POLITICS AND CULTURE IN SPAIN

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PREFACE

Politics and Culture in Spain is the fifth monograph to be completed in the series on the analysis of culture and politics in a variety of national settings. The series is designed to further understanding of how culture helps shape political systems and behavior in selected countries. The monographs should be useful to analysts, diplomats, and others with extensive knowledge of the particular country as well as to those seeking an introduction.

The Department of State selected the countries to be included in the series. As series editor, I chose the authors of individual monographs and prepared a set of guidelines developed in two conferences organized by the Office of Long-Range Assessments and Research at State and attended by government and academic specialists. The guidelines reflect my perspective on “Culture and Politics” as presented in a monograph with that title prepared as part of the project. That general work is available to those seeking more background on the topic.

Each country monograph was revised following a review session attended by academic and government specialists on the country. However, the country author bears final responsibility for the contents of the volume; it should not be interpreted as representing the official opinion or policy of the Department of State.

The country author also prepared the references and the annotated bibliography of the most important interpretations of culture and politics in the country. For statistical and other basic information on the country, readers should consult the latest issue of Background Notes, issued by the Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State.

I am indebted to many people for the success of this series. Dr. E. Raymond Platig, Director of the Office of Long-Range Assessments and Research at the Department, heads the list. This collaboration between government and the academy has been facilitated and enriched by his understanding of both cultures. He joins me in expressing appreciation to the many participants in our conferences on the conceptual monograph and on individual countries. Their collective experience is formidable. Their insights, criticisms, and advice have been invaluable.

Samuel H. Barnes
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POLITICS AND CULTURE IN SPAIN

HIGHLIGHTS

Serious questions concerning Spain's political culture became salient following the death of Francisco Franco in 1975 and the beginning of the transition to a new regime. Many believed that certain Spanish cultural features had been incompatible with peaceful democratic competition in the past, and that some had also been responsible for retarding Spain's economic development, excluding it from the West European community of modern democratic societies. These concerns were heightened by the fact that the former dictator's social outlook was conservative, traditionalist, semi-corporatist, and explicitly anti-democratic. Consequently the civics training imparted to generations of young people sought to resurrect a traditionalist view of Spanish society and undermine values often thought to be essential components of a democratic political culture.

A decade later we see in Spain (with the notable exception of Euskadi — the Basque country) a legitimate and consolidated democratic regime. In general terms, the values of contemporary Spaniards are very similar to those of other West Europeans, and the explicitly political components of Spain's mass-level culture can be regarded as fully supportive of democratic politics and the basic institutions of the present constitutional monarchy. At the elite level as well, cordial relations among representatives of competing parties have contributed to consolidation of a new democratic regime — in sharp contrast with the Second Republic. With regard to an understanding of politics in Spain at the national level, the most important and distinguishing feature of Spanish political culture is change. Both at the mass and elite level, the values and rules of the game of the present era represent a marked contrast with the traditional stereotypes associated with Spain, as well as with clearly observable patterns of behavior in the past.

What explains this departure from traditional views of Spanish political culture? One answer (to which we will only briefly allude) is that some of these cultural stereotypes may always have been incorrect, or were accurate descriptions of only a segment of Spanish society in the past. A second explanation (to which we will devote considerable attention) is that rapid and profound socio-economic development over the past three decades has undermined many of the values, perceptions and role definitions central to the traditional culture of Spain. Rigid sex-role definitions have been broken down by transformations in family structures and by the entry of women into the monetized sector of the economy; the drastic decline of religiosity in Spain has weakened the influence of the Church on the formation of values, and reduced the potential for disruptive political conflict over religious issues; patron-client relations have been virtually eliminated as a prominent feature of electoral behavior due to increases in literacy, urbanization, and access to mass communications and transportation networks; and value heterodoxy — if not a breakdown of consensus on many values — has resulted
from the removal of old restraints, and from exposure to a much broader array of socializing agents and experiences.

A third source of cultural change concerns the behavior of political and social elites. Discontinuity was an important characteristic of Spanish 19th- and early 20th-century history. Political and social elites often engaged in behavior which could be characterized by drastic swings of the pendulum from one extreme to the other. As a consequence, traditional forces such as the monarchy, the Church and even the concept of national identification divided Spaniards from one another, rather than serving as sources of national unity. Another factor which undermined even the concept of national identification divided Spaniards from one another, somewhat distinct. Among these are amiguismo (although it is declining in mainstream, there remain some ways in which Spaniards' modal cultural traits are long-term impact on the basic character of a culture or subculture.

patterns of political interaction determined largely by elites may have a profound of present-day democratic stability. Political elites departed markedly from their representatives of the "real Spain."

This discontinuity is not necessarily undesirable, at least from the standpoint of present-day democratic stability. Political elites departed markedly from their predecessors during the transition to democracy insofar as they sought to moderate partisan differences, tranquilize public opinion, and reach consensus on traditionally divisive issues. Their successful efforts have culminated not only in democratic consolidation and institutionalization of rules of the game conducive to democratic stability, but also in a reinforcement of moderate forces in Spanish politics and the undermining of support for more radical alternatives. The stark contrast between this outcome and the violence and instability within Euskadi (whose subculture will be analyzed in this monograph) provides clear evidence of the extent to which patterns of political interaction determined largely by elites may have a profound long-term impact on the basic character of a culture or subculture.

While Spanish culture and society have evolved towards the West European mainstream, there remain some ways in which Spaniards' modal cultural traits are somewhat distinct. Among these are amiguismo (although it is declining in importance), a pronounced individualism, which contributes to low levels of civic commitment and affiliation with secondary associations, and to unstable leadership patterns within political parties; emphasis on friendly personal relations; moderate, left-of-center, and vaguely anticapitalist political views and preferences; and low levels of interest in and involvement with politics, despite keen attentiveness to the personal images of party leaders. But the most important conclusion to be drawn from this exploration of politics and culture is that differences between the modal cultural features of Spain and those of other West European societies are fewer and less politically relevant than those distinguishing some regions within Spain from others, and are much less marked than differences between the Spain of today and the Spain of the past.

Stereotypes of "the Spanish national character" are deeply ingrained in popular literature, as well as in serious scholarly analyses of Spanish history and political economy. Among those traits most often associated with Spaniards are an intense and intolerant religiosity; great concern with dignity, personal honor and social status; pride verging on arrogance; fierce individualism; low levels of interpersonal trust; an austere and non-materialist life style; excessive concern with death and immortality; rigidly sexist role definitions (with machismo and "Donjuanismo" strongly prevalent among men); contempt for business enterprise; a propensity towards cruelty and violence; and a preference for glorious imperial conquest over manual labor.

Historians often attribute the economic and political decline of Spain in the 17th century to certain of these cultural traits. Américo Castro (1965) argues that because the Reconquista, which returned the Iberian peninsula to Christian control, directly involved the expulsion of Jews and Moors, the core values of the newly emerging society would place great stress upon heroic conquest and contempt for those values associated with the defeated peoples. Specifically, he claims that it resulted in a Castilian repudiation of the values of hard work, technological advance, and material achievement. Catalans, with a different culture which placed much greater stress upon commercial enterprise, were more aggressive in business matters; but their economic activities were hindered by restrictive policies enacted by the Castilian central government. Overall, it is argued that these Castilian cultural traits delayed economic development substantially, and that when industrialization did occur it was initially restricted to Catalunya and Euskadi, with most of the Castilian heartland remaining backward and agrarian.

Scholars and politicians also attributed much of the political instability and violence experienced by the Spanish polity to the values and behavioral styles of political elites, which may or may not (depending on the scholar in question) have their roots in Spanish culture. The 19th century French psychologist Alfred Fouillée claimed that Spaniards are "semi African" and inherently violent and fanatic (cited in Caro Baroja, 1970:104). Francisco Franco argued that important features of the Spanish character were "anarchic spirit, negative critique, lack of solidarity among men, extremism and mutual hostility," and used these alleged qualities as justification for his contention that they must be countered by strong authoritarian government (Linz, 1970b:131).

Less sweeping claims are made by contemporary scholars who argue that the norms and behavioral styles of prominent political leaders during the Second Republic directly and powerfully contributed to the outbreak of the Civil War. Payne writes, for example, that a central characteristic of political elite norms and behavior "was insistence on ideological purity in the tradition of European
radicalism;... compromise and practical adjustment were adjudged a sellout of principle." The monistic, ideological orientation of left Republicanism is reflected in the attitudes of Manuel Azaña, who once wrote that "It will be necessary to restore doctrines in their purity and shield oneself against compromise. Intransigence will be symptomatic of integrity" (Payne, 1970:91).

It is not clear whether the "national character" stereotypes set forth above ever were accurate descriptions of the dominant values and norms of most Spaniards. Some prominent scholars suggest that these characterizations were always exaggerated and perhaps inaccurate. Others have suggested that these cultural traits may have been appropriate only for the lower aristocracy of Castile — that other social strata and regional cultural minorities, particularly in Catalonia and Euskadi, may have had greatly different systems of norms and values (López Pintor and Wert, 1982). But it is absolutely clear that this stereotype of the "Spanish national character" is not valid as a description of political culture today.

In the remainder of this monograph I shall set forth the basic characteristics of Spanish culture and of several important subcultures. I shall show how these cultural features have changed in recent years, and discuss the extent to which they depart from the caricatures often used to label or "explain" contemporary Spanish society. I shall also explore the impact of two forces which have given rise to profound change in the modal norms and values of the peoples of Spain.

The first of these forces is socioeconomic modernization. A substantial body of social science research has documented the extent to which structural changes associated with economic development can exert a powerful influence on a society's culture and basic features of political behavior by its population. Important cultural changes with political ramifications have occurred in Spain at least in part as a result of this process. Over the past 25 years Spanish society has been profoundly transformed. Powerful waves of migration have contributed to an extensive urbanization and to the progressive disappearance of parochial village subcultures. Education, exposure to communications media, and access to transportation networks have eliminated patron-client relationships from all but a few relatively isolated rural areas, and substantially expanded the portion of the population engaged in what may be euphemistically referred to as "unmediated" political participation. The expansion of the industrial and tertiary sectors of the economy has greatly affected social stratification in rural areas. Informal pressures to conform to village norms in rural Spain were homogeneous. Social conformity mechanisms are also stronger than they are in urban areas. Informal pressures to conform to village norms in rural Spain were reinforced by authoritarian family structures (see Ayala, 1966:164) and, in the political sphere, by the intervention of the caciques (local notable and political boss). And certainly no present-day institution could rival The Holy Office of the Inquisition in its efforts to root out heterodoxy and enforce strict adherence to a single set of religious and social values. In contrast, the range of cultural options and variety of socializing agents is much greater in open, urbanized societies with well developed communications media.

The second source of cultural and subcultural change in Spain is the behavior of political and social elites. An exclusive reliance on socioeconomic-reductionist analysis would suggest that value change would be relatively steady and unidirectional. This would not satisfactorily describe the patterns of change which have taken place in Spain. Juan Linz argues that one origin of the weakness of "tradition" and the absence of an integrative value consensus in Spanish social and political life can be found in the sharply discontinuous patterns of change over the past two centuries — discontinuities which are largely the result of the independent actions of prominent social or political actors and institutions (Linz, 1972). Traditional institutions which have played important integrative roles in the political development of other European countries — institutions such as the monarchy, religious organizations, and political parties — were seriously weakened in Spain by abruptly discontinuous patterns of change. I shall carry Linz's argument further by arguing that those traditions were so weak that, just as the coming to power of Juan Carlos I represented an instauration (not a restoration), so too was the establishment of the current Spanish democracy. Traces of the past may be seen in certain features of democratic politics (such as the importance of Basque and Catalan nationalism, and certain aspects of voting behavior), but the dominant institutional and behavioral features of the current Spanish democracy in many respects represent sharp departures from what would have resulted from the inheritance of traditions.

Another factor which has prevented traditions or cultural symbols from unifying all the population of Spain within a single community is linguistic and...
cultural pluralism. Most Catalans and Gallegos, and some Basques, speak distinct regional languages. They also define themselves first and foremost as Catalans, Gallegos or Basques. Thus, as Linz has argued, "Nationalism — which for many societies is one component of the syndrome of modernity — in the case of Spain acts as a divisive factor, due to the emergence of peripheral nationalisms. Tradition, the sense of historical continuity... is a Castilian-dominated tradition and therefore questionable to minorities in search of the peripheral national tradition" (1972:5).

GENERAL CULTURAL PATTERNS

Recent studies of the beliefs and values of Spaniards clearly reveal that Spain fits well within the ranks of developed Western European societies. Although certain specific values, beliefs, or behavioral norms are either stronger or weaker than the European average, the overall pattern suggests that Spain has adopted a typically West European cultural orientation.

