a discredited regime.

Let us now pursue some of the more obvious analytic questions posed by the
general discontent among voters in 1968, and by the Wallace movement in particu-
lar. We shall first consider influences on the actual partitioning of the vote
on Election Day, and then examine some of the attitudinal and social bases under-
lying the outcome.

HYPOTHETICAL VARIATIONS ON THE VOTE OUTCOME

Impact of the Wallace Ticket. There were signs of some concern in both the
Nixon and Humphrey camps that the success of George Wallace in getting his name
on the ballot might divert votes and lower their respective chances of success.
Nixon was more alarmed by the prospective loss of the electoral votes in the Deep
South that Goldwater had won in 1964, while Humphrey was alarmed in turn by in-
telligence that Wallace was making inroads outside the South among unionized labor
that had been customarily Democratic since the New Deal. At the very least, the
Wallace ticket was responsible for the injection of unusual uncertainty in a game
already replete with unknowns. Now that the dust has settled, we can ask more
systematically how the election might have been affected if Wallace had been dis-
suaded from running.

Numerous polls made clear at the time of the election that Wallace voters
tended to be quite disproportionately nominal Democrats, and data from our sample
are congruent with this conclusion, although the differences were more notable
in the South than elsewhere. For the South, 68% of Wallace voters considered
themselves Democrats, and 20% Republicans. Outside the South, proportions were
46% Democratic and 34% Republican. Yet these proportions taken alone do not ad-
dress in any satisfying fashion what might have happened if Wallace had not run.
In the first place, these partisan proportions among Wallace voters do not differ
very markedly from those which characterize the regional electorates taken as a
whole. Indeed, as we shall see, the overall association between partisanship and

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[12]Although there is some slight tendency for pre-convention supporters of McCarthy
to be relatively young, the distribution by age is more homogeneous than expected,
and much more so than is the case for Kennedy. It is possible that young people
supporting McCarthy as the only alternative to the Administration switched more
heavily than the middle-aged to Kennedy when he announced his candidacy.

attitudes toward Wallace (the rating scale) shows Republicans slightly more favorable across the nation as a whole, although this fact is faintly reversed with blacks set aside, and the main lesson seems to be that the "true" correlation is of utterly trivial magnitude (.05 or less). More important still, however, is the obvious fact that Democrats voting for Wallace were repudiating the standard national ticket, as many as a third of them for the second time in a row. If Wallace had not run, we can have little confidence that they would have faithfully supported Humphrey and Muskie.

It is clear that the crucial datum involves the relative preferences of the Wallace voters for either Nixon or Humphrey, assuming that these preferences would have been the same without Wallace and that these citizens would have gone to the polls in any event. This information is available in the leader ratings used for Table 2. In Table 3 we have arrayed the total sample according to whether Humphrey or Nixon was given the higher rating, or the two were tied, as well as by the respondent's party identification. Within each cell so defined, we indicate the proportion of the vote won by Wallace, and the number of voters on which the proportion is based. The latter figures show familiar patterns. Of voters with both a party and a candidate preference, more than four-fifths prefer the nominee of their party. And while Democrats are in a majority, it is clear that the tides are running against them since they are suffering the bulk of defections.

Table 3 goes here

It is interesting how the Wallace vote is drawn from across this surface. While the numbers of cases are too small to yield very reliable estimates in some of the internal cells, it is obvious that Wallace made least inroads among partisans satisfied with their party's nominee, and showed major strength where such partisans were sufficiently disgusted with their own party nominee actually to prefer that of the opposing party. Conceptually, it is significant that these protestors included Republicans unenthusiastic about Nixon as well as the more expected Democrats cool to Humphrey. Practically, however, Nixon Democrats so far outnumbered Humphrey Republicans that while Wallace drew at nearly equal rates from both groups, the majority of his votes were from Democrats who otherwise preferred Nixon rather than from Republicans who might have given their favors to Humphrey.

This in turn provides much of the answer to one of our primary questions. While the data underlying Table 3 can be manipulated in a variety of ways, all reasonable reconstructions of the popular vote as it might have stood without the Wallace candidacy leave Nixon either enjoying about the same proportion of the two-party vote that he actually won or a slightly greater share, depending on the region and the detailed assumptions made. In short, unless one makes some entirely extravagant assumptions about the mediating electoral college, it is very difficult to maintain any suspicion that the Wallace intrusion by itself changed the major outcome of the election.

Impact of the McCarthy Movement. If he was ever tempted at all, Eugene McCarthy decided against forming a fourth-party campaign for the presidency. At the same time, he withheld anything resembling enthusiastic personal support for Hubert Humphrey. In view of his devoted following, some observers felt that McCarthy's refusal to close party ranks after Chicago cost the Democratic nominee precious votes, and conceivably even the presidency.

In order to understand the basis of McCarthy support at the time of the election, it is useful to trace what is known of the evolution of McCarthy strength

Table 3

DISTRIBUTION OF THE WALLACE VOTE, BY TRADITIONAL
PARTIES AND CANDIDATES

		PARTY IDENTIFICATION		
		Democratic	Independent	Republican
Rating of Two Major Candidates	HUMPHREY over NIXON	4% (347)	26% (23)	21% (24)
	Tied	24% (79)	9% (11)	6% (17)
	NIXON over HUMPHREY	26% (132)	15% (53)	7% (314)

The percentage figure indicates the proportion of all voters in the
cell who reported casting a ballot for Wallace. The number of voters
is indicated between parentheses.

from the time of the first primary in the spring. It will be recalled that McCarthy
was the sole Democrat to challenge the Johnson administration in the New Hampshire
primary. With the aid of many student volunteer campaign workers, he polled a
surprising 42% of the vote among Democrats, as opposed to 48% drawn by an organized
write-in campaign for President Johnson. Although he failed to upset the president
in the vote, most observers saw his performance as remarkably strong, and a clear
harbinger of discontent which could unseat Lyndon Johnson in the fall election.
This reading was plainly shared by Robert Kennedy, who announced his own candidacy
for the nomination four days later, and probably by Johnson himself, who withdrew
from any contention less than three weeks later.

Sample survey data from New Hampshire at the time of the primary show some
expected patterns underlying that first McCarthy vote, but also some rather unex-
pected ones as well. First, the vote among Democrats split toward Johnson or
McCarthy in obvious ways according to expressions of satisfaction or dissatisfac-
tion with Administration performance in general and its Vietnam policy in particu-
lar. The McCarthy vote in New Hampshire certainly reflected a groundswell of anger
at the Johnson administration, and an expression of desire for a change which was
simply reiterated in November. Surprisingly, however, in view of McCarthy's clear
and dissenting "dove" position on Vietnam, the vote he drew in New Hampshire could
scarcely be labelled a "peace vote," despite the fact that such a conclusion was
frequently drawn. There was, of course, some hard-core peace sentiment among New
Hampshire Democrats that was drawn quite naturally to McCarthy. Among his supporters
in the primary, however, those who were unhappy with the Johnson administration for
not pursuing a harder line against Hanoi outnumbered those advocating a withdrawal
from Vietnam by nearly a three to two margin! Thus the McCarthy tide in New Hamp-
shire was, to say the least, quite heterogeneous in its policy preferences: the
only common denominator seems to have been a deep dissatisfaction with the Johnson
administration.[13] McCarthy simply represented the only formal alternative avail-
able to registered Democrats. This desire for an alternative was underlined by
the fact that most of the 10 percent of the Democratic vote that did not go to
Johnson or McCarthy went to Nixon as a write-in candidate on the Democratic ballot.