Several of the cliches associated with the "Spanish national character" are debunked in a study by López Pintor and Wert (1982). They derived a list of stereotypes of Spanish character from several works by prominent Spanish writers and historians (Menéndez Pidal, Ámérico Castro, Madariaga, Lain Entralgo, and others), and then used recent survey data to see if these cultural traits were, indeed, widespread among contemporary Spaniards. Two sets of traditional values were found to be completely inaccurate as descriptions of contemporary Spanish culture. The austerity and non-materialism regarded as components of the traditional life style have definitely given way to values and purchasing habits of a mass-consumption society. In addition, the exaggerated sexual stereotypes associated with traditional Spain (especially machismo and Donjuanismo) are not widespread. Differences between the values and beliefs of men and women are narrowing substantially, as are differences between masculine and feminine roles and behavior (also see Sani and del Castillo, 1983). Ayala argues that these changes in sex roles are the result of the decline of feudal social relations and the entry of women into the labor force (1986:117 and 170). To this list of vanishing traditional traits could be added an exaggerated concern with one's position in the social hierarchy: survey data have found that this is now regarded as little more than one aspect of the stereotype associated with the Castilian regional subculture.7

A more rigorous examination of the contemporary values of Spaniards was undertaken by Francisco Orizo (1983), in conjunction with a cross-national study of values in nine European countries (Stoetzel, 1982). The findings of these studies further undermine the credibility of central components of the traditional stereotype. Avoidance of work is not found to be a particularly Spanish characteristic. While Spaniards report less job satisfaction than other Europeans (Orizo, 1983, p. 377), they place greater stress on the importance of diligence in work than respondents of any other European country: 41% of Spaniards mention this as an important virtue, vs. a European average of 23% (Stoetzel, 1982:25). Neither are intense religiosity or intolerance distinctly Spanish traits. To be sure, until recently religiosity in Spain was much higher than the European average, and more Spaniards (87%) claim to believe in God than do most other Europeans (75%); but only 22% of Spaniards mentioned "religious faith" as an important virtue — a figure which is close to the European average (17%), and much below Ireland's 42%. In addition, these studies showed that Spaniards are close to the European average in several measures of tolerance for others and on a composite index of permissiveness.

While we may regard Spain as fundamentally modern and European, there are some features of Spanish culture which do distinguish Spain from other European countries, and some of them have a significant impact on Spanish politics. These will be discussed in greater detail later, but for comparative purposes should be succinctly summarized at this point:

1. Amiguismo: At least until the recent past, Spaniards relied heavily upon personal recommendations and personalistic networks (in some instances, full-fledged patrons in patron-client networks) in their dealings with officialdom. Within the political elite, as well, personal networks often constituted important political resources and channels for political communication, recruitment, and interest articulation.

2. Anticapitalism: A diffuse anticapitalism was characteristic of opinions on both the left and the right poles of the political spectrum. This general stance is declining but still pervasive at the mass level. Over the past few years political elites within the largest parties of the left and right (the Socialist PSOE and Alianza Popular, respectively) have more fully endorsed the merits of the free market either in words (AP) or deeds (the PSOE in government). Even at its peak, however, this anticapitalist stance was always characterized by...

3. Moderation: Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, studies of Spanish public opinion revealed that the vast majority of Spaniards were to be found near the center of the political spectrum. There has been a gradual shift to the left since the mid 1970s, and a decrease in the number of persons placing themselves at or near the exact center of the continuum (probably representing a gradual depopulation of the "mantis", as "false centrists" progressively learned about politics and the meaning of the left-right continuum); but the modal opinion among Spanish voters today is still of the moderate center-left. This moderation also characterizes the most important "parliamentary subcultures" of contemporary Spain. In sharp contrast with the Second Republic (where extremist anti-system parties and movements could be found on both left and right), there are today no significant parties of the extreme left or extreme right outside of the Basque country.4

4. Political passivity: Spaniards are less interested in and involved with politics than most other Europeans. Levels of electoral turnout are usually below the average for industrialized societies. Membership in political parties and other secondary organizations is also quite low. Low levels of affiliation may be related to...
5. Individualism: Some scholars have argued that Spanish culture is characterized by high levels of individualism and a low sense of civic commitment, resulting in high levels of tax evasion (see Díaz-Plaja:65-81).

6. Gregariousness: At the same time that Spaniards defend their individuality, they are also regarded as gregarious, and as placing much value on friendly interpersonal relations. I have also found Spanish political elites, in particular, to be open, congenial and honest.

7. Dependence on television for news: Newspaper and magazine readership is below the European average, while television viewing is relatively high.

8. The personalization of politics: Given low levels of “social partisanship” in Spain (i.e., parties are not well rooted in secondary associations), low levels of party identification (in part, due to the relative novelty of partisan competition), and a heavy dependence on television as a source of political information, the images of party leaders have played perhaps disproportionately important roles in the dynamics of electoral competition.

9. “The family demons”: While Francisco Franco may have been incorrect about the degree to which “the family demons” of “anarchic spirit, negative critique, lack of solidarity among men,” etc., were integral parts of a Spanish national character, the almost pathological propensity of party elites to engage in disruptive and occasionally destructive intra-party conflicts may be rooted in some aspects of an elite-level political subculture as yet unexplored by social scientists. These qualities stand in sharp contrast with the pervasiveness of amiability and gregariousness which constitute distinguishing features of Spanish culture in the aggregate.

10. Elite compromise and democratic stability: While political elites have engaged in unseemly intra-party squabbles, inter-party relationships have been, with few exceptions, quite civil and even amiable. The moderation of inter-party conflict (which was at least in part a product of the unusually keen historical memories of Spanish political elites) greatly facilitated the transition to democracy. The absence of disruptive partisan conflict and the positive roles played by the King at several crucial junctures have decisively contributed to the consolidation of Spanish democracy at the national level.

11. Some regional subcultures greatly affect politics: The Basque and Catalan regions are so distinct that they have developed party systems with entirely different dynamics and dominant parties. In addition, the present democratic regime is not yet fully consolidated within Euskadi, and among a politically significant sector of the Basque population independence is preferred over continued membership within the Spanish state.

12. Increasingly European: Spaniards have shifted decisively in the manner in which they perceive Spain as relating to the rest of the world. Traditional self-images had combined elements of isolationism (neutrality in both World Wars being a result) with perceived status as a “bridge” to Latin America in the west, and to the Middle East and the Arab world. EEC membership and NATO membership have been accompanied by a shift towards seeing Spain as an integral member of the West European community of democratic nations.

Let us now turn our attention to a more detailed exploration of the manner in which important features of Spanish culture have been affected by this extensive development of Spain’s economy and social structure.

SOCIOECONOMIC CHANGE AND ITS IMPACT ON CULTURE

The largely rural, agrarian underdeveloped Spain of the 1930s — with the country’s few industrial zones largely limited to Catalunya and Euskadi — no longer exists. Since the early 1960s, Spanish society has been rapidly and profoundly transformed. The motor powering this development was an economic growth rate which averaged 7.3% per year in real terms between 1961 and 1973, producing a cumulative expansion in real Gross National Product of 147% during this time period (Gunther, 1980:63). An additional force for change was an opening up of the Spanish economy and society, which greatly increased exposure of Spaniards to foreign values and styles of life. By the end of the 1970s over 40 million foreign tourists visited Spain annually; and between 1960 and 1973 over 2 million Spanish workers were temporarily employed in other European countries (Rodríguez Osuna, 1985:39).

The extent of these changes can be appreciated by examining the occupational structure of the Spanish economy at various intervals. In 1930, approximately 50% of all Spanish workers were employed in the agricultural sector. By way of comparison, the percentage of the labor force in the agricultural sector that same year in France was 27%, in Germany 22%, and in the United Kingdom only 10% (Linz, 1981a:365). Compared with other West European countries, the Spanish economy at the time of the Second Republic (Spain’s previous experiment with democracy) could be regarded as underdeveloped. Little change took place during the two decades following the Civil War. But as can be seen below, the economic takeoff which began around 1960 rapidly transformed the Spanish economy into a more modern structure not greatly unlike those of other contemporary West European countries.

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<th>Percentage of Economically Active Population in Each Sector</th>
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<td>Industry</td>
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(Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, España: Anuario Estadístico, various years.)
Accompanying this restructuring of the economy has been a massive shift of residential patterns from rural to urban. In 1930, 57% of the Spanish population resided in towns with fewer than 10,000 inhabitants, and 21% of all Spaniards lived in towns or villages with less than 2,000 inhabitants. By 1981, these figures had fallen to 27% and 9%, respectively. And over these same five decades, residents in cities larger than 100,000 increased from 15% of the population to 42%. By the end of this migratory process, Spain was about as urbanized as the average European country.9

What has been the impact of these social changes on Spanish culture, particularly those values, norms and practices most relevant to politics?

Caciquismo, Amiguismo and Village Culture

Numerous anthropological studies have been undertaken in Spain examining in great detail the dynamics of social life, and the nature of dominant values and beliefs.10 Most of these studies have focused upon small villages, and have reached similar conclusions: Village residents had a highly localized image of reality, with strong communal loyalties and attitudes of rivalry or suspicion verging on xenophobia towards neighboring villages and the outside world. Religion (particularly local saints and relics) exerted a powerful unifying and integrative influence on village society. In politics, villagers exhibited a “subject” orientation (cf., Almond and Verba, 1963; and Lerner, 1958). They deferred to the authority of village headmen (caciques) in electoral matters: as a villager said to Pitt-Rivers, “When they tell me to vote, I ask, who for, and when they tell me who for, I vote. And if they don’t ask me to vote, I stay at home and mind my own business” (Pitt-Rivers, 1954:159).

Caution must be exercised so that the findings derived from studies of very small villages (typically in the north of Spain or in isolated mountain valleys) are not inappropriately extrapolated to other parts of the country as well. Gilmore (1976), for example, found in a survey of this literature that 26 of the 27 studies he examined dealt with villages having fewer than 2500 inhabitants, and most of them were smaller than 1000 in population. He found very different patterns of beliefs and social interactions in his own study of an “agro-town” of 8000 in Andalucia. In place of the integrative function of religion reported in many other studies, for example, he found that “religion and ceremonial practices often provoke higher active negative reactions which ignite class conflict, thereby reinforcing class polarization” (p. 96). And he found that class tensions within the community were more salient and intense than feelings of hostility or suspicion between neighboring towns.

Before the findings of these anthropological studies may be properly assessed, some caveats are clearly in order. First, the geographical location of the village is of considerable importance. In general terms, the northern rural regions differ profoundly in their social structural characteristics from southern towns (except, perhaps for isolated sierra villages). Peasants in the north tend to own their own lands, and class differences are minimal; the rural populations of Andalucia,

Extremadura and La Mancha, on the other hand, are predominantly landless day-laborers, often employed on huge latifundia, and they tend to reside as a “rural proletariat” in agro-towns.11 Consequently, social differences and class tensions are more acute in the south. Reinforcing these social-structural differences are differences in religious practice: northern peasants tend to be much more religious than their southern counterparts.12 Also, in contrast with the political conservatism of the northern peasantry, agricultural workers in the south have a long tradition of radicalism.

Second, the size of the town or village is of considerable importance. Gilmore places great stress on the “sociopolitical divergences between the homogeneous, unaminist and ‘independent’ peasant society, and the more complex and heterogeneous town society” which he studied (1976, p. 99). We must be aware that the village society so exhaustively scrutinized in most anthropological studies is rapidly vanishing, and is no longer representative of Spanish society in the aggregate. By 1981, the share of the Spanish population residing in towns under 2000 had fallen to 9%, and the portion inhabiting villages under 1000 amounted to less than 5% of all Spaniards. Thus, Gilmore warns against the dangers inherent in extrapolating from studies of small villages, and thereby exaggerating the applicability of the romantic village integration perspective (1976:101).

Finally, we must be aware that an agricultural revolution has taken place in Spain over the past two decades, mainly as a result of the large-scale mechanization of agriculture. A new prosperity has spread to many areas previously regarded as poor and backward (see Harding, 1984). This has led to a substantial transformation of class relations in rural Spain, with considerable political implications. With these caveats in mind, let us briefly examine one feature of village society which in the past had a substantial impact on the nature of Spanish politics, and which still exists in some rural areas — caciquismo.

Prestigious and sometimes economically powerful local nobles (caciques) exerted such a powerful impact on electoral politics under the Restoration monarchy (1876-1923) that one prominent scholar has concluded that we cannot speak of democratic politics in Spain prior to the founding of the Second Republic in 1931.13 In the vast majority of constituencies (virtually all of those outside of large cities), caciques manipulated local electorates in a carefully orchestrated game of pseudo-competition between the two dominant parties. The key to this system was the patron-client relationship which linked voters to local caciques who were, in turn, connected to influential individuals and bureaucratic agencies in Madrid. As Varela explains, “The power of caciques is derived from their ability to act as transmission belts between local interests and the Administration” (Varela, 1977:292). This relationship can be beneficial for poorly educated or illiterate peasants. Christian (1972) argues that in many villages the intervention of caciques or other literate elites in resolving official matters was necessary since, from the peasant’s viewpoint, bureaucrats and judges spoke an unintelligible language. Overall, electoral domination by caciques required the existence of a “largely
apolitical and even illiterate mass electorate of the countryside and the provincial cities and towns" (Linz, 1967:198).