The entry of Robert Kennedy into the race did provide another alternative
and, as we have seen, a very popular one as well. He made major inroads into the
potential McCarthy strength, and by the time our autumn sample was asked what can-
didate of the spring would have been preferred for the Democratic nomination, 46%
of those Democrats with some preference cited Kennedy first while only 18% men-
tioned McCarthy. Nevertheless, even this 18% cannot be thought of as constituting
hard-core McCarthy support at the time of the actual election, since almost two-
thirds of this group had turned their attention elsewhere, giving at least one of
the other presidential hopefuls a higher rating than they gave McCarthy in the
responses underlying Table 2. The remainder who reported McCarthy as their pre-
convention favorite and awarded him their highest ratings just after the election,
make up some 6% of Democrats having some clear candidate preference, or 3% of all
Democrats. Along with a handful of Independents and Republicans showing the same
reiterated McCarthy preference, these people can be considered the McCarthy "hard-
core."

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[13]See also the account for New Hampshire by Louis Harris, "How Voters See the
Issues," Newsweek, March 25, 1968, p. 26.

While it is this hard-core whose voting decisions interest us most, it is instructive to note where the other two-thirds of the pre-convention McCarthy support among Democrats went, over the course of the campaign. If these migrations are judged according to which presidential aspirant among the nine hopefuls of Table 2 was given the highest rating in November, one discovers that a slight plurality of these erstwhile McCarthy backers found George Wallace their preferred candidate in the fall. Slightly smaller groups favored Kennedy and Nixon, and a scatter picked other Republicans like Reagan and Rockefeller, despite their own Democratic partisanship. Very few of these McCarthy Democrats--about one in seven--migrated to a preference for Hubert Humphrey. Where the actual presidential vote was concerned, the choice was of course more constrained.

Since the McCarthy movement was commonly thought of as somewhat to the left of Humphrey and the administration, while Wallace was located rather markedly to the right, a major McCarthy-to-Wallace transfer of preferences may seem ideologically perplexing. Were McCarthy supporters so furious with the Humphrey nomination that pure spite overcame issue feelings and led to a protest vote for Wallace? Although there were rumors of such a reaction at the time, our data suggest a somewhat simpler interpretation. We have already noted the attitudinal heterogeneity of McCarthy voters in New Hampshire. Those in our autumn sample who recall a pre-convention preference for McCarthy are similarly heterogeneous. Indeed, on some issues of social welfare and civil rights, pre-convention McCarthy supporters are actually more conservative than backers of either Humphrey or Kennedy.

This heterogeneity declined markedly, however, as the size of the McCarthy group eroded over the summer to what we have defined as the hard-core. If we compare the attitudes of that hard-core on major issues with those of the professed early backers of McCarthy who subsequently supported Wallace, the differences are usually extreme. The McCarthy-Wallace group was against desegregation, in favor of an increased military effort in Vietnam, and was highly indignant with the situation in the nation where "law and order" was concerned (see Table 4). People supporting McCarthy to the bitter end took opposite positions

Table 4 goes here

on all of these major issues. Similarly, the winnowing down of the McCarthy support operated very sharply along demographic lines. Among non-Southern white Democrats who reported a pre-convention McCarthy preference, for example, the hard-core that remained enthusiastic about McCarthy through to the actual election were 60% of college background, whereas, of those whose ardor cooled, only 18% had had any connection with college.

In short, then, it is evident again that among Democrats particularly, McCarthy was an initial rallying point for voters of all policy persuasions who were thoroughly displeased with the Johnson administration. When the Wallace candidacy crystallized and his issue advocacies became more broadly known, that portion of the discontented to whom he spoke most directly flocked to him. Hence it seems very doubtful that Humphrey would have won many votes from this group even if McCarthy had lent the Vice President his personal support in a wholehearted fashion. The main motivation of this group was to register its disgust with incumbent leaders concerning civil rights advances, timidity in Vietnam and

Table 4

ISSUE DIFFERENCES AMONG WHITES PREFERRING McCARTHY AS THE
DEMOCRATIC NOMINEE, ACCORDING TO NOVEMBER
PREFERENCES FOR McCARTHY OR WALLACE

		McCARTHY "HARD CORE"[a]	VOTED WALLACE[b]
"Are you in favor of desegregation, strict segregation, or something in between?"	DESEGREGATION	79%	7%
	IN BETWEEN	21	50
	SEGREGATION	0	43
		100%	100%
		(24)	(14)
"Do you think the (Chicago) police (at the Democratic Convention) used too much force, the right amount of force, or not enough force with the demonstrators?"	TOO MUCH FORCE	91%	0%
	RIGHT AMOUNT	9	50
	NOT ENOUGH	0	50
		100%	100%
		(23)	(12)
"Which of the following do you think we shoud do now in Vietnam: pull out of Vietnam entirely, keep our soldiers in Vietnam but try to end the fighting, or take a stronger stand even if it means invading North Vietnam?"	PULL OUT	50%	7%
	STATUS QUO	50	7
	STRONGER STAND	0	86
		100%	100%
		(24)	(13)

[a]This column is limited to whites whose pre-convention favorite was Eugene McCarthy and who continued to give him their top rating after the November election.

[b]It is to be emphasized that this column includes only those Wallace voters who said that in the spring of 1968 they had hoped Eugene McCarthy would win the Democratic nomination. This fact explains the small case numbers. However, in view of the relative homogeneity of respondents in the table--all are whites who reported a pre-convention McCarthy preference and most happen in addition to be nominal identifiers of the Democratic Party--the disparities in issue position are the more impressive.

outbreaks of social disorder. It may well be that by September, with the far more
congenial candidacy of Wallace available, Senator McCarthy would already have be-
come a relatively negative reference point for this two-thirds of his early sup-
port, especially if he had joined forces with Humphrey. Therefore if we are to
search for votes withheld from Humphrey because of the kinds of discontent McCarthy
helped to crystallize, they are much more likely to be found among the McCarthy
hard-core.

We persist in looking for such withheld votes, not simply because of rumors
they existed, but also because there are rather tangible signs in the data that
they were present in 1968. Such votes could take any one of four major alterna-
tive forms: they could be located among citizens who went to the polls but did
not vote for president; they could be reflected in votes for minor party candi-
dates; they could involve staying at home on election day; or they could take the
form of votes spitefully transferred to Humphrey's chief rival, Mr. Nixon. Easi-
est to establish as "withheld votes" are the first two categories. Although their
incidence is naturally very limited, both types can be discerned in the sample
and do occur in conjunction with strong enthusiasm for McCarthy. Projected back
to the nation's electorate, perhaps as much as a half-million votes are represented
here, lying primarily outside the South. This is only a faint trace when sprinkled
across the political map of the nation, however, and taken alone would probably
have made little or no difference in the distribution of votes from the electoral
college.