Patron-client relationships of a different kind received an additional boost from certain characteristics of the Franquist regime. I argued in an earlier study (1980) that, somewhat paradoxically, elite recruitment, interest articulation, and policy deliberations within General Franco's authoritarian regime could best be regarded as taking place within a "power vacuum." The dynamics of interpersonal relations, and especially amiguismo (the use of personalistic networks as a political instrument), played a disproportionately important role in the absence of "coercive resources" commonly employed in other regimes.14 Amiguismo was especially important in elite recruitment and lobbying efforts.15 In a later study of the reestablishment of political parties under the new, democratic regime, I also found that personal networks often served as embryonic structures upon which party organizations were built, at least with regard to the two main parties of the center and right, the Unión de Centro Democrático (UCD) and Alianza Popular (see Gunther, Sani and Shabad, 1986:133-139 and 170-177). Thus, in the 1970s amiguismo was a significant feature of elite political culture.

Both caciquismo and amiguismo appear to have declined in recent years. Caciquismo has disappeared from all but rural areas in Galicia, parts of Old Castile and León, and isolated villages in Andalucia. Economic development and migration have drastically undermined this institution. As argued above, caciquismo requires the existence of a sizable bloc of poorly-educated peasants. Lacking the ability to read, understand, and effectively respond to bureaucratic publications and proceedings, a peasant may find an educated and influential intermediary to be a powerful ally. The loss of political autonomy which inevitably accompanies the cacique's intervention is regarded as less important than the tangible gains which the client receives in return. Education, literacy, and improvement of communications media increase the ability of citizens to fend for themselves, and the increasing desire to participate more actively in politics, which is a product of socio-economic modernization and education, makes the loss of political autonomy to the cacique seem all the more objectionable.

Since economic development has, by and large, eroded away the underpinnings of caciquismo, that institution has survived only in a few areas and under certain conditions. It has often taken on a more coercive form, far removed from the feelings of mutual admiration and respect which helped to stabilize traditional patron-client relations. In his modern guise, the cacique is often head of the local branch of the Cajas de Ahorro (savings and loan); approval of a loan to a client was alleged to be contingent upon political support for the patron, in the opinion of some provincial-level party elites I interviewed in 1978 and 1979. Those interviews also suggested that the level of economic development interacts with the geophysical properties of the province as determinants of the survival of caciquismo. Caciquismo had disappeared from large urban areas by the end of the 19th century (Tuseill, 1978). It is now entirely absent from those areas linked to metropolitan centers by adequate transportation networks, but it survives in economically undeveloped areas which are also physically isolated from important political and administrative centers. One example is the interior of Galicia, where the population is scattered across nearly 40,000 separate nuclei of population in hilly or mountainous valleys, poorly linked to one another by an inadequate transportation system. Under these circumstances, exposure to political stimuli may be low, and the utility of a caciquil intermediary in dealing with official matters in far-off bureaucratic offices may still be considerable.

Amiguismo has also declined, in large part as a product of socioeconomic development. Juan Linz has provided strong evidence supporting the thesis that particularism is displaced by universalism as societies develop economically. His data also show that belief in ascription as a basis of status declines and achievement criteria increase in importance as a product of development (Linz, 1969). The extent to which amiguismo has declined in recent years can be seen in two waves of survey data collected one decade apart. In 1968, Juan Linz and Amando de Miguel asked a large sample of Spaniards "What do most people in Spain do to resolve an official matter?" Respondents were presented with three universalistic options (work through normal channels, resolve the matter personally, and hire a lawyer or agent), and three particularistic alternatives (use friendships, favors or acts of courtesy, and "recommendations" — i.e., a written introduction from a friend of the relevant official). In 1979, we included that same item in our survey of the attitudes and political behavior of 5,439 Spanish citizens. During that eleven-year period the number of persons preferring the universalistic channels increased from 39% to 72%, while those selecting particularistic contacts declined from 61% of all respondents to 41%.17

Amiguismo at the elite level of Spanish society and politics may also have declined substantially (see Gunther, Sani and Shabad, 1986). Unfortunately, no systematic data are available which would enable us to compare Spain with other West European countries in this respect. Overall, I would contend that amiguismo has decreased in political importance as a consequence of social modernization and the institutionalization of political parties, although I suspect that it continues to play a more important political role than in northern European countries.

Secularization

An intense religious commitment probably did distinguish Spain's culture from the cultures of other West European countries until the recent past. Survey data from the early 1970s reveal much more widespread attendance at religious services than was typical of European societies (see Monier, 1986:137). The institutional presence of the Church in Spanish life was also greater. Under the Franquist regime, Spain was a confessional state. In 1961, 49% of all students at the secondary level attended Church-operated schools (Payne, 1984:186), and even in public schools religious training was a mandatory component of the curriculum at all grade levels. Franco reserved key ministerial posts for individuals who were strong defenders of Church interests, and involved Church officials in the censorship of movies and printed matter.
But a rapid and extensive secularization of Spanish society has taken place within the past few years. In 1965, over 80% of all Spaniards described themselves as practicing Catholics; by 1983 only 31% described themselves as "practicing Catholics" or "very good Catholics" (Montero, 1986:134-135). Similarly, as recently as 1976, only 17% of those interviewed in a nationwide survey described themselves as "non-practicing," "indifferent" or "atheist"; in a period of only seven years, that segment of the Spanish population rose to 45% (Montero, 1986:135).18

This process of secularization does not mean that anticlerical sentiments are again on the rise in Spain — indeed, the absence of anticlericalism in Spain today stands in sharp contrast with the Second Republic. Neither does it imply that a complete rejection of religious belief has taken place. A poll taken in 1985 indicated that Spaniards ranked fifth among a large number of Western industrial societies in terms of the importance that persons claim religion plays in their lives — behind the United States, Ireland, Canada, and Italy (Montero, 1986:133). In addition, the comparative study of contemporary values in Europe undertaken by Orizo, Stoetzel, et al., showed that more Spaniards claimed to believe in God (87%) than the average European (75%) (Stoetzel, 1982:339). But this process of secularization has led to a marked decrease in the level of religious commitment of most Spaniards. The demographic locus of the secularization process suggests that it may continue into the future, although at a reduced rate of change: younger Spaniards are far less religious than the old.19 While forecasting the future is always a risky business, it seems reasonable to expect that as the oldest age cohorts pass out of the Spanish population, replacement by their less religious successors will further reduce the aggregate level of religiosity in Spain.

Secularization has also been accompanied by a drastic decline in the organizational infrastructure and institutional presence of the Church. Even prior to the acceleration of this process in recent years, Spain had lagged behind several other European countries in this respect. No Church-sponsored trade union of any significance exists today, and only since 1982 has a nationwide Christian democratic political (i.e., outside of Euskadi and Catalunya) succeeded in electing Deputies and Senators to the Cortes — and that party, the Partido Demócrata Popular, may not survive its disastrous defeat in the 1987 municipal elections. This infrastructural weakness has been exacerbated by the serious shrinkage of the religious sector of education. Between 1965 and 1984, students in state-operated secondary schools increased from 19% to 70% of total secondary school enrollment (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 1966 and 1985), while the number of senior seminary students in Spain declined from 8000 in 1965 to 1728 in 1982 (Payne, 1984:219).

Montero argues that this process of secularization is the product of socioeconomic modernization in Spain: the underpinnings of religious practice were eroded away by industrialization and the transformation of the occupational structure; by urbanization and the shift to more modern life styles; and by the emergence of a new, educated middle class (Montero, 1986:133). It is not my intention to try to explain why this process of secularization has taken place, although it is noteworthy that one facet of Montero's argument is substantiated by a detailed anthropological study.20 The consequences of secularization, however, are of considerable significance for Spanish politics.

Reading, Viewing, Consuming and Participating

The economic take-off of the past two decades has transformed Spain into a mass-consumption society. Between 1958 and 1980 the percentage of family income devoted to food, clothing, and housing decreased from 74% to 55%, while the amount left over for vacations and other discretionary spending increased from 18% to 35% (Teyanos, 1984:50). The cumulative result has been the raising of patterns of consumption to typical European levels. Between 1966 and 1980, the percentage of families with at least one television set increased from 32% to well over 90%; families with refrigerators increased in number from 28% to 91%, while those with washing machines rose from 36% to 80%; and families with automobiles increased from 12% to 52% (Tezanos, 1984:53). In one important aspect of modernity, however, Spain lags substantially behind the European average: education and literacy levels are below standard. This is one legacy of the Franquist regime which will take considerable time to overcome. As a result of the budgetary austerity characteristic of the last 15 years of that regime, public spending on education during the 1960s was abysmally low. A 1965 study revealed that Spain's level of government spending on education (as a percentage of its GNP) placed it in a tie with Angola in 122nd place out of the 131 countries surveyed (Gunther, 1980:67-70)!

These levels of education spending were the lowest in Western Europe — significantly lower even than those of Greece and Portugal which were less developed economically. Fewer than 40% of children attended school beyond the age of 13. As a result, estimates of illiteracy in the mid-late 1960s ranged between 8% and 13% of the total adult population. An important reform enacted in 1970 has moved Spanish education rapidly towards European standards: by 1981 the illiteracy rate had fallen to 5.4% of the adult population. This represents a significant improvement, but when one realizes that illiteracy rates were below 5% in Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, France, England and Scandinavia as early as 1900, Spain must be regarded as a laggard. In the absence of adult education programs, the rate of illiteracy in Spain will decline only gradually, as the poorly educated older age cohorts pass on.21

Associated with these relatively low levels of educational attainment and literacy are patterns of exposure to communications media which depart substantially from the European average. A 1978 study undertaken by the Ministry of Culture found that only 22% of the 31,000 Spaniards sampled claimed to read a newspaper or magazine every day; another 12% said they read several times a week; and 9% claimed to read a newspaper or magazine about once a week. Over half of those sampled stated that they never read newspapers or magazines (Ministerio de Cultura, 1978:25). Corroborating these findings, and setting Spain in comparative perspective, Stoetzel, et al. found that 47% of Spaniards regularly or occasionally read newspapers or magazines. This figure was substantially below the European average (65%), not to mention the much higher scores for Ireland (75%), the United Kingdom and West Germany (82%), and Denmark and Holland.
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(87%). Only Italy (46%) and France (50%) were close to Spain's low level of exposure to the print media (Stoetzel, 1982:64).

In sharp contrast, in 1978 (when fewer Spaniards owned televisions than they do today) 80% of those interviewed by the Ministerio de Cultura claimed to watch television every day, and another 8% said that they watched at least once a week. In 1978 only 8% said that they never watched television (ibid:38); by 1985 that figure had fallen to 1%. These findings are of considerable relevance to Spanish electoral politics, insofar as news about politics tends to come disproportionately from the broadcast media. The 1984 survey conducted by Barnes, McDonough, and López Pina found that 46% of those interviewed often followed political news on radio or television, and another 28% did sometimes. By way of comparison, only 23% often and 19% sometimes read about political news in newspapers. Thus, Spaniards are almost twice as dependent upon television and radio as sources of news about politics as they are dependent on the print media. As I have argued elsewhere, this heavy dependence upon television as a source for political news, in combination with the low level of "social partisanship" which is also characteristic of Spanish society, has led to the disproportionate impact of the image of each party's national leader as a determinant of the vote (Gunther, 1986c).

It has often been demonstrated in political science that socioeconomic modernization and increased literacy usually are associated with increased levels of political interest, information, and involvement. Thus, one could argue that additional consequences of Spain's delayed modernization and poor educational structure may be the low levels of interest in politics exhibited by Spaniards, low levels of organizational affiliation (especially with political or quasi-political groups), and relatively low levels of voting turnout.

Despite the great interest in the Spanish transition to democracy exhibited by political scientists and other international observers, Spaniards have remained remarkably detached from the political evolution of their own country. Apart from a temporary increase as the transition to democracy began, levels of interest in politics have stubbornly remained low, and expressions of complete disinterest in politics are more widespread among Spaniards than among citizens of any other Western European country except Italy.24

This lack of interest appears to be accompanied by feelings of powerlessness and confusion about political matters. In both our 1979 and 1982 surveys, we asked respondents if they agreed with the statement that "Government and politics sometimes appear to be so complicated that a person like me cannot know what is happening." Not only did the level of agreement with that statement remain unchanged at 60% throughout this period, but the number of persons disagreeing with that statement actually decreased, from 21% in 1979 to 18% in 1982. Spaniards also felt more distant from political parties than most Europeans: in 1982 only 29% felt "close" to political parties, compared with the European average of 38% (Stoetzel, 1982:64).

Finally, Spaniards are less actively involved with politics, as well as with a wide range of secondary organizations than other Europeans. They turn out to vote in elections less regularly than most Europeans, but more frequently than Americans (see Montero, 1984a, 1984b, 1984c and 1987a; and López Pintor, 1981). Relatively few of them affiliate with political parties (Montero, 1981; and Bartolini, 1980), and the infrastructure of secondary associations in Spain (particularly those linked to political parties) is substantially less developed than in most other industrialized societies.25

It would be incorrect to attribute this low level of involvement in politics entirely to the delayed development of the Spanish economy or to its still lagging levels of educational achievement. Other factors almost certainly contributed to the comparative lack of political involvement found in Spain. In any effort to explain the relatively low voting turnout levels of most elections, for example, López Pintor points out that one must take into consideration the sheer exhaustion of the Spanish electorate. In a period of just over two years Spaniards were called to the polls on five separate occasions; in just over three years, Andaluces were asked to vote six times, and Basques and Catalans seven times. It is perhaps unreasonable to expect voters to expend the time and effort necessary to cast ballots so frequently (López Pintor, 1981:43).

A more significant explanation is set forth by Montero: apathy and non-involvement may be part of Franco's legacy. He argues that the basic features of the Franquist political culture may be summarized in "four terms: demobilization, depoliticization, apathy and anti-partyism" (Montero, 1981:30). Linz (1970a and 1975c) would add that, despite the rhetoric of the Falange, after about 1943 the Franquist regime had no interest in mobilizing the Spanish population for the purpose of any radical transformation of society. Citizens were expected to be passive and obedient rather than active and participatory.26 The widespread lack of political interest under Franco was not surprising, given the stultifyingly colorless nature of the news broadcast by government-run radio and television stations, and restrictions of press coverage of partisan political developments.27 My own personal observation in the 1970s was that, for most people, repression was unnecessary: they were simply bored into passivity.

Demobilization and depolarization were also important factors of the transition to democracy in Spain, and they further reduced the excitement of political participation during a crucial stage of autodidactic development.28 Finally, Díaz-PiJaJa contends that a pronounced emphasis on individualism remains a continuing feature of Spanish culture, and suggests that the resulting commitment to one's personal autonomy may undermine commitments to organizations: "The Spaniard lives with a society," he writes, "but never immersed within it" (1986:62).

Linz also sets forth an historical and structural explanation of the weakness of secondary organizations in Spanish society. He claims that this weakness may partly be attributed to the turbulence and discontinuities characteristic of the previous two centuries: "Perhaps the organization and legitimation of interests requires prolonged periods of political stability; they may to some extent be
incompatible with intense conflicts," he argues. The turmoil of 19th and early 20th century Spanish history "aroused passions, popular mobilizations and violence, which left little room for the defense of more concrete and narrow interests, for bargaining, and for the creation of stable organizations" (Linz, 1981a:367). The development of secondary organizations was also disrupted by the Civil War and by repression under the Franquist regime. The Second Republic had been a period of substantial mobilization, accompanied by excessive politicization of rapidly expanding secondary organizations, especially trade unions. Franco abolished all trade unions and many other politicized secondary organizations, and clandestine efforts to reconstruct them met with repression until the very end of the regime. Even the development of religious organizations (which were not persecuted) was disrupted on the eve of the restoration of democracy. The breakdown of consensus over political, social, and economic values within the network of Catholic Action organizations in the late 1960s plunged those bodies into internal crisis and overt conflict with the Church hierarchy. As a result, by 1972 total membership in Catholic Action and all its ancillary organizations had fallen to 100,000, down from nearly a million the decade before (Payne, 1984:198).

Whatever the causes, the consequences of these low levels of involvement with political parties and voluntary associations are of considerable importance. As Barnes, McDonough, and López Pina (1985) have shown, levels of stable identification with political parties are quite low. The high level of volatility exhibited by Spanish voters in the 1982 election is at least in part attributable to the absence of this kind of psychological anchor of partisanship in Spain. Similarly, the absence of links between parties and strong secondary associations also deprives partisan alignments of important social-structural sources of stability. This is due both to the weakness of the secondary organizations themselves—especially trade unions, membership in which is lower than in any other West European country—and to the absence of linkages between the voluntary associations and political parties, which is particularly significant with regard to religious groups (see Gunther, Sani and Shabad, 1986, chapter 6).

The weakness of secondary organizations and mass parties has also undermined the capacity of the political system to provide for the articulation of interests and contain that basic political function within proper institutional channels. Orízco wrote prophetically in 1983, "The mobilization potential of the Spanish population is greater than the degree of political commitment which it is willing to assume. Mobilization is the triumph of the moment, of impulse, of short-term action, and with a specific objective, as contrasted with the permanent commitment implied by work with a political party or even merely being affiliated with one" (p. 374). The waves of disruptive strikes and the violent student protests of early 1987 are perhaps examples of what can happen when the ineffective articulation of interests through weak secondary organizations gives way to direct action.

A TRADITION OF DISCONTINUITIES

In Spain there has been no continuous flow of tradition, no continuous transmission of a cultural heritage, no continuous process of selection of the past to be shared and incorporated into the present. The history of few countries is perceived in such conflictual terms as by the Spaniards who talk about 'two Spains' in permanent struggle, or as a genuine Spain and an 'anti-Spain' that needs to be destroyed to save the true essence of the nation... Intellectuals have confronted Spaniards with the choice to approve or reject in toto long periods of their history, to choose sides for or against almost any of the great decisions that affected its development... [Thus], it becomes difficult for the 20th century Spaniard to use tradition as consensus through time... Tradition as presentness of the past is limited.

(Linz, 1972:2 and 66)

In his brilliant essay on "Tradition and Modernity in Spain," Juan Linz argues that repeated patterns of abrupt and discontinuous change which took place in the 19th and early 20th centuries, in conjunction with the polemical use of history by politicians and scholars alike, have undermined the potentially unifying and integrative functions of traditional institutions. I argued at the beginning of this essay that the modal set of beliefs, values, and norms which emerged from 16th century Castile are, by and large, not relevant to culture and politics in Spain today. One reason, as argued above, is that a profound modernization of Spanish society has taken place, irrevocably transforming the environment within which values, beliefs, and behavioral norms develop. I would now like to turn my attention to a second reason for the breakdown of cultural and political traditions in Spain—the behavior of social and political elites. In agreement with Linz, I shall argue that the past behavior of political elites—specifically, repeated clashes between increasingly polarized alternatives, leading to pendulum swings in policies and governmental structures—has precluded consensual acceptance of a large number of symbols and institutions. The creation of a new democracy in the late 1970s was successful not because (as Shils would have recommended) it built upon inherited traditions, but because the founding elites strove to escape from the past, or at least not to repeat the errors of their predecessors. Let us begin this discussion with a brief summary of the patterns of discontinuous change which undermined consensus over the Church, the monarchy and the basic institutions of government. We shall then explore the present status of each of these sets of institutions which, fortunately, can best be characterized by an abandonment of the polarization of the past.

The Church

In his history of Catholicism in Spain, Stanley Payne claims that "Religion played a much more direct role in the original definition of a Spanish identity and culture than was the case in most western countries" (1984:xi). Indeed, since the current boundaries of Spain were secured through protracted warfare against Islamic armies, Catholicism played a special role in defining the new state and
distinguishing it from its predecessors. And since the "reconquest" of Iberia was undertaken by kingdoms and peoples speaking different languages and having different cultural traditions, Catholicism was the only thing which the founders of the Spanish state initially shared in common. Moreover, it has been argued that until the 18th century the Church functioned as an integrating and leveling institution. It was a relatively independent national Church, and it often intervened on behalf of the poor (Brenan, 1974).

By the late 18th century, however, signs of Church-state tension began to appear, and by the mid 19th century the Church had become a source of division rather than national integration. Repression of liberals following the accession to the throne of the reactionary Fernando VII (1814-1822, restored to the throne through the intervention of French troops in 1823) began the process which progressively alienated liberals from the Church. The outbreak of the first Carlist War (1833-1840) following the death of Fernando even more drastically polarized Spanish society between proponents of an ultra-reactionary clericalism and the growing ranks of anticlerical liberals. Enactment of anticlerical liberal legislation in 1835 led to expulsion of the Jesuit order (the Jesuits were expelled from Spain on four separate occasions during the 18th and 19th centuries!), but more importantly, closed large numbers of convents and monasteries, and confiscated Church lands, thereby transferring ownership of about 15% of the surface area of the country (Payne, 1984, p. 84). It has often been argued that a qualitative change in relations between the Church and various social groups occurred as a result of the confiscation of Church lands and, in exchange (according to the terms of a 1851 Concordat), state subsidization of the Spanish Church. Loss of its economic independence forced the Church into the arms of reactionary propertied classes, thus alienating itself from middle-class liberals and working-class Spaniards. These tensions culminated in sporadic outbreaks of anticlerical violence.

The founding of the Second Republic coincided with an upsurge of anticlerical sentiments which were reflected in the Constitution of that regime. This situation helped to alienate both the Church and religious Spaniards from the new regime, and drove them into the arms of the Franquist forces who eventually overthrew the Republic. Upon founding his authoritarian regime, Franco restored numerous privileges and financial assets to the Church, and again converted Spain into a confessional state. Thus, the 150-year period which preceded the founding of the present democratic regime was marked by increasing polarization of opinions over the proper role of the Church in Spanish society, and by drastic pendular swings between conservative or reactionary confessionalism and its anticlerical opposite.

Fortunately, by the late 1970s two developments had occurred which contributed to far-reaching compromises over the role of the Church in a newly democratic Spain, and helped to stop the pendulum somewhere in the middle. One of these was a marked shift in the values, calculations, and behavioral styles of the constituent political elites, but this was preceded by a profound transformation of the Church itself. During the 1960s the Spanish clergy abandoned both its reactionary heritage and its close association with the Franquist regime. Vatican Council II encouraged the adoption of new attitudes and a significant shift in the political orientations of the Spanish clergy, especially among younger priests. Some priests even played active roles in the clandestine opposition to the Franquist regime, particularly within Euskadi. The extent of these changes should not be exaggerated, however. The Spanish Catholic Church did not as a collectivity move sharply to the left during this period. Indeed, many older priests and several bishops steadfastly remained right-wing in both their social and political views. These changes did mean, however, that by the final decade of the Franquist era the Church could by no means be regarded as a homogeneously conservative institution.

Perhaps more important as a factor contributing to a depolarization of attitudes towards the Church was its policy of avoiding partisan entanglements during the decisive stages of the transition (1975-1979). Under the leadership of Cardinal Tarancón, the Church refused to endorse any specific political party and avoided playing a visible role during the drafting of a new Constitution. While it has become more active in political controversies in recent years, its ostensible partisan neutrality and its low profile during the transition insulated the Church from divisive political conflicts during the regime's crucial formative period.

In sharp contrast with the Second Republic, present-day Spanish attitudes towards religion are largely depoliticized and depolarized. No political party has expressed anticlericalism in its public statements or policy proposals. Even the former antagonism between socialism and Catholicism has faded markedly: in our 1982 survey, only 18% of those interviewed said that one could not be a "good Catholic and a good Socialist."

This does not mean that religion has become irrelevant to politics. Several studies have clearly demonstrated that there is a strong association in Spain between religiosity, on the one hand, and left-right self-placement and partisan preference, on the other. Unlike in the past, however, this cleavage is best regarded as latent or potential political conflict, and does not overtly divide Spaniards from one another. Political intervention by the Church has on occasion exacerbated tensions and has given rise to overt conflict. Examples of this occurred during deliberations over public financing of Church-operated schools and the debate over the Socialist government's bill to legalize abortion. Until now, the behavior of religious and political leaders has made it possible to contain these conflicts within reasonable limits, and Spaniards want to keep it that way: a strong consensus has emerged in support of the notion that the Church should not intervene in politics. The electoral disaster experienced by the Christian-democratic PDP in 1987 seems to confirm this widespread desire to keep religion out of politics.

The Monarchy, the Franquist Regime, and the New Democracy

Just as the patterns of abrupt and discontinuous change of the 19th and 20th centuries precluded the "inheritance" of a unifying and integrative religious tradition in Spain, so, too, did they destroy consensus concerning basic political institutions. Over the preceding two centuries, Spain has swung back and forth
between monarchy and republic, democracy and authoritarianism, rigid centralism and regional autonomy. The existence today of a solid consensus in support of a constitutional monarchy and an unevenly decentralized state is the product of conscious acts of creation by contemporary elites, and not the inheritance of a traditional legitimacy.

This is certainly true of the monarchy. The first three-quarters of the 19th century saw monarchs deposed, dynastic disputes erupt, and civil wars fought over the position of Head of State, all of which undermined popular support for this traditional institution. The Bourbon monarchy which was restored in 1875 lasted only until 1931, and ended in disrepute. By the time of Alfonso's hasty abdication, supporters of the monarchy were demoralized and disorganized, and the monarchical tradition had dealt a serious blow.