It is more difficult to say that specific instances of abstinence from any
voting in 1968, or "defection" to Richard Nixon, reflect an abiding loyalty to
McCarthy that Humphrey could not replace, and would not have occurred but for the
McCarthy intrusion. There is a faint edge of non-voting that looks suspiciously
of this sort, but it is again very limited: most ardent McCarthy fans were too
politically involved to have thrown away a chance to vote at other levels of office.
Far more numerous are the defections to Nixon on the part of voters of liberal and
Democratic predispositions, who reported sympathy toward McCarthy. Here, however,
it is difficult to be confident that McCarthy made any necessary contribution to
the decision equation: the situation itself might have soured these people suf-
ficiently, McCarthy or no. Nevertheless, when one begins to add together puta-
tive "withheld votes" from the preceding three categories one does not need to
factor in any very large proportion of these defectors to arrive at a total large
enough to have provided Humphrey with a tiny majority in the electoral college,
without requiring any gross maldistribution of these new-found popular votes out-
side the South.

We should reiterate, of course, that any such hypothetical reconstructions
must be taken with a grain of salt. If McCarthy had embraced Humphrey on the
final night in Chicago, not all of his most fervent supporters would necessarily
have followed suit, and Humphrey would have needed most of them for a victory.
Or if Humphrey had catered more dramatically to the McCarthy wing in terms of
Vietnam policy after the election, he might have suffered losses of much greater
proportion to Wallace on his right, for there is simply no question but that
Democrats sharing the circle of ideas espoused by Wallace outnumbered the Demo-
crats attuned to McCarthy by a very wide margin--perhaps as great as ten to one.
Moreover, it is appropriate to keep in mind our earlier suggestion that the
Wallace intrusion hurt Nixon's vote more than Humphrey's: if we now remove
Wallace as well as McCarthy from the scene, the net result might remain a Nixon
victory.

·However,all this may be, it seems probable that the entire roster of prominent Democratic candidates--McCarthy, Wallace, Kennedy, McGovern--who were in their various ways opposing the administration, must have contributed cumulatively to Humphrey's problem of retaining the loyalty of fellow Democrats in the electorate. Certainly the failure of liberal Republican: leaders to rally around the Goldwater candidacy in 1964, itself an unusual departure from tradition, had contributed to the Republican disaster of that year. 1968 provided something of a mirror image, and the result was an inordinate movement of the electorate between the two consultations.

THE "RESPONSIBLE ELECTORATE" OF 1968

In describing the current of discontent that swirled around the Democratic Party and the White House in 1968, we indicated that disgruntled Democrats rather indiscriminately supported McCarthy in the earliest primaries, but soon began to sort themselves into those staying with McCarthy versus those shifting to Nixon or Wallace, according to their more precise policy grievances on the major issues of Vietnam, civil rights, and the problem of "law and order." By the time of the election, the sorting had become remarkably clean: in particular, differences in issue position between Wallace supporters and what we have called the McCarthy hard-core are impressive in magnitude.

Even more generally, 1968 seems to be a prototypical case of the election that does not produce many changes of policy preferences but does permit electors to sort themselves and the candidates into groups of substantial homogeneity on matters of public policy. This trend over the course of the campaign calls to mind the posthumous contention of V.O. Key, in The Responsible Electorate, that the ·mass electorate ·is a good deal less irrational, ill-informed or sheep-like than it had become fashionable to suppose. He presented empirical materials to develop a counter-image of "an electorate moved by concern about central and relevant questions of public policy, of governmental performance, and of executive personality."[14] He argued that in a general way voters behaved rationally and responsibly, or at least as rationally and responsibly as could be expected in view of the pap they were frequently fed by contending politicians, while recognizing in the same breath that contentions of this unequivocal nature were necessarily overstatements.

To our point of view, Key's general thesis represented a welcome corrective on ·some earlier emphases, but his findings were hardly as discontinuous with earlier work as was often presumed, and the "corrective" nature of his argument has itself become badly exaggerated at numerous points. We cannot begin to examine here the many facets of his thesis that deserve comment. However, several features of the 1968 campaign seem to us to demonstrate admirably the importance of the Key corrective, while at the very same time illustrating vividly the perspective in which that corrective ·must be kept.

It is obvious, as Key himself recognized, that flat assertions about the electorate being rational or ·not are of scant value. In New Hampshire, as we have

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[14]V.O. Key, Jr. The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting, 1936-1960. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1966, pp. 7-8.

observed earlier, Democrats exasperated at Johnson's lack of success with the
Vietnam War voted for Eugene McCarthy as an alternative. The relationship between
this disapproval and the vote decision is exactly the type of empirical finding
that Key musters in profusion from a sequence of seven presidential elections as
his main proof of voter rationality and responsibility. In the New Hampshire
case, however, we might probe the data a little farther to discover that more often
than not, McCarthy voters were upset that Johnson had failed to scourge Vietnam a
good deal more vigorously with American military might, which is to say they took
a position diametrically opposed to that of their chosen candidate. This realiza-
tion might shake our confidence somewhat in the preceding "proof" of voter ration-
ality. But then we push our analysis still another step and find that many of
the New Hampshire people fuming about Vietnam in a hawkish mood voted for McCarthy
without having any idea of where he stood on the matter. Hence while they may have
voted directly counter to their own policy preferences, they at least did not know
this was what they were doing, so the charge of irrationality may be a bit ungenerous.
In the most anemic sense of "rationality," one that merely implies people have per-
ceived reasons for their behavior, these votes perhaps remain "rational."

However, when we reflect on the rather intensive coverage given by the national
mass media to Eugene McCarthy's dissenting position on Vietnam for many months be-
fore the New Hampshire primary, and consider how difficult it must have been to
avoid knowledge of the fact, particularly if one had more than the most casual in-
terest in the Vietnam question, we might continue to wonder how lavishly we should
praise the electorate as "responsible." Here, as at so many other points, pushing
beyond the expression of narrow and superficial attitudes in the mass public to
the cognitive texture which underlies the attitudes is a rather disillusioning ex-
perience. It is regrettable that none of the data presented in The Responsible
Electorate can be probed in this fashion.

Key was interested in showing that the public reacted in a vital way to cen-
tral policy concerns, at least as selected by the contending political factions,
and were not driven mainly by dark Freudian urges, flock instinct, or worse still,
the toss of a coin. With much of this we agree wholeheartedly. In addition, to
put the discussion in a slightly different light, let us imagine in a vein not
unfamiliar from the literature of the 1950's that voting decisions in the American
electorate might be seen as a function of reactions to party, issue and candidate
personality factors. Let us imagine furthermore that research suggests that these
determinants typically have relative weights in our presidential elections of 60
for the party factor, and 40 divided between the issue and candidate determinants.
The exact figures are, of course, quite fanciful but the rough magnitudes continue
to be familiar. Since classical assumptions about voting behavior have attributed
overweening weight to the issue factor, it is scarcely surprising that investigative
attention shifts heavily away from that factor to the less expected party and can-
didate influences. If the issue factor draws comment at all, the finding of great-
est interest is its surprisingly diluted role.