In the immediate aftermath of the death of Francisco Franco, the status of the new King as a unifying and legitimate head of state was not to be taken for granted. Indeed, PCE leader Santiago Carrillo predicted that historians would refer to him as “Juan the Brief.” The base of his legitimacy was relatively narrow, and was largely restricted to a minority of the population on the right. In part, this was a result of a close association between Juan Carlos and the Franquist regime. Franco explicitly pointed out that his selection of Juan Carlos as his successor represented an instauration of a monarchy, not a restoration. Thus, Juan Carlos owed his position not to tradition, but to appointment by Francisco Franco.

Podolny (forthcoming) analyzes in detail the process by which Juan Carlos established his own legitimacy as a popular and unifying symbol of the new democracy. At the outset, he possessed only the rational-legal legitimacy granted to him by Franco. While this “backward legitimacy” (Di Palma, 1980) was crucial in maintaining the allegiance of the previous regime’s supporters, most importantly the army, it was insufficient as a basis of regime legitimacy. A poll taken at the time of Juan Carlos’ inauguration indicated that only 31% of the population would prefer a monarchy to a republic if the King did not induce political change (Jiménez Blanco, 1997:35-38). Political change, however, necessarily implied betrayal of the Fundamental Principles of franquismo to which Juan Carlos had sworn allegiance, and could have undermined the rational-legal legitimacy acceded him by the former regime’s supporters. Thus, an extraordinary balance would have to be struck between the maintenance of the “backward legitimacy” granted by Franco, and the building of “forward legitimacy” through steady progress towards dismantling the Caudillo’s authoritarian regime — two inherently contradictory tasks.

Recent survey data show consistent patterns of support for Juan Carlos and the basic institutions of the present democracy. They also reveal that attitudes towards Juan Carlos have improved steadily over time (especially following his heroic defense of Spanish democracy in the face of an attempted coup in February 1981), and that nostalgia for the Franquist past has declined. Between 1979 and 1982 the press was full of articles concerning an alleged desencanto (disenchantment or disillusionment) with the new regime. However, survey data indicate that, while there was certainly growing dissatisfaction with the incumbent governments of that period, there was no serious decline in support for democratic institutions; neither could Spain’s relatively low levels of voting turnout be regarded as evidence of alienation from the political system (see Montero, 1984b and 1986b). Survey data collected by Juan Linz in the immediate aftermath of the 1981 attempted coup even demonstrated that support for democracy in Spain at that time was more widespread than mass-level attitudinal support for democracy had been in France in 1968. Finally, accompanying the increase in support for democratic institutions there has been a substantial decline in preference for alternative forms of government.

There are only two exceptions to my overall conclusion that support for the present regime is fully consolidated. Stable support for political parties is still relatively low. Thus, one can speak of Spain today as characterized by an unconsolidated party system set within an otherwise consolidated democracy. The second exception is regional in nature: a significant segment of the Basque population denies the legitimacy of the current regime, and demands the right to secede from the Spanish state.

Barnes has written that “The views of mass publics do not issue full-blown from ‘the people’” (Barnes, et al., 1986:6). Analysis of survey data collected at various intervals during the transition to democracy certainly substantiates this claim. While Spanish public opinion prior to the death of Franco was vaguely predisposed towards evolution in the direction of other West European systems, there was no consensus concerning what form a new regime would take. The DATA survey undertaken in 1975, for example, revealed that few Spaniards identified with the institutions of the Franquist regime, and most were anticipating some kind of change. It also showed that substantial majorities favored expanded civil liberties, such as freedom of the press (74%) and freedom of religion (71%).

At the same time, however, there was no consensus in favor of such a basic democratic principle as freedom of political parties (37%) (Linz, et al., 1981a:10). Neither was there any certainty at all that the future democratic regime would be accepted as legitimate by all politically significant groups, or endorsed by the substantial majority of public opinion seen in the figures presented above. Instead, I agree with Barnes’ suggestion that “Mass opinion ... [is] shaped by the interaction of the public with leaders... and formed by the continuing dialogue of politics” (ibid.). In that dialogue, in the process of founding the present democratic regime, Spanish political elites interacted with one another in such a fashion as to stabilize and depolarize the political atmosphere, and build consensual support for the newly emerging institutions. In this respect, their behavior was markedly different from that of the founders of the Second Republic. It was also markedly different from the “dialogue” which eruped in the Basque country. The recent transition to democracy in Spain has had a lasting impact on the nature of public opinion in Spain, at least so far as its negotiated, evolutionary nature precluded a polarization of group interactions, such as those which doomed the Second Republic and have led to high levels of violence and instability in Euskadi.
Space does not permit even a summary of the process by which the present regime was created (see Carr and Fusi, 1980; Huneuas, 1985; Gunther, 1985a; Gunther and Blough, 1981; and Gunther, Sani and Shabad, 1986). Familiarity with some of its features, however, is essential to an understanding of its success and of the moderation which is characteristic of Spanish public opinion today:

1. It was an evolutionary process, in which there was no abrupt collapse of authority of the outgoing regime. The outgoing authoritarian regime was dismantled under the authority of a head of state selected by Franco, and through institutions and legal procedures established by Franco himself. This contributed “backward legitimacy” to the democratization process in the eyes of the former regime’s supporters.

2. There was moderately rapid and unidirectional progress towards democracy. Lack of visible and sustained progress could have led to frustration on the part of regime opponents, who might have responded by resorting to mass mobilizations in lieu of negotiation and dialogue.

3. It was a process which dismantled but did not repudiate the former regime or punish its elites. There were no vigorous attacks on the former regime’s leaders which might have converted them and their supporters into embittered opponents of the new regime and, perhaps, the core of anti-system parties or movements, or organizers of military rebellions. Instead, as Linz has demonstrated (1981), they were converted into a sizable and politically significant bloc in support of Spanish democracy.

4. The course of the transition was determined primarily through direct negotiations between reformist sectors of the outgoing regime and representatives of all of the significant forces in opposition. While the threat of mass-mobilizations by opposition groups provided a useful stimulus for the making of concessions, the absence of widespread mass mobilizations (except in Euskadi) contributed to successful conflict regulation.

5. Elite negotiations adhered to certain consociational or quasi-consociational principles which greatly facilitated the achievement of consensual agreement. Foremost among these were the privacy of those discussions, the more-or-less proportional representation of all significant political groups, and the explicit abandonment by all participants of majoritarian, winner-take-all rules of conflict resolution.

6. Inter-party consensus extended to both the political and economic arenas. The securing of “social pact” and pursuit of loose fiscal and monetary policies eased potential social tensions during the most critical stages of the transition.

One reason why constituent elites engaged in such moderate, constructive behavior in the transition to democracy is related to important features of elite-level political culture during the mid 1970s — specifically, the “historical memory” of the civil war, and the widespread belief that the cleavages present within Spanish society could still serve as the basis for disruptive conflict which might threaten the democratization process. In numerous interviews with participants in these negotiations, I encountered expressions of grave concern that the errors of the past not be repeated. This awareness of the real threats faced by Spanish party elites helped to induce them to behave in a restrained and moderate manner.41

The success of this negotiated transition precluded a polarization at the mass level of Spanish society, as I have argued, but it also had a positive impact on subsequent elite-level interactions. Interparty fears and suspicions were reduced, confidence in the ability of the system to adequately regulate conflict was increased, and cordial relations were established across party lines — even from one extreme end of the political spectrum to the other. In this respect, the elite-level political culture of contemporary Spain is remarkably different from that of the Second Republic, when ideological posturing, intransigence, and rancorous verbal clashes were much more prevalent.

An improvement in inter-party elite relations has also been facilitated by personal friendships and cordial occupational encounters (particularly within the university community) which began under the Franquist regime — i.e., during a period of forced depoliticization.42 (In one respect, however, this shared university background may have introduced a divisive element into intra-party politics at the elite level. The leadership position of Adolfo Suárez — who was not well educated and was not regarded as an intellectual — was resented by other centrist and conservative political leaders, who felt that their academic records and professional achievements made them superior to the poor boy from Cebreros. Linz goes beyond this specific example to argue that this elitism, or “achieved ascription,” may be a central feature of the values of the traditional bureaucratic middle class (the classe médiale, university professors and the engineering professions).43 In terms of inter-party relations, however, it is clear that personal ties derived from university affiliations have served to dampen the intensity of conflict between party leaders, thus substantially affecting elite-level political culture.)

In addition, social mobility and the greater variety of socializing experiences which accompanies modernization have meant that persons within the same family have come to adopt vastly different political viewpoints.44 Inter-party hostility is almost certainly dampened by the substantial political heterodoxy which now characterizes many families.

In one disturbing respect, however, Spanish political elites have behaved in a manner consistent with their predecessors: they have exhibited an almost pathological propensity to engage in destructive intra-party conflicts. Each and every nationwide party, even the highly institutionalized PNV (Basque Nationalist Party — whose origins can be traced back to the 19th century), has undergone convulsive leadership struggles. Alianza Popular has suffered two major schisms (in one respect, however, this shared university background may have introduced a divisive element into intra-party politics at the elite level. The leadership position of Adolfo Suárez — who was not well educated and was not regarded as an intellectual — was resented by other centrist and conservative political leaders, who felt that their academic records and professional achievements made them superior to the poor boy from Cebreros. Linz goes beyond this specific example to argue that this elitism, or “achieved ascription,” may be a central feature of the values of the traditional bureaucratic middle class (the classe médiale, university professors and the engineering professions).43 In terms of inter-party relations, however, it is clear that personal ties derived from university affiliations have served to dampen the intensity of conflict between party leaders, thus substantially affecting elite-level political culture.)
time the country's largest party in terms of its share of the electorate, progressively disintegrated in advance of the 1982 elections, and suffered such a serious defeat that it has ceased to exist. Even the now predominant PODEMOS (Socialist party) underwent a considerable crisis in 1978-1979, leading to the temporary resignation of Felipe González as party leader. I know of no political elite in any industrialized democracy which has been so prone to self-destructive behavior. Thus, while intraparty relations are restrained and even cordial, the propensity of political elites to engage in intra-party struggles harkens back to the habits of an earlier era.

Apart from monographic studies of individual parties, however, this phenomenon has not been the subject of systematic scholarly investigation. López Pintor and Wert (1982) set forth a promising line of argument, involving what they believed were unusually low levels of inter-personal trust among Spaniards. Unfortunately, the persuasiveness of that argument was substantially undercut by the findings of the very rigorous studies undertaken by Ortzo (1983) and Stoetzel (1982): levels of inter-personal trust measured through several different items were found to be higher among Spaniards than among the populations of other European countries. Díaz-Pajas (on the basis of rather impressionistic evidence) argues that elite-level fragmentation is a manifestation of individualism and the fierce defense of personal autonomy (1986:125-127). My own personal suspicion is that this may be related to traditional values and behavioral styles of the Spanish academic elite. While academic prima donnas are by no means unique to Spain, their heavy representation within the leadership ranks of many parties did distinguish Spain in the 1970s and early 1980s from several other western democracies. Overall, this remains a largely unexplored facet of the Spanish political culture.

SIGNIFICANT SUBCULTURES

Partisan Subcultures

The Franquist regime failed utterly in its efforts to socialize the Spanish population in a manner which might perpetuate that authoritarian system after the death of its founder. None of the electorally significant "partisan subcultures" or "political families" which exist in Spain today may be regarded as inheritors of a Franquist political tradition. This is not to say that the Franquist regime had no impact on the structure of public opinion in Spain: by suspending partisan politics for nearly four decades, and by depoliticizing a formerly polarized society, the state was "wiped clean" for most Spanish citizens. The profound transformation of Spanish society and of the international environment which occurred during the interregnum meant that, by the time competing parties and ideologies began to reemerge in Spain, more moderate options (at least in comparison with the polarized alternatives of the Second Republic) would have greater appeal. The parties and ideologies which dominate Spanish politics today bear little resemblance to those of that earlier period.

During the Second Republic, revolutionary and/or anti-system parties and ideologies could be found on both left and right, and even the behavior of those in the middle could often be regarded as "semi-loyal" (see Linz and Stépan, 1978). One of the largest political families under the Second Republic was anarchism, joined (in some regions) with syndicalism. Anarchism had a particular appeal to the dechristianized rural proletariat of the latifundist south, while anarchosyndicalism had its largest following in Catalunya and Aragón. The extreme commitment to individual freedom in anarchist thought led to a policy oriented towards destroying religion and the state — which were regarded as limiting freedom. The means to achieve this objective involved direct action, and totally eschewed representative political institutions and political parties. The only valid tactic (as described by Gómez Llorente) was "progressive and recurrent agitation (including terrorism) until the day of the revolutionary explosion" (1976:35-36). Anarchosyndicalists added to this general orientation a commitment to a disciplined trade union (the largest of which was the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo), which would keep up the workers' fighting spirit and would strive to bring about a revolutionary general strike. Pragmatic bargaining was displaced by a rigid moralism and belief in the mystique of violence (see Brenan, 1962; and Payne, 1970). The anarchist/anarchosyndicalist political family was the largest on the Spanish left during the first two decades of the 20th century, and labor relations in areas of CNT strength were, indeed, quite violent.