It is at this point that the Key volume exerts its most useful influence.
Key points out that there is, after all, an issue factor, and he develops an analy-
tic format which dramatizes the role that issue reactions do play. This dramatic
heightening is achieved by focussing attention on voters who are shifting their
vote from one party to the other over a pair of elections. If we set for our-
selves the explanatory chore of understanding why the change which occurs moves
in the direction it did, it is patently evident that the party factor--which merely
explains the abiding finding that "standpatters" persistently outnumber "changers"
by factors usually greater than four--is to be set aside as irrelevant. If this

in turn leaves candidate and issue factors sharing the explanatory burden, our sense of the relative importance of the issue factor is of course radically in- creased, even though it is our question that has changed, rather than anything about the empirical lay of the land. Key was quite explicit in his desire to explain movement and change in the electorate, rather than voting behavior in a more general sense, and there is no gainsaying the fact that from many points of view it is indeed the change--marginal gains and losses--which forms the critical part of the story of elections.

In our analyses of such changes in the national vote over the course of presidential elections in the 1950's and 1960's we have been impressed with the magnitude of the effects introduced as new candidates focus on different issues of public policy, and as external events give particular candidate-issue inter- sections greater salience for the nation.[15]   However, 1968 provides an opportunity to examine relative weights of party, candidate and issue factors under more varied circumstances than United States presidential elections usually proffer. We have talked above for illustrative purposes as though there were "standard" relative weights that would pertain for these three factors in some situation-free way. This is of course not the case: we can imagine many kinds of elections which would vastly shift the weights of such factors, if indeed they can be defined at all.

The Wallace movement is a good case in point. By Key's definition nobody who voted for Wallace could have been a "standpatter:" all must be classed as "changers." Therefore party identification as a motivating factor accounting for attraction to Wallace is forced back to zero, and any variance to be understood must have its roots distributed between Wallace's attraction as a personality and the appeal of the issue positions that he advocated.[16]

In point of fact, the Wallace candidacy was reacted to by the public as an issue candidacy, a matter which our data make clear in several ways. For example, about half of the reasons volunteered by our respondents for favorable feelings toward Wallace had to do with positions he was taking on current issues; only a little more than a quarter of the reactions supporting either of the two conven- tional candidates were cast in this mode. Still more noteworthy is the relative purity of the issue feelings among the Wallace clientele where the major contro- versies of 1968 were concerned. Among the whites who voted for one of the two

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[15] Donald E. Stokes, "Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency," Ameri- can Political Science Review, Vol. LX, No. 1; March, 1966.

[16] This is not to say that it would be inconceivable for identification with one of the two traditional parties to correlate with preference for some third-party candidate. For example, it is possible that most of the voters for Henry Wallace's Progressive Party in 1948 were identified with the Democratic Party. However, it is clear that in such an instance "party loyalty" would have been a rather spuri- ous name for the motivating factor. In the case of George Wallace, even this kind of spurious correlation is absent, except insofar as his Democratic origins and the invisibility of his American Independent Party label made it easy for Democrats to support him. Indeed, in the context of this argument it will be fascinating to discover whether Republicans and Democrats invoked different images of Wallace's party location in order to satisfy their need for consonance while voting for a man who reflects their own issue commitments.

major candidates, only 10% favored continued segregation rather than desegregation
or "something inbetween;" among Wallace voters, all of whom were white, almost
40% wanted segregation. Where the issue of "law and order" was concerned, a sub-
stantial portion of the voters felt that Mayor Daley's police had used about the
right amount of force in quelling the Chicago demonstrations. However, among
white voters for Nixon or Humphrey, the remainder of the opinion was fairly evenly
split between criticizing the police for using too much force or too little, with
a small majority (55%) favoring the latter "tough line." Among Wallace voters,
the same ratio was 87-13 favoring a tougher policy. Or again, 36% of white voters
for the conventional parties felt we should "take a stronger stand (in Vietnam)
even if it means invading North Vietnam." Among Wallace voters, the figure was 67%.
Much more generally speaking, it may be observed that all Wallace voters were
exercised by strong discontents in at least one of these three primary domains,
and most were angry about more than one. Wallace was a "backlash" candidate, and
there is no question but that the position communicated to the public and accounted
for his electoral support in a very primary sense. The pattern of correlations
between issue positions and the vote for these "changers" would support Key's
thesis of a "rational" and "responsible" electorate even more impressively than
most of the data he found for earlier elections.

Another way of organizing these preference materials helps to illuminate even
more sharply the contrast between the bases of Wallace support and those of the
conventional candidates. It will be recalled that all respondents were asked to
give an affective evaluation of each of the three candidates taken separately, along
with other aspirants. If we examine the pattern of correlations between issue
positions and the ratings of Humphrey, Nixon and Wallace, we capture gradations of
enthusiasm, indifference and hostility felt toward each man instead of the mere
vote threshold, and we can explore the antecedents or correlates of the variations
in sentiment toward the individual candidates.

Where the ratings of Wallace given by whites are concerned, patterns vary
somewhat South and non-South, but substantial correlations with issue positions
appear everywhere. In the South, the most generic question of civil rights policy
shows a relation of .49 (gamma) with Wallace reactions; the most generic question
on "law and order" shows a .39; and the central Vietnam policy question shows a
relationship of .30. Party identification, however, shows a relation of only .04.
Other ancillary questions probing more specific aspects of policy feelings in these
areas vary around the most generic items somewhat, but tend to show fairly similar
magnitudes of relationship. Outside the South, patterns are a little less sharp
but remain unequivocal. Instead of the above correlations of .49, .39 and .30 in
the main issue domains, the figures are .25 (civil rights), .27 (law and order),
and .25 (Vietnam). The relationship of party identification to Wallace ratings
among whites, however, is .01. Thus it is true in both regions that party iden-
tification is entirely dwarfed by any of several issue positions in predicting
reactions to Wallace among whites, and in terms of "variance accounted for" the
differences between issues and party would best be expressed in terms of orders
of magnitude.

Differences that are almost as sharp turn up in the relationships surrounding
the ratings of Nixon and Humphrey. Here, however, everything is exactly reversed:

Table 5 goes here

Table 5

CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ISSUE POSITIONS, PARTISANSHIP AND
AFFECTIVE RATINGS OF THE MAJOR CANDIDATES
(Whites Only)[a]

ISSUE DOMAIN:	NON-SOUTH			SOUTH		
	Humphrey	Nixon	Wallace	Humphrey	Nixon	Wallace
A. Civil Rights (6 or 7 items[b])	.17	.09	.27	.24	.08	.41
B. Law and Order (2 items)	.25	.05	.27	.19	.01	.35
C. Vietnam (2 items)	.05	.03	.23	.14	.02	.26
D. Cold War (4 items)	.12	.11	.15	.16	.05	.28
E. Social Welfare (2 or 3 items[b])	.22	.20	.09	.26	.13	.10
F. Federal Gov't Too Powerful? (1 item)	.37	.18	.17	.49	.13	.15
SUM: 18 issue items	.19	.10	.20	.22	.07	.31
SUM: Three Major 1968 Issue Domains (A,B,C)	.16	.07	.26	.22	.07	.37
PARTISANSHIP: (3 items)	.47	.47	.04	.39	.36	.03

[a]Cell entries are average absolute values of gamma ordinal correlations
between items of the types listed in the rows and affective ratings of the
candidates noted in the columns.