A comparative latecomer was socialism, but by 1936 its organizational presence in the trade union sector had caught up with the CNT. Since, by definition, anarchists do not elect candidates to the national parliament, the socialist PODEMOS was the largest party of the left during the Second Republic, receiving an estimated 16% of the vote in 1936. Socialism in most European countries was ambivalent concerning tactics and ultimate objectives during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The PODEMOS was no exception: it contained both moderate, "parliamentary" factions and supporters of a more revolutionary and militantly obrerista version of socialism; and the intense struggles among them badly divided the Socialist party and contributed to a polarization of Spanish politics in general. The UGT's involvement in the bloody Asturian uprising in 1934 contributed to a worsening of the political climate in Spain during the final two years of the Republic, and led to a perception of the party by its opponents as committed to democratic procedures only insofar as they were useful in attaining revolutionary objectives (see Robinson, 1970).

A "conditional" loyalty to the institutions of the Second Republic was also exhibited by the largest party of the right, the CEDA (Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas). In several respects, this clerical party was different from contemporary Christian Democratic parties. First, in accord with the Papal encyclicals Rerum Novarum (1891) and Quadragesimo Anno (1931), it was committed to the same corporatism as was emerging in Italy and Austria (see Montero, 1977). Second, not only was it not fully committed to the institutions of the Second Republic, but its leader (José María Gil Robles) proclaimed his hostility to the Constitution immediately following inclusion of its anticlerical provisions. Finally, the rancorous tone of the public statements of Gil Robles and other CEDA leaders may not have been unique within the context of the Second Republic, but...
the style of discourse of this political subculture further contributed to the violent
demise of Spanish democracy.46

Even the behavior of the most important "centrist" political family during the
Second Republic — the left-republicanism most clearly represented by Manuel
Azana — had many traits which contributed to the collapse of the Second Republic.
Its harsh anticlericalism, combined with an insensitivity to the wishes of its
opponents and even the passive majority in the middle, contributed to the
polarization of social life.47 Added to this was a verbal style which was described
by Payne as "cold, sneering, sarcastic, sectarian and often brilliantly eloquent."48

An analysis of the basic characteristics of all of the partisan subcultures under
the Second Republic is clearly beyond the scope of this piece. Let me conclude by
simply pointing out that the four described above were the most important which
existed at that time, and that, by no means, were they the most extreme. Spain also
had a classically Stalinist Communist party which, although initially quite small,
grew enormously in numbers and political influence (particularly within the army)
as the Civil War progressed,49 while on the right were fascist and anti-democratic
rightist parties.

The Franquist regime half-heartedly sought to resocialize the Spanish
population. The "ideology" it attempted to teach Spanish school children (as set
forth in Fernández-Miranda, 1966) was one blending features of Spain's religious
traditions with the corporatist principles set down by the founder of Spanish
fascism, José Antonio Primo de Rivera. The Franquist regime explicitly rejected
liberal democratic concepts of universal suffrage as a basis of regime legitimacy
and as a method of elite recruitment. In his "civics textbook," Fernández-Miranda
claimed that universal suffrage is unacceptable as a basis of legitimacy because it
includes no provisions guaranteeing continued adherence to Natural law and divine
law.50 It was also rejected on the grounds that, according to the precepts of
corporatist thought, it is inherently disruptive of social order: the most common
units of organization in liberal democracies, political parties and interest groups, are
"mechanistic," unnatural, inorganic and therefore destructive. Legitimacy was to be
based, instead, upon the regime's alleged roots in Spanish Christian civilization, the
exceptional historical position of the Caudillo, and "representation" through a
system of "organic democracy."

It would be irrelevant for our purposes to delve deeper into the logic of
political legitimacy under the Franquist regime. Even though the regime survived
until the death of its founder, its basic precepts are not taken seriously by any
sectors of society which are electorally significant today, and it is even doubtful
that, by the 1970s, they were taken seriously by more than a small minority of
Spaniards. Political socialization during the final years of the Franquist regime
involved little more than "going through the motions."51 The ineffectiveness of this
socialization process can be seen in survey data gathered just before Franco's death.
López Pintor estimates that only about 15% of the Spanish population actively
identified with the Franquist regime; about 25-30% made up an opposition
subculture which was active, informed and interested in politics; and the remaining
majority (called "the indifferent majority" by López Pintor, 1975, and "the absent majority" by López Pina and Aranguren, 1976) were passive,
uninformed, and uninterested in politics (López Pintor, 1981:17). Indeed, within a
few years after Franco's death, anti-democratic attitudes and a nostalgia for the
Franquist past characterized the sentiments of less than 4% of the Spanish
population (Linz, 1982b:42).

There are several reasons why this effort to resocialize Spaniards failed. The
first is that, by the late 1950s, the initial "ideological" formulations were not even
taken seriously by the governing Franquist elite. Rather than serving as guidelines
for the formulation of public policy or the recruitment of new elites, the
"Fundamental Principles" of franquismo were substantially altered in 1958 to fit
better with the neoliberal capitalism towards which public policy had shifted (see de
Miguel, 1975, and Gunther, 1980). Second, the economic development which that
policy shift helped to make possible opened up the borders of Spain and massively
exposed its citizens to foreign (i.e., democratic) models for emulation. This
exposure occurred through the temporary migration of 2 million workers abroad
and the annual influx of 40 million foreign tourists, and through the expansion of
higher education. Third, the Franquist regime was a "sloppy" authoritarian regime;
the absence of secret police penetration into all but a few centers of active
opposition (such as the Communist party) permitted rebellious subcultures to
emerge, particularly in the universities and industrial zones. Finally, it is likely that
"civics textbook" beliefs are not particularly salient or central for most individuals,
and may therefore be amenable to change. Whatever the reasons, franquismo did
not survive Franco.

The structure of public opinion in Spain today is greatly different from what
it was in the past. As argued above, there is substantial attitudinal support for the
basic institutions of democracy. The prospects for democratic stability are
enhanced as well by the overwhelming moderation which is characteristic of
Spanish public opinion in the aggregate, and by the partisan subcultures which exist
at the national level. Surveys taken since the 1970s have consistently shown that
the great bulk of the Spanish electorate locate themselves just to the left of center.
Very few respondents in our 1982 survey placed themselves near either extreme of
the left-right continuum.52

In their socioeconomic views, Spaniards are somewhat anticapitalist, perhaps
as a result of a convergence on this theme in the past by parties of both left and
right, as well as the Church. Survey data show that, even though a large majority
have consistently endorsed the notion of private personal property, in the mid 1970s
surprisingly large numbers endorsed anticapitalist stands regarding ownership and
management of the means of production.53 Enthusiasm for nationalization has
decreased significantly in recent years, particularly under the "socialist" governments
of Felipe González. Nonetheless, our 1982 survey still showed that more people
(35%) preferred the term "nationalization" over the term "private property" (27%).
More widespread than anticapitalist attitudes are strong preferences for greater
equality in the distribution of wealth,54 as well as acceptance (even among business
elites) of the notion that government has an important role to play in regulating the
Considerable moderation is reflected in the partisan subcultures which exist at the national level. The extreme left and extreme right have virtually disappeared. By 1982, fewer than 1% of Spanish voters cast ballots for parties of the extreme right, and just over 1% supported parties to the left of the PCE (except for extremist regional parties, which will be discussed below). None of the national-level subcultures represented in the Cortes exhibited the anti-system or polarizing traits of their predecessors. Anarchism and anticlerical liberalism have completely disappeared from Spanish politics. The Stalinism of the Communist PCE has given way to a stand which is not antidemocratic: the Eurocommunist consensus projected during the first two democratic elections may have broken down, and the remaining fragments of Spanish communism may have drifted somewhat to the left, but this does not imply that the party has adopted an anti-system or semi-loyal stance (see Mujal-León, 1983a; and Gunther, 1987c). The socialist PSOE, after intense internal debate in 1978-79, has moved away from socialist maximalism: not only have the ambiguities of the past (concerning tactics and ultimate objectives) disappeared, but the PSOE in government has adopted fiscal policies which are more conservative than those of the preceding UCD governments (see Share, 1986; and Gunther, 1986a). The conservative Alianza Popular has moved towards the neoliberal right in economic policies (abandoning the quasi-corporatist rhetoric of some of its initial founders), but, at the same time, has laid to rest all of the initial suspicions concerning its commitment to the new democracy. Only the final ideological or attitudinal configuration of the center remains in doubt. The inchoate nature of public opinion near the center and center-right portions of the left-right continuum, in combination with the present partisan fragmentation of that segment of the available political elite, means that the identities of those individuals or parties who will mold the public opinions of centrist Spaniards are as yet undetermined.

Nevertheless, it is clear that the basic orientations of all of the national-level partisan subcultures are substantially different from those which dominated the politics of the Second Republic. As a result of socio-economic modernization, elite-level “historical learning,” the advent of modern public opinion polling and adoption of “rational, vote-maximizing” orientations by party leaders, and altered postwar circumstances throughout Western Europe (leading to a discreditting of both fascism and Stalinism), moderation, not polarization, is the dominant characteristic of most partisan subcultures. There is, unfortunately, one significant regional exception: Euskadi.

Regional Subcultures

Spain is a multicultural, multilingual, multinational society. Some regions possess distinctive cultural features which are merely analogous to regional variations found in the United States. In this respect, residents of Andalucía are about as different from those residing in Castilla-León as Texans are different from Bostonians — they have different accents, styles of dress, modal values, social outlooks, self images, and political preferences.

But regional variations are much greater in Spain than in societies like the U.S. because of the existence of five regions (Galicia, Catalunya, Valencia, Baleares and Euskadi) within which distinct languages are spoken. In three of these regions, significant social movements and political parties have emerged on the basis of this linguistic and cultural distinctiveness. The pressures they have exerted on governments in Madrid since the death of Franco have culminated in a substantial decentralization of the political system. In Euskadi and Catalunya, these movements have been so powerful as to have created regional party systems whose dynamics are distinct from those found in the rest of Spain. In the Basque provinces, political violence related to demands for independence has posed a grave threat to the stability of the new democratic regime. Let us begin this exploration of regional cultural patterns with a brief description of some modal cultural traits and images not involved with language and national identity, and then move on to a somewhat more detailed look at these more powerful cultural cleavages.

It has often been argued that economic structures and relations which are geographically distinct have had a profound and lasting impact on culture and politics in Spain. Until quite recently, industrialization in Spain was largely restricted to Catalunya, Euskadi, and Madrid, with smaller industrial centers also present in Valencia and the mining districts of Asturias. Thus, those cultural features often associated with urban, industrial working classes were confined to those areas, all but one of which were located in the geographical periphery of Spain. A second broad distinction separated the northern half of the country from the south: since Galicia, Andalucía and the interior of Spain were overwhelmingly agricultural until the 1960s, it is not surprising to find that patterns of land ownership have had a significant social and cultural impact. While many exceptions to these generalizations can be found, it is reasonably accurate to assert that farmers in the northern half of the country tended to own their own land (with most parcels ranging from medium size to small), while in Andalucía the most typical pattern was that of huge estates (laifundia) worked by landless day-laborers (see Malefakis, 1970). Thus, rural areas in the north were populated by a conservative landowning peasantry, while extreme social inequality was characteristic of the south. In Andalucía, in particular, there was considerable polarization between impoverished agricultural workers (who supported leftist parties and/or constituted the core of support for an anarchist movement) and an often reactionary class of landowners. Historians have also contended that these economic patterns were related to geographic differences in aggregate levels of religiosity. As the Spanish Catholic Church tilted towards the right in the 19th century, the urban working classes (especially in Catalunya) and landless agricultural workers in the south became dechristianized, while the landowning peasantry of the north remained religious (see Brenan, 1962, chapter 3).

These patterns are still reflected in the modal beliefs and political preferences of the inhabitants of these regions, as revealed in recent surveys of public opinion. Our 1982 data, for example, reveal that levels of religiosity in Catalunya and...
basics political orientations within these regions are roughly parallel, except for Euskadi (which will be discussed below). A study undertaken by García Ferrando in 1979 revealed that larger numbers of persons placing themselves on the right end of the political spectrum were to be found in Galicia (18%), Castilla-La Mancha (15%), Extremadura (13%), and Castilla-León (12%) than anywhere else in the country, while the highest levels of leftists sentiments were to be found in Euskadi (where 53% placed themselves near the left end of the ideological continuum), Catalunya (the figure for Barcelona province was 43%), and Madrid (42%). These attitudes are clearly reflected in voting patterns. Support for the Communist PCE in the 1983 municipal elections, for example, was greatest in Barcelona, the industrial and mining districts of Asturias, and Andalucía (especially its stronghold in Córdoba). The conservative Coalición Popular, meanwhile, received its highest levels of support in the two Castiles, Galicia and Santander.