[b]An item having to do with the role of the federal government in aid to
local education was considered a social welfare item outside the South, but
a civil rights issue within that region.

it is _party_ that towers over all other predictors, and the central 1968 issues
tend to give rather diminutive relationships. Thus comparable correlations (gam-
mas) between partisanship and candidate ratings all run between .36 and .44,
varying only slightly by region and man. Where Nixon is concerned, the average
correlation values for issue items in the three main domains emphasized in the
1968 election never get as high as .10, and fall as low as .01, with the central
tendency about .05. Where Humphrey is concerned, somewhat higher issue values
are observed, varying between .05 and .25 according to the region and the domain.
Moreover, there is another issue domain not hitherto cited in which average values
over three items for Humphrey considerably outstrip the Wallace correlation in
both North and South. Significantly, this is the domain of items concerning
governmental social welfare activities that one might associate with the period
running from the New Deal through the 1950's.[17] Nevertheless, averaging correla-
tions across all of these issue domains (the obsolescing as well as the three most
salient in 1968) suggests that party identification still accounts for three to
five times as much variance in Humphrey ratings as does the average issue among
the 18 issues posed in the study. These correlation patterns are summarized by
region in Table 5.

Such dramatic comparisons between types of support for Wallace on one hand
and the conventional candidates on the other may be perplexing to the casual
reader who is keeping the thesis of V.O. Key in mind. After all, it is the pat-
tern of Wallace support that shows the kind of strong issue orientation Key sought
to demonstrate, whereas evaluations of both Humphrey and Nixon seem to show a
strong factor of traditional party allegiance suffocating most issue concerns into
relative obscurity. Yet the span of time Key's data covered limited him almost
completely to observation of races of the routine Humphrey-Nixon type. Did these
earlier two-party races look more like the Wallace patterns for some unknown rea-
son?

The answer, of course, is very probably not. However, if we set the Wallace
phenomenon in 1968 aside and limit our attention in the Key fashion to two con-
trasting groups of "changers" between the 1964 and 1968 elections (Johnson to
Nixon; Goldwater to Humphrey) we can show correlations with issue differences
which look very much like those presented in cross-tabulations by Key for earlier
elections: some strong, some weak, but nearly always "in the right direction."
There are, to be sure, other problems of interpretation surrounding such correla-
tions that one would need to thrash out before accepting the Key evidence fully.[18]

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[17]Another domain of issues surrounding the "cold war" as it confronted the nation
in the 1950's with controversies over foreign aid and trade with communist coun-
tries shows only modest correlations with the candidate rankings, and Nixon and
Humphrey ratings show more of a parity with the Wallace correlations, although in
an absolute sense the latter continue to outrun the former sharply in the South
and mildly elsewhere. See Table 5.

[18]These include such considerations as that of the causal direction underlying
the observed relationships; or known and systematic biases in recollection of a
presidential vote four years later; or the superficiality of the issues that show
such patterns, as opposed to issues thought basic by sophisticated observers; or
blatant misinformation supporting the issue positions registered; or a tendency
for the less informed to "shift" more quickly than the better informed, with
position on any given issue held constant, etc.

But our principal point here is the simple one that even with Wallace analytically discarded from the 1968 scene, the rest of the 1968 data seem perfectly compatible with the data Key used. The only reason there may seem to be a discontinuity, then, is due to the different nature of the question being asked by Key which, by focussing on marginal change from election to election, effectively defines party loyalty out of the explanation and correspondingly opens the way for greater orienting weight for issues.

It is because the change in vote division from election to election is so critical that V.O. Key's contribution is a welcome corrective. On the other hand, the configurations of 1968 data we have summarized here help to put that contribution into perspective. The patterns of Wallace support show how empirical data can look when issues play a strongly orienting role. The contrasts between these patterns and those generated by routine two-party politics may help to suggest why investigators have tended to be more impressed by the feeble role of issues than by their strength.

The lessons to be drawn are several. One is a simple point of methodology. It has been suggested upon occasion in the past that relationships between issue positions and voting choice turn out to be as pallid as they usually are because investigators fail to ask the right questions or word them in confusing ways. We feel that improvement in these matters is always possible. However, we have seen that exactly the same issue items which continue to look pallid in accounting for assessments of Humphrey and Nixon blaze forth into rather robust correlations where Wallace is concerned. Hence we conclude that poor item choice scarcely accounts for past findings.

Another lesson is more substantive. Some past findings have been to our mind "overinterpreted" as implying that issues are poorly linked to voting preferences because of innate and hence incorrigible cognitive deficiencies suffered by the mass electorate in the United States.[19] Merely the Wallace data taken alone would suffice to show, exactly as Key argued, that the public can relate policy controversies to its own estimates of the world and vote accordingly. The fact that it does not display this propensity on any large scale very often invites more careful spelling out of the conditions under which it will or will not.

It seems clear from the 1968 data that one of the cardinal limiting conditions is the "drag" or inertia represented by habitual party loyalties: as soon as features of the situation limit or neutralize the relevance of such a factor, issue evaluations play a more vital role. Much research has shown that partisanship is fixed early in life and tends to endure. As the individual moves through the life cycle, old political controversies die away and new ones arise toward which at least some individuals crystallize opinions. While the parties try to lead this new opinion formation among their faithful, and probably succeed on a modest scale, there are many independent sources of such opinion for the citizen. The average citizen either does not know his party's position well enough to be influenced on many matters, or if he knows, frequently resists the influence. As

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[19]We much prefer an interpretation which hinges on a general inattention which is endemic because information costs are relatively high where little information is already in hand, and the stakes are rarely seen as being very large. While such a "condition" is likely to persist in mass electorates, there is nothing about it which is immutable given the proper convergence of circumstances.

a result, policy opinions are very loosely or anachronistically linked to party preference at any point in time. But in the moment of truth in the polling booth, party allegiance seems the most relevant cue for many voters if conditions permit it to be used.

'Another type of condition which mediates the links between citizen position on issues and voting choice is the "objective" degree of difference between parties or candidates with respect to policy controversy, or the clarity with which any objective difference gets communicated to the populace. In every United States election there are accusations from one quarter or another that the two conventional parties provide no more than "tweedledee" and "tweedledum" candidates. However, these accusations as aired in the public media rose to something of a crescendo in 1968 from both the Wallace and the McCarthy perspectives. And even as measured a source as the New York Times noted wrily that it would take no more than the deletion of two or three codicils to leave the official 1968 campaign platforms of the Democratic and Republican parties as utterly undistinguishable documents. If the main discriminable difference between Humphrey and Nixon began and ended with the party label, then it would certainly not be surprising that the public sorted itself into voting camps by party allegiance and little more, save where Wallace was concerned. In this case, the public would be limited to exactly that "echo chamber" role which Key ascribed to it.

As a matter of pure logic, nobody can deny that policy differentiation between parties is likely to be a precondition for meaningful relationships between policy feelings and partisan voting decisions. Our only problem here is to evaluate whether the party/issue data configurations surrounding Humphrey and Nixon are the obvious result of some lack of policy difference peculiar to 1968, or represent instead some more abiding feature of presidential voting in the United States. Unfortunately, there is no obvious way to arrive at an objective measurement of "degree of party difference." Perhaps the closest approximation is to ask the public how clear the differences appear to be. Nevertheless, since some people invariably feel party differences are big and others feel they are non-existent, even this approach leaves one without reference points as to "how big is big" where reports of this kind are concerned, except inasmuch as trends in such reports can be observed over periods of time. In this light, it can be said while reports of "important differences" between the Democrats and the Republicans were slightly fewer in 1968 than in 1964 (the year of Goldwater's "choice, not an echo"), they show a reasonable parity with such reports for 1952 and 1960. Hence in the public eye, at least, differences between what the major parties stand for were not lacking in unusual degree in 1968.

It may be useful to note that whereas we have labelled the Wallace effort in 1968 an "issue candidacy" from the point of view of the electorate, we have not said that it was an ideological candidacy from that same point of view. From other viewpoints of political analysis, it was of course just that: a movement of the "radical right." Moreover, with occasional exceptions, data on issue positions show Wallace voters to differ from Humphrey voters in the same "conservative" direction that Nixon voters do, only much more so. Therefore by customary definitions, not only was the leadership of the radical right, but the rank-and-file

espoused clearly "rightist" positions of a sort which were frequently extreme, on highly specific questions of public policy.[20]

Yet there was an element of ideological self-recognition present among Gold-water voters in 1964 that was simply lacking among Wallace voters in 1968. One measure of ideological location which we use involves the respondent in rating the terms "liberal" and "conservative." If the respondent gives the highest pos-sible score to the stimulus "liberal" and the lowest possible score to "conser-vative," he is rated as the most extreme liberal, with a score of 100. In the reverse case, the extreme conservative receives a score of zero. At 50 are clustered individuals who either did not recognize these terms, or gave the same affective rating to both.[21] In 1964 there was a rather considerable relationship between such a measure and response to Goldwater, in the expected direction. In 1968, the same scale showed only a very limited correlation with reactions toward Wallace (gammas of .13 and .09 among whites within the South and outside, respec-tively). Indeed, as Table 6 shows, in both political "regions" of the country Wallace voters were more favorable to the "liberal" label than Nixon voters! Thus

Table 6 goes here

while Wallace supporters were entirely distinctive in their "backlash" feelings on public policy, they were much less ideologically attuned to a left-right spectrum than their Goldwater predecessors.

Although Wallace supporters did not seem anywhere nearly as distinctive in terms of ideological measures as they did on specific issues, they did show some moderate trends in terms of other more generic political attitudes. In particu-lar, various measures bearing on discontent with the responsiveness and probity of government show correlations with ratings given by whites to Wallace, and are related but with opposite signs to ratings of the "establishment" candidates, Humphrey and Nixon. Since Wallace was more of a mainstream candidate in the South than in the rest of the country, it might be thought that his appeal in that region might depend less strictly on this syndrome of political alienation than it would elsewhere. However, these relationships are stronger and more per-vasive in the South, and seem only weakly mirrored in other parts of the nation. Within the South, white attitudes toward Wallace are quite sharply associated with our scales of political efficacy and cynicism about government. People drawn to Wallace tended to feel they had little capacity to influence government, and expressed distrust of the morality and efficiency of political leadership. These correlations reach a peak on items where the referent is most explicitly "the federal government in Washington," and it is plain that Southern voters felt more or less attracted to Wallace in the degree that they responded to his complaints

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[20] This was not true across every issue domain. The most notable exception was in the area of social welfare issues such as medicare and full employment guaran-tees, on which issues Wallace voters were significantly more "liberal" than Nixon voters, and almost match the liberalism of Humphrey voters. This admixture was of course familiar in Wallace's frequent appeals to the underdog and the working man, in the tradition of Southern populism.

[21] For reasons discussed elsewhere, a rather large proportion of the American electorate--nearly half--is found at this point of ideological neutrality.

Table 6

IDEOLOGICAL RESPONSES OF WHITE VOTERS FOR DIFFERENT PRESIDENTIAL
CANDIDATES IN 1964 AND 1968[a]

	1964		1968		
	Johnson	Goldwater	Humphrey	Nixon	Wallace
NON-SOUTH	51.8	39.9	51.8	43.4	44.9
SOUTH	49.6	35.9	49.5	40.7	41.9

[a]The cell entry registers the mean value shown on the ideological scale
described in the text for white voters for each of the candidates
listed. A high value indicates that liberalism is held in relative
favor; a low value means that conservatism is preferred.

that Washington bureaucrats had been persistently and unjustly bullying the
South with particular respect to civil rights.   Since there is no methodological
need for it to be true, it is of particular interest that ratings of Humphrey
show as substantial correlations in the opposing direction, in the South and
other regions as well: people responding warmly to Humphrey had quite sanguine
views of government.

All told, then, a sense of political alienation was a rather visible cor-
relate of a sorting of the citizenry away from the conventional candidates toward
Wallace, as was certainly to be expected and necessary if terms such as "back-
lash" are relevant.   At the same time, it is worth keeping the apparent temporal
sequences clear.   The data suggest that Southern whites have become alienated
with government because prior attitudes, particularly racial ones, have been con-
tradictory to national policy for nearly twenty years.   Thus there is a readiness
to condemn government on a much broader front, and Wallace appealed in obvious
ways to this readiness in the South.   Outside the South Wallace also articulated
the same array of specific grievances and received a clear response.   However,
the evidence suggests that any resonance he might have achieved in terms of a
more generic condemnation of government, while present, was relatively limited.

THE SOCIAL BASES OF WALLACE SUPPORT

A variety of facts already cited about the Wallace movement of 1968 makes
clear that while there was some modest overlap in support for Goldwater in 1964
and Wallace in 1968, it was at best a weak correlation and the Wallace clientele
differed quite notably from Goldwater's.   Thus, for example, almost exactly half
of our 1968 Wallace voters who had participated in the 1964 election reported that
they had voted for Johnson.   Or again, we have seen that the majority of Wallace
voters, like the electorate as a whole, was identified with the Democratic party,
while it is obvious that most Goldwater voters were Republican identifiers.   Simi-
larly, we have just noted that the Wallace movement had a much less clear ideolo-
gical focus among its sympathizers than marked Goldwater supporters in 1964.

This discrepancy in clientele may seem perplexing.   After all, in the terms
of conventional analysis in political sociology both candidates were "darlings
of the radical right."   Yet the limited degree of overlap between Goldwater and
Wallace voters is confirmed in equally impressive fashion when one compares their
social backgrounds or even their simplest demographic characteristics.   Among
Goldwater voters, for example, women both South and non-South showed the same
slight majority they enjoy in the electorate; Wallace voters in the South showed
a similar balance, but elsewhere were rather markedly (almost 60-40) male.   The
Goldwater vote had been much more urban, while the Wallace vote was relatively
rural and small-town, particularly in the South.   Outside the South, the age
distribution of Wallace voters departed markedly from that shown by Goldwater
in 1964, with the proportion under 35 being about twice as great and that over
65 only half as large.

The well-publicized appeal of Wallace to the unionized laboring man is clearly
reflected in our data: outside the South, the proportion of white union members
preferring Wallace over the other major candidates was more than three times as

great as it was within households having no unionized members (19% to 6%); even
in the South where other appeals were present and the unionization of labor is
more limited, the contrast between the preferences of union members and non-union
households remains dramatic (52% to 28% giving top preference to Wallace over the
conventional candidates). Indeed, in both regions the occupational center of
gravity of Wallace popularity was clearly among white skilled workers. Nation-
wide, only about 10% of the Wallace vote was contributed by the professional and
managerial strata, whereas persons of these occupations had given Goldwater almost
half of his vote (46%). Needless to say, the proportion of unionized labor sup-
porting Goldwater was very low. Along with these class differences, marked dis-
crepancies in educational background can be taken for granted. In the South,
one-third of Wallace's support came from whites with no more than grade school
education, while the national figure for Goldwater was 13%. The proportion of
voters of college experience backing Goldwater was about double that found voting
for Wallace either in the South or elsewhere.