Certain other regional cultural attributes have little political impact, but provide interesting insights into how regional subcultures see themselves and each other. A study of regional stereotypes in Spain undertaken by Sangrador García (1981) involved administering an extensive adjective checklist to representative samples of Basques, Catalans, Gallegos, Castellanos, and Andaluces as a means of mapping their perceptions. The resulting data largely confirmed several widespread, traditional stereotypes. Three of the five adjectives most frequently selected to describe Catalans (by themselves and by others) were “practical,” “hard-working” and “entreprising.” This imagery could be traced back over six centuries, to a time when Barcelona was the capital of an outward-looking trading empire, while the Kingdom of Castilla-León consisted of an economically backward and agrarian society (see Vicens-Vives, 1967). Since that time, Catalans have been most commonly seen as entrepreneurial and pragmatic. The Castilian self-image is also deeply rooted in tradition, and conjures up imagery of Don Quixote — “noble,” “honorable,” “simple,” “lovers of their country” and “responsible” are the terms most commonly selected by Castellanos to describe themselves. Unfortunately, this flattering terminology clashes brutally with the adjectives selected by others to describe Castilians: while they agreed that “noble” was appropriate, respondents representing other regions of Spain indicated that they regarded Castilians as “primping” (“chulito,” which can also mean “show-off” and “pimp”), “proud/ arrogant” (“orguillosos”), “conservative,” and “snooty” (“clasiastas” — mired in class or caste distinctions). Andalucíanos were also described in terms which were sometimes less than flattering: “humorous,” “excessive,” “carousing” and “happy-go-lucky” were terms used both by themselves and by other Spaniards. Andaluces departed from the terminology used by others only insofar as they did not describe themselves as “charlatans.” Examining the stereotype of Basques as seen by others leads us into an exploration of the most politically significant aspect of regional subcultures: Basques were described by other Spaniards as “strong,” “separatists,” “lovers of their country,” “valiant” and “extremist” — all of which pertain in varying degrees to activities in support of nationalist aspirations. Let us turn our attention to micronationalist sentiments and, more generally, to linguistic cleavages in Spanish society.

Regional languages are significant features of subcultures in Catalunya, Euskadi, Galicia, Valencia, and the Balearic Islands. However, the presence of distinct languages in these areas (a product of the complex state-building processes which created Spain between the 8th and 15th centuries) is not related in a simple or direct manner to the emergence of micronationalist parties or movements. Nationalism has had a powerful impact on Basque and Catalán politics and society, has exerted much less influence on Gallego politics, and has had very little impact on political life in Valencia and the Balears. Nonetheless, knowledge of the regional language is much more widespread in Galicia and Valencia than in Euskadi. The contemporary political relevance of these cultural attributes is a function of a multiplicity of factors, perhaps most importantly the behavior of political elites during critical stages of the transition to democracy.

Gallego (which is closely related to Portuguese) is the most widely spoken regional language: according to our 1979 survey data, 86% of the residents of Galicia claim to speak Gallego. This compares with the 78% of the residents of Catalunya who claim to speak Catalán, and the 68% of Valencianos who claim to speak Valenciano (which, like Catalán, is most closely related to the Occitanian dialects spoken in portions of southern France). These figures, however, give a somewhat misleading picture of the real strength of these regional languages. Over one third of the inhabitants of Catalunya are immigrants from other parts of Spain (especially Andaluces and Extremaduras), who had no prior knowledge of Catalán. Separating these immigrants from those born in the region, 97% of native-born Catalans are familiar with the Catalán language. Even among the immigrant community, Catalán is spoken by 38%, who had learned the language following their migration to the region. The strength of the Catalán language derives in part from its rich literary tradition, and from the fact that the intellectual, economic, social, and political elites of the region never abandoned the language, even though they also became fully fluent in Spanish. Thus, Catalán remained a viable language for use in a wide variety of settings, including the workplace. This not only meant that native-born Catalans were free to use their regional language in most aspects of daily life, but it also provided a substantial incentive for immigrants from other parts of Spain to learn Catalán as a prerequisite to economic and social advancement (see Laitin and Solé, 1987). This stands in sharp contrast with patterns of language use in other regions. Economic and social elites in Valencia, Euskadi, and Galicia shifted decisively to the use of Spanish as an occupational language, relegating the regional languages to use within the family and among friends. Fluency in Castilian Spanish became the avenue to economic and social advancement in these areas, while the regional languages acquired a certain stigma as tongues spoken primarily in rural areas. In particular, Euskera (the Basque language, which is not an Indo-European language) had experienced a precipitous decline by the end of the Franquist era: by 1970 less than 20% of the inhabitants of the Basque region could speak Euskera, and the level of illiteracy among Basque speakers was a staggering 66%. Roslyn Frank concludes that until “quite recently, in the Basque country to be a Basque-speaker was to be classified as backward, lower class and rural” (see Frank, 1986).
Distinct regional and/or national identities have developed among substantial majorities of the Basque, Catalan, and Gallego populations. There are important differences between regions, however, with regard to the basic nature of these identities and their political relevance. The extent to which these regional identities are incompatible with a "Spanish" identity is certainly significant in this regard. The Basque nationalist identity is more exclusive than that of most Gallegos and Catalans. In our 1979 survey, fully one half of those born in Euskadi regarded themselves as Basque only (the other options being Spanish, more Spanish than Basque, both Basque and Spanish, and more Basque than Spanish); only about 20% of Gallegos and native-born Catalans described themselves in that exclusionary manner. These survey data support our more subjective judgments based on interviews we have conducted over the past decade with leaders of Basque and Catalan parties. Catalan politicians did not hesitate to regard themselves as Spanish. Basque nationalist politicians, however, studiously avoided even the mention of the word "Spain," usually referring, instead, to "the Spanish state" (Shabad, 1986).

Basque and Catalan nationalist beliefs are different in other important ways as well. Catalan nationalism has always been an open, integrative doctrine, which values in a positive manner the extent to which the region has successfully assimilated immigrants through the ages. Nationalist writers defined the Catalan national identity in terms of language and culture (which are acquired attributes). Accordingly, the preservation and furthering of that national identity could be achieved by continued use of Catalan in daily life, and by teaching immigrants Catalan language and customs. Early Basque nationalists, in contrast, defined the Basque national identity principally in terms of "race" (an ascribed characteristic). Consequently, they believed that the best hope for the preservation of that nationality lay in isolation from the foreign influences of immigrants and the Spanish state.

It is important to note that Basque nationalist parties have substantially redefined the basis of national identity since Sabino de Arana's original formulation. The racial criterion originally set forth has been removed, resulting in a more open and assimilative stance vis-à-vis those who are not ethnically Basque. Most Basque nationalists now believe that one need only live and work in Euskadi in order to be considered Basque, while about 30% regard the ability to speak Euskera as the basis of the Basque national identity. Still, a majority of immigrants and nearly half of those over age 55 continue to regard descent from a Basque family as a criterion for identification as a Basque (see Linz, 1986:32-34).

Another important difference between Basque and Catalan nationalist doctrines as originally formulated concerns the ambiguity exhibited by Basques towards the Spanish state. Prior to the Carlist Wars, the fueros which linked Euskadi to the rest of Spain could be regarded as constituting a confederal relationship under which, in earlier centuries, Basques "elected" the King of Spain as their sovereign. This implied a tenous and conditional status within the Spanish state. Basque nationalists, moreover, regarded their fueros as "laws created and legitimized by people who enjoy free sovereignty" (Payne, 1975:76, quoting Sabino de Arana). As such, they could not be amended, eliminated or (as in 1978) reinstated by decisions of Spanish politicians. This latter rationale led representatives of the PNV to walk out of the Cortes during the vote on the new democratic constitution in July 1978, and led the party to campaign on behalf of abstention from the December constitutional referendum. The ambiguous stand towards the new regime by PNV leaders is a continuing source of anxiety on the part of Spanish government officials, as well as a source of considerable tension and conflict.

Contemporary Basque nationalism can be broken down into three politically relevant ideological families. The mainline Basque Nationalist Party has come to place great stress on the preservation of Basque language and culture, and it has for the most part abandoned the original Sabimiano racial definition of nationhood. The PNV, however, still adheres to a relatively conservative (in the Basque context, at least) Christian democratic stance — a substantially modernized version of the original "God and the Old Laws" ideology formulated by Sabino de Arana (see Payne, 1975:72-73). A schism in the party in late 1986 led to creation of a rival centrist party in Euskadi under the leadership of the former president of the Basque regional government, Carlos Garaikoetxea. His new Eusko Alkartasuna advocates a more secular and social democratic version of Basque nationalism (see Llera Ramo, 1987). The third Basque "political family" combines nationalism with a leftist, anticapitalist, social-revolutionary doctrine. This relatively new variety of Basque nationalism stresses the need for a vigorous defense of Basque language, culture, and national interests, combined with radical socioeconomic change. This is the version of Basque nationalism which has been advocated by ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna) and its allied political party Herri Batasuna, as well as by the more pragmatic Euskaldiko Etxera (which merged with sectors of the regional branch of the Eurocommunist PCE in 1982).

Regional subcultures have been relevant to politics in the new democratic Spain in three different respects. First, the emergence of strong nationalist movements after the death of Franco meant that the restructuring of the state would have a prominent place on the new political agenda. Thus, the transition to democracy was accompanied by a profound political and administrative decentralization, culminating in the formation of seventeen regional governments.

Second, regionalist or micronationalist parties have emerged with strong strength in Euskadi and Catalunya, and with significant and increasing support in Galicia. Indeed, support for such parties has increased almost steadily in all three regions since the first democratic elections in 1977. The share of the popular vote for Basque nationalist parties in parliamentary elections rose from 37% in 1977, to 50% in 1979, to 55% in 1982 and 56% in 1986. Support for Catalan nationalist parties has steadily increased during this same period from 22% to 35%, while Gallego parties have enlarged their combined share of the vote in nationwide parliamentary elections from 4% to 12%. In elections for regional parliaments, support for micronationalist parties has been even stronger: 68% of the seats in the current Basque parliament are held by Basque nationalist parties; Catalan nationalist parties hold 51%; and even in the Gallego parliament, representation of
regional nationalist parties has reached 23%. Overall, it can be stated that micronationalism has significantly affected partisan politics in three regions of Spain, and that this influence has grown steadily over the past decade. The impact of nationalism in Euskadi and Catalunya has been so substantial as to have culminated in party systems whose dynamics are distinct from those found in the rest of Spain, while the strength of Basque and Catalan nationalist parties within their respective regional government bodies appears to have made them dominant if not hegemonic.

The third way in which regional subcultures have affected politics in Spain involves violence associated with efforts by a sizable minority of Basques to accede from Spain and create their own nation-state. This violence has exerted a powerfully polarizing influence on politics and culture within the Basque region, but has also posed a threat to the stability of the Spanish democratic regime itself. Between 1975 and 1987 over 600 persons (many of them Spanish police and military officers) had been assassinated, the vast majority of them by the various factions of ETA. Frustrations within segments of the military over this breakdown of order led to several conspiracies against the regime, and one coup attempt which came terrifyingly close to succeeding in February 1981. That Spanish democracy has survived in the face of Basque terrorism and attempted military rebellion (not to mention a national unemployment rate which exceeded 22% by the mid 1980s) provides encouraging evidence that Spain’s new democratic institutions have consolidated and that the post-Franco transition has been successful. Persistent violence and deep political divisions still evident in Euskadi also suggest that an analysis of regime consolidation must clearly distinguish between the polarization and incomplete consolidation of democratic institutions in Euskadi, on the one hand, and the overwhelming success of this process throughout the rest of Spain, on the other.

Indeed, it has been argued that political developments and the basic dynamics of the transition were fundamentally different in Euskadi from what was found in the rest of Spain (see Malefakis, 1982). At the national level, the transition to democracy following the appointment of Adolfo Suárez as prime minister in July 1976 was characterized by demobilization at the mass level and restraint by partisan elites. The principal method of decision making was private negotiation between sets of representative political leaders. The late-Franquist and post-Franco periods in Euskadi, in sharp contrast, were characterized by extraordinarily high levels of mass mobilization over an extended period of time: our 1979 survey data reveal that an astounding 40% of Basque respondents had personally participated in protest demonstrations. The principal arena for the “dialogue” between government and opposition was the streets. The progressive fragmentation and polarization of elite structures (with Basque nationalist parties experiencing repeated schisms, and with ETA itself dividing and subdividing throughout this period) meant that no single set of Basque leaders had the ability to make binding agreements on behalf of all politically active Basque nationalists. In marked contrast with “the politics of consensus” (leading to resolution or satisfactory regulation of differences, and the forging of patterns of behavior based upon civility, tolerance, and mutual respect), the ultimate consequence of the dialectic of rocks, clubs, and tear gas which dominated the transition process in Euskadi was extreme polarization. Between 1976 and 1979, the portion of the Basque electorate placing itself near the center of the political spectrum fell from 39% to 20%; the level of class consciousness increased; electoral support for the most extreme revolutionary-nationalist party has steadily increased, and its electorate has become more exclusionary in its national self-identification and more uniform in its support for Basque independence (see Sani and Shabad, 1986); and hostility towards the army, the police and “big business” (symbols of the Spanish capitalist order) was much higher in Euskadi than in any other part of Spain. While one might speculate that increasing levels of Basque hostility towards ETA in recent years might augur well for an ultimate decrease in support for terrorist violence, the fact that expressions of support for independence among Basque survey respondents more than doubled between 1976 and 1979, and have remained more or less stable at about 25% of the population since then, suggests that this divisive political conflict is far from resolution. In addition, there is evidence that acceptance of violence as a legitimate form of political activity has become a distinguishing and potentially durable characteristic of Basque political culture.