All of these comparisons help to underscore the major disparities in the
social bases of support for Goldwater and Wallace, despite the apparent common
policy ground of the relatively extreme right. While one should not lose track
of the fact that there was a small and systematic overlap in clientele, it is
abundantly clear that neither candidate exhausted the potential support for a
severely conservative program in matters of civil rights, law and order or Vietnam.
In a very real sense, it can be seen that Wallace was a poor man's Goldwater. As
we suggested at the time, Goldwater pitched his campaign on an ideological plane
which rather escaped some members of the electorate who might otherwise have found
his positions congenial.[22] Wallace's perfectly direct appeal to citizens of this
latter description, along with the undercurrent of populism alien to the Goldwater
conservatism, apparently sufficed to put off some of the Arizona senator's more
well-to-do supporters.[23] The Goldwater support was drawn from a relatively urbane
and sophisticated conservatism; Wallace appealed to many similar instincts, but
the style was folksy and tailored to the common man.

In a significant way, too, Wallace remained a regional candidate despite his
discovery that he could win more than scattered votes in the North and his con-
sequent entry on the ballot across the nation. Over half of his popular votes
came from the states of the Confederacy. Everything, from his lack of political
experience at a federal level to his marked Southern accent, suggested a parochial
relevance that had rarely been salient where Goldwater was concerned. While elec-
toral maps leave no doubt as to the regional nature of the response, sample survey
data show that even these visible effects have been diluted by inter-regional
migration. Thus, for example, while much has been written about the Wallace ap-
peal in various European ethnic communities of northern cities, little has been
said about the "American ethnic group" of southern white migrants, most of whom
are blue-collar and frequently in a position to take special pleasure in the
spectacle of a Southern compatriot coming north to give the Yankees what for.

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[22]P. Converse, A. Clausen, and W. Miller, "Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964
Election," American Political Science Review, June, 1965, 59, 321-336.

[23]It is quite possible, however, that some of this support might have moved to
Wallace had the Republican Party nominated anybody but Nixon or Reagan, among
the main contenders.

Our data estimate that Wallace drew over 14% of the vote from these migrants,
and less than 7% otherwise outside the South. On the other hand, the significant
stream of migration of Yankees into the South, the political implications of
which we have described elsewhere,[24] provided something of a barrier to further
Wallace successes. Heavily Republican in a non-Southern sense and now constitut-
ing better than one-seventh of white voters in the region, these migrants were
even less interested in voting for Wallace than were Southern whites in the North,
and gave the former Alabama governor only 10% of their vote while their native
Southern white colleagues were casting almost one vote in every three for him.

Table 7 summarizes the affective ratings given Wallace by our respondents
according to the region in which they grew up as well as their current region of

Table 7 goes here

residence. It is rather clear that the region of socialization is a more critical
determinant of these assessments of Wallace than is the region of current resi-
dence. Moreover, it is easy to show that regional differences in correlates of
Wallace preference also follow lines of socialization rather than those of current
residence. For example, we have noted that Wallace's appeal to women outside the
South was rather limited. For white women of Southern background living outside
the South, the response was much as it was in the South. Setting the migrants
aside, the sex ratio among white Wallace enthusiasts outside the South is even
more sharply masculine.

It is not our purpose here to do more than briefly summarize the social and
demographic correlates of Wallace preferences, for numerous other essays are being
prepared to treat the subject in detail. However, one correlate which has fre-
quently surprised observers deserves more extended discussion, both because of its
practical significance and because of its high relevance to some of the theoreti-
cal issues uniquely illuminated by the 1968 election. We speak of the relationship
between the Wallace movement and the generational cleavages so evident at other
points in data from the presidential campaign.

It would seem self-evident that Wallace's primary appeal to traditional and
even obsolescing American values, as well as his caustic treatment of the rebels
of the younger generation, would have brought him votes that were even more heavily
clustered among the elderly than those drawn by Goldwater in 1964. We have already
noted that Wallace took issue positions that were communicated with unusual clarity,
and that these positions determined in unusual degree the nature of his clientele.
On almost every issue of nearly a score surveyed, the position characteristic of
Wallace voters in our sample is also the position associated with older citizens,
where there is any age correlation at all. Hence it is somewhat surprising to
discover that among white Southerners there is actually a faint negative correla-
tion between age and a Wallace vote. And it is perplexing indeed to discover
that outside the South voting for Wallace occurred very disproportionately among
the young. For example, Wallace captured less than 3% of the vote among people
over 70 outside the South, but 13% of those under 30, with a regular gradient

[24]A. Campbell, P. Converse, W. Miller, and D. Stokes, Elections and the Political
Order. New York: John Wiley, 1965, Chapter 12.

Table 7

REACTIONS OF WHITES TO WALLACE BY REGION
OF SOCIALIZATION AND RESIDENCE

| | | RESPONDENT NOW RESIDES... | | |
		Outside the South	Within the South	TOTAL
RESPONDENT	Outside the South:	26.2[a] (757)	26.5 (51)	26.2 (808)
GREW UP...	Within the South:	34.7 (53)	50.0 (281)	48.5 (334)
	TOTAL:	26.7 (810)	46.3 (332)	

[a]Cell entries are mean values of ratings on a scale from 0 (hostility) to 100 (sympathy) accorded to George Wallace by white respondents of the types indicated. .

connecting these two extremes.   One of the major ironies of the election, then, was that Wallace made his appeal to the old but mainly received the vote of the young.

However, a whole cluster of empirical theory has grown up in recent years which, without any particular knowledge of the Wallace platform, would predict that such a third-party candidate would draw votes primarily from the young in just this way.   It is established, for example, that repeated commitments of votes to a political party tend to increase the strength of psychological iden- tification with that party, and it is an immediate corollary that voters of the older generation are more fixed in their party loyalties than are relatively new voters.[25]   It follows with equal logic that when some new candidate or ad hoc party arises to challenge the conventional parties of a system, it should have relative difficulty making headway among the older generation, even though it might have natural appeals to voters of these age cohorts.

We have never had a chance to test this somewhat non-obvious expectation, although reconstructions of the fall of the Weimar Republic have always suggested that voters for the Nazi Party in its culminating surge were very disproportionately drawn from the youngest cohorts of the German electorate.   Therefore the age dis- tribution of Wallace support has been of uncommon interest to us.   When issue ap- peals of a rather vital sort conflict with long-established party loyalties, as they must have in Wallace's case for many older voters, which factor is likely to exert most influence on the voting decision?   The apparent difficulties older people had in voting for Wallace, particularly outside the South where he was a less "legitimate" Democrat and hence a less conventional candidate, seemed to provide a rather clear answer.

However, if this interpretation is correct a variety of ancillary effects should be discernible in the 1968 data.   For example, if prior party identifica- tion is truly the critical source of resistance to a Wallace vote simply because of the disloyalty implied, the prediction that the young would vote more heavily for him need not mean the young have any monopoly on admiration for him.   Indeed, one could almost predict that the older generation should have shown more warmth of feeling toward Wallace per vote allotted him than would be true of the younger generation, simply because of the "artificial" inhibition on the vote represented by greater loyalty to a conventional party.   Moreover, since strength of identi- fication is measured explicitly in this study, it is of importance to show that it does indeed vary positively as in times past with age; that such identifica- tion with a conventional party is indeed negatively associated with voting for Wallace; and that the tendency of young persons to vote for Wallace did co-occur with weak conventional loyalties.

All of these empirical expectations are borne out, and usually in rather handsome fashion.   First, while the young voted more heavily for Wallace, the correlation between age and affective rating of him as a political figure is non-existent.   Second, the old in 1968 were, as always, much more strongly iden- tified with one of the two conventional parties than the young.   Third, defec- tion from a conventional party to vote for Wallace was indeed strongly related

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[25]Philip E. Converse, "Of Time and Partisan Stability," Journal of Comparative Politics, July, 1969.

to degree of party identification, particularly outside the South:[26] the proba-
bility of a Wallace vote doubles there as one moves each step from strong through
weak to "independent" or leaning identifiers. And finally, when strength of par-
tisanship is controlled, the sharp inverse correlation between age and a Wallace
vote outside the South is very nearly wiped out; within the South where it was
a somewhat ragged relationship to begin with, it completely disappears or if any-
thing, shows a slight reversal as though Wallace might in fact have had some extra
drawing power for the older voter, aside from the complications posed by other
allegiances.

    This nest of relationships holds more than detached clinical interest in
several directions. The reader concerned about the future of the Wallace move-
ment as an electoral force on the American scene is likely to be interested in
the fact that the clientele was young rather than aging. In a sense this is a
pertinent datum and in a sense it is not. It is unquestionable that a Wallace
candidacy in 1972 has a brighter future than it would have if its 1968 legions
were dying out of the population. Nonetheless, the whole thrust of our argument
above is that the Wallace movement is not in any special good fortune to have
drawn young voters: this will be true of virtually any new party entering the
lists: in an old party system, and but for the habits which kept older voters
with the conventional parties, the initial Wallace vote would probably have been
significantly larger. Still more to the point, we would hazard that the future
of the Wallace movement as a third party will be determined more by Wallace's
personal plans and the organizational aspirations of his entourage on one hand,
and by the evolution of events affecting national frustrations on the other,
than by the age level of its 1968 voters.

    Nevertheless, the youthful nature of Wallace's clientele provides a further
irony to the backdrop of generational cleavage reflected in the 1968 campaign.
For while such a cleavage was genuine and intense, as some of our earlier data
have witnessed, one of the most important yet hidden lines of cleavage split the
younger generation itself. Although privileged young college students angry at
Vietnam and the shabby treatment of the Negro saw themselves as sallying forth
to do battle against a corrupted and cynical older generation, a more head-on
confrontation at the polls, if a less apparent one, was with their own age mates
who had gone from high school off to the factory instead of college, and who were
appalled by the collapse of patriotism and respect for the law that they saw
about them. Outside of the election period, when verbal articulateness and leisure
for political activism count most heavily, it was the college share of the younger
generation--or at least its politicized vanguard--that was most prominent as a
political force. At the polls, however, the game shifts to "one man, one vote,"
and this vanguard is numerically swamped even within its own generation.

    This lack of numerical strength is no intrinsic handicap: any cadre of
opinion leadership is small in number. However, it must successfully appeal to
some potential rank and file, and it certainly cannot risk becoming a negative
reference point for large numbers of people if it expects to operate in a medium
involving popular elections. In part because of collegiate naivete concerning

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[26]The South shows somewhat diluted patterns here, compatible with the likelihood
that for at least some Southern Democrats, a vote for Wallace was not conceived
as a defection.

forms of dissent that maintain sympathy,[27] and in part because the public image
of constructive efforts by the many can be so rapidly colored by a few whose needs
are mainly to antagonize as much of society as possible, this vanguard became a
negative reference point for most Americans. The result at the election thus had
a different coloration from what went before: McCarthy did not run and Wallace
captured a proportion of the vote which was historically amazing. Indeed, it was
probably the political stodginess of the older generation so decried by campus
activists which kept the vote of "people over 30" within the channels of the con-
ventional parties and prevented the Wallace vote from rising still higher. Cer-
tainly it is true that in several major metropolises of the United States where
party loyalty has been nullified in primary election settings in the spring of
1969, candidates of relative Wallace coloration have been surprising observers
with their mounting popularity.

There can be no question but that dramatic and persistent displays of dissent
on the campuses between 1964 and 1968 helped to place question marks around "con-
sensual" national policies which might otherwise have continued to be taken for
granted by most of the citizenry. At the same time, disregard for the occasional
junctures of electoral decision when the mass public has some say in the political
process may mean that a battle was won but a war was lost. For some few, this
politique de pire is quite intentional, being thought to help "radicalize" the
electorate in ways that can be controlled and manipulated. For most student ac-
tivists, however, success in raising questions is of little value if one is help-
ing in the same stroke to elect "the wrong people" to answer them. And quite
apart from the nature of the leadership elected in 1968, it is obvious to any
"rational" politician hoping to maximize votes in 1970 or 1972 that there are
several times more votes to be gained by leaning toward Wallace than by leaning
toward McCarthy.

If these facts were inevitable consequences of "raising the issues" from the
campuses, the dilemma would be severe indeed. It is not clear to us, however, that
any intrinsic dilemma is involved. Much of the backlash being expressed in the
1968 voting received its impetus less from irreconcilable policy disagreement--
although on civil rights there is more than a modicum of that--than from resent-
ment at the frequency with which the message of dissent from the campuses was
clothed to "bait" conventional opinion. In the degree that the feelings and opin-
ion reflexes of the common man, including age peers of lower circumstances, were
comprehended at all, they tended to be a subject for derision or disdain. Strange

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[27]The American public seems to have a very low tolerance for unusual or "showy"
forms of political dissent. Responses to an extended set of items in the 1968
study on the subject are simply appalling from a civil libertarian point of view.
At the most acceptable end of the continuum of "ways for people to show their
disapproval or disagreement with governmental policies and actions" we asked
about "taking part in protest meetings or marches that are permitted by the
local authorities" (italics not in original question). Less than 20% of all
respondents, and scarcely more than 20% of those giving an opinion, would approve
of such subversive behavior, and more than half would disapprove (the remainder
accepted the alternative presented that their reaction "would depend on the cir-
cumstances"). In view of such assumptions, the overwhelmingly negative reaction
to the Chicago demonstrations despite sympathetic media treatment (cited earlier)
is hardly surprising.

to say, such hostile postures communicate with great speed even across social gulfs, and are reciprocated with uncommon reliability. Fully as often, of course, there was simply no comprehension of the dynamics of public opinion at all.

Whether one likes it or not, the United States does retain some occasional elements of the participatory democracy. A young and well-educated elite-to-be that is too impatient to cope with this bit of reality by undertaking the tedium of positive persuasion may find its political efforts worse than wasted.