If we can conclude that polarization, lasting changes in the region’s political culture, high levels of political violence, and a pervasive climate of fear (Linz, 1986b:18) have resulted from a markedly different pattern of political development in Euskadi, then we must still address the question, “Why did the Basque region follow such a drastically different path during the transition?” Can we identify any initial cultural traits which predisposed Euskadi to violence and confrontation, rather than dialogue and compromise? The answer to the latter question appears to be mixed, but generally negative. An examination of “civic textbook” attitudes reveals no significant difference between Basques and other Spanish citizens: aggregate levels of agreement by Basques with the statement “A negotiated settlement is the best way to resolve a conflict” are virtually identical to those found in other parts of Spain, and are actually higher than levels of agreement among Catalans; and slightly more Basques than other Spaniards agreed that “Democracy is the best form of government known.” Similarly, attempts to explore patterns of childhood socialization for signs of early predispositions towards violence or aggression have been unsuccessful. Clark’s analysis of ETA concludes that “violence plays virtually no role in [Basque] culture... Basques do not support or practice violence on either an interpersonal or an intergroup level, and traditional Basque culture does not support ETA behavior” (Clark, 1984:278). His survey of the anthropological and sociological literature on Basques, however, does turn up evidence in support of more modest claims that Basque socialization practices may encourage the development of attitudes of mistrust towards the environment, and may place a high premium on risk taking and a spirit of adventure. “Basque political culture,” he concludes, “offers the outside observer an unusual mixture of moderation and high risk, of compromise and dedication to struggle” (Clark, 1980:128). His overall conclusion, however, is that the explanation of ETA violence and the confrontational style of politics in Euskadi since the late Franco era is not to be found in any pre-existing cultural predispositions. Instead, he argues that polarization and violence in Euskadi are responses to previous repression of Basques (especially of the Basque language and certain cultural
symbols) under the Francoist regime, as well as reactions against police repression of Basque nationalism during the transition to democracy. I would add to his analysis that police repression is a predictable response to pressure for political change exerted largely through popular mobilization, accompanied by high levels of political violence. Such processes set in motion a self-reinforcing cycle of violence, in which action by one side engenders desires for revenge by the other. What is most noteworthy is that this phenomenon was clearly acknowledged by ETA tacticians, who incorporated it within what served as an officially endorsed strategic option at various stages in the struggle against the Spanish state. According to the "action-repression-action spiral theory" each repressive act by Madrid had to be set in motion, it may no longer be under their control. Consequently, "ETA is a process may have been initialized by the independent acts of political elites, but once Basque political culture. 1 agree with Clark's depressing overall conclusion: this transition to democracy in Euskadi along a path markedly different from that followed in the rest of Spain. This trajectory was not a product of any deep-seated change exerted largely through popular mobilization, accompanied by high levels of political violence. The formal ideologies of leftist/nationalist groups (Herri Batasuna, Euskadiko Ezkerra, and the various factions of ETA), as well as the attitudes of survey respondents who support greater regional autonomy or outright independence, are remarkably different from the original formulation of Basque nationalism. Sabino de Arana and the early PNV were conservative, confessional, bourgeois, and hostile towards the maketo who had invaded Euskadi from other parts of Spain. Supporters of left-abertzale parties and aspirations today, however, tend to be secular, leftists, and (in an effort to build a strong coalition in opposition to capitalism) in favor of collaboration with working-class immigrants. They are also militantly anti-Franquist. This clustering of attitudes suggests that the alteration of the character of micronationalism or regionalism in Spain may have occurred as a product of a general reaction against the Francoist regime. Francoist authoritarianism was a sufficiently powerful negative model, and its four decades of existence was of sufficiently long duration, to bring about a realignment of political values relating to regionalism and support for regional autonomy. Those who opposed the regime for whatever reason, according to this line of argument, were induced by psychological pressures, which moved them towards the establishment of cognitive consistency, to reject all aspects of that regime: its authoritarianism, its conservatism, its clericalism, and its centralism of state institutions. Individuals, then, were ultimately led to reject the entire Gcsari of the various features of the Francoist regime without carefully distinguishing one set of system characteristics (e.g., regionalism) from another (e.g., religiosity). Thus, persons on the left (both in Euskadi and in other parts of Spain as well) have tended to embrace everything that is anti-Franquist: anti-centralism, anti-militarism, secularism, etc. This suggests that the appeal of formal ideologies and the clustering of attitudes at the mass level may be substantially affected by political developments which have their origins at the elite level of political systems.

CONCLUSIONS, SPECULATIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE, AND FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Most studies of politics and culture cast cultural characteristics in the role of independent variables which purport to explain political behavior. The value of the preceding analysis must be assessed in light of this criterion. I would argue that, indeed, we can gain a better understanding of politics in Spain by exploring relevant cultural traits. At the national level, changes in elite political culture have contributed to the sharp differences between the stability of the current democracy and the disintegration of the Second Republic. Similarly, the disappearance of extremist belief systems (anarchism, anarcho-syndicalism, fascism, etc.) and the moderation of ideologies of other political families (especially the decline of maximalist socialism and disappearance of a semi-loyal, corporatist version of Christian democracy) have further contributed to the mitigation of political conflict. And the development of democratic values, combined with the growing legitimacy of basic democratic institutions, have made it possible for this relatively new regime to cope with such potentially disruptive factors as high levels of unemployment, continued terrorist violence and even attempted coups.

But this analysis departs from the traditional treatment of political culture insofar as it focuses our attention on cultural change. In this respect, certain cultural features are regarded as dependent variables, which may be altered in response to social-structural and contextual influences. Accordingly, we have seen that important traits often associated with traditional interpretations of Spanish culture have been substantially transformed as a product of a profound modernization of Spanish society in recent years, as well as in response to political events whose origins may be found at the elite level of politics. This raises a crucial question: which features of contemporary political culture are likely to remain as lasting characteristics of Spanish society and politics, and which may be regarded as temporary and highly susceptible to pressures for change in the future?

The preceding analysis suggests several answers to this question. The first is that values, perceptions, modes of interpreting reality, and behavioral norms that "fit" with the dominant social context may remain stable over time. The degree of anchoring of attitudes, beliefs, and norms in a social structure or in a particular social or political environment is a variable; accordingly, such orientations vary in stability over time. We have seen that General Franco's efforts to resurrect certain traditionalist values and marry them to a corporatist-authoritarian political structure were doomed to failure by the substantial transformation which Spain underwent particularly in the 1960s. The passivity, deference to authority, narrow religiosity and anti-liberalism which were central components of Francoist "civics training" simply did not ring true in a modern, urbanized society set within the context of a stable, prosperous, democratic, post-war Western Europe. While no consensus on
democratic norms and values had been forged by the time of Franco’s death, it is clear that the vague desire to emulate democratic West European societies had undermined the credibility of Francoist political culture.

A second relevant generalization is that when political-cultural traits are not psychologically "central," and/or when they are not anchored in a compatible social structural context, they may be highly responsive to salient events which occur in a political system. The presence or absence of political violence is perhaps the most salient in this regard, and may leave a lasting imprint on the political culture of a society. Both from a review of scholarly literature and from personal experience (as a student in Berkeley during the 1960s and 1970s, and as a field researcher in Euskadi in the 1970s), I have concluded that participation in or observation of political violence almost invariably has a powerful, if not gut-wrenching, emotional impact which can instantaneously polarize political attitudes. If such events are repeated with some regularity over time (as in Euskadi), they may substantially transform a political culture. Thus, the pervasive fear, suspicion, and partisan animosity of Euskadi stands in sharp contrast with the moderation, tolerance, and inter-party civility which characterizes the rest of Spain.

I have also argued that what may have been a consensus on values and other cultural features of an earlier era has broken down, and has not been replaced by a comparable consensus. Heterodoxy has replaced conformity with a clearly identifiable set of traditional values. This does not mean, however, that the present democratic regime is lacking in political-cultural support. Not only do the institutions and practices of the current democracy "fit" with the vague predispositions of the Spanish populace already present by the mid 1970s, but after more than a decade since some of the key institutions were set in place they have acquired attitudinal support and legitimacy. Strong attitudinal support within the Spanish population has made it possible for these democratic institutions to weather occasional crises. Similarly, the passage of time may help to stabilize the party system, which, to this point, has been the sole exception at the national level to the full consolidation of the current regime. It is likely that in the aftermath of four general elections, not to mention numerous local and regional contests, the level of stable partisan attachments to the PSOE and Alianza Popular has increased considerably. If the alignment of partisan forces near the center of the political spectrum can be clarified and stabilized, it is likely that the potential for high electoral volatility (such as that manifested in 1982) will be substantially reduced.

Foreign Policy Attitudes

What of the values and attitudes of the Spanish public towards foreign policy issues? Can we see any evidence of cultural traits which directly address the stands taken by the Spanish government in international relations? With two exceptions, the answer is "no." In general terms, foreign policy issues are not very salient (except temporarily, and only in some cases), and they certainly cannot be regarded as "central" elements in the belief-systems of most Spaniards.

One exception pertains to Spanish language and culture as the basic core of Latin American culture. Spaniards regard Spain as the "mother country" for many societies in the Western Hemisphere. Accordingly, in literature, public opinion, and actual foreign-policy behavior, Spaniards exhibit great affection towards their brothers in the west, and express great concern over political events which affect them. In a 1979 poll, for example, 77% of Spaniards expressed the opinion that Spain should maintain its "special relationship" with Latin America, and 78% stated that this relationship should extend to both the economic and cultural spheres. These survey data seem to support the frequently stated assertion that elements of Spanish foreign policy are affected by a culturally-rooted perception of Spain as a "bridge" between Europe and Latin America. (These same data, however, provide little support for the common assertion that Spaniards also see themselves as serving as a "bridge" between Europe and the Arab world.)

Even this "special relationship" with Latin America appears to be weakening, however, as a by-product of the ever growing Spanish self-image as an integral member of the West European community of wealthy, democratic nations. For over two decades, public opinion polls have revealed overwhelming levels of support for formal entry into the EEC, and when asked to choose between closer integration with Latin America and membership in the EEC Spaniards overwhelmingly selected the latter.

The second exception to my overall conclusion pertains not to the presence of values and attitudes embedded within the Spanish culture, but rather to the absence of elements found in the cultures of some other West European countries. Given its abstention from both the First and Second World Wars (and subsequently its exclusion from the Marshall Plan, etc.), Spaniards do not regard themselves as integral members of an American-led alliance. Moreover, only 21% of Spaniards polled in December 1979 (CIS study #1207) believed that the Warsaw Pact posed a real threat to Western Europe. This does not necessarily reflect a deep mass-level commitment to a continuation of isolation and neutralism (as strong support for EEC membership, the favorable vote on NATO membership and some survey data indicate) but it does mean that there is no stable core of anti-Soviet or pro-American sentiments present within the Spanish population, as in Great Britain or West Germany.

By no means does this imply that anti-Americanism is a widespread or permanent feature of Spanish public opinion. I disagree with assertions that anti-Americanism is part of Spain’s political culture (see Mujal-León, 1986). To be sure, many Spaniards have consistently favored removal of the American air base from Torrejón since the late Franquist period, and public opinion data collected in the mid 1980s have revealed that many Spaniards hold attitudes which have been portrayed as "anti-American." A poll taken in December 1985, for example, indicated that more Spaniards (20%) regarded the United States as a greater threat to world peace than the Soviet Union (15% — CIS study #1207). Prior to 1980 the USSR was perceived as a much greater threat to world peace than was the US. A careful survey of public opinion data collected at regular intervals since the 1960s, however, suggests that these negative opinions represent short-term responses to salient temporary events (such as the Socialist government’s demands for reduction
of the American military presence in exchange for continued NATO membership, and the protracted bilateral negotiations which followed) and a spill-over of hostility towards important features of American foreign policy under the Reagan Administration (such as the revival of Cold-War rhetoric against the USSR, the invasion of Grenada, support for the Contras in Nicaragua, and the bombing of Libya).

More importantly, the data available through the end of 1985 indicated that anti-American attitudes were not significantly higher than negative sentiments towards other great powers. The proportion of respondents interviewed by the CIS in June 1985 who expressed “unfavorable” or “very unfavorable” attitudes towards the United States stood at 27%; unfavorable sentiments towards France in that same survey were expressed by 24% of respondents; 25% had unfavorable opinions of Great Britain; and 33% expressed dislike of the USSR. Moreover, the level of favorable opinions of the United States in that survey (41%) was higher than for any of these great powers: 36% had “favorable” or “very favorable” opinions of the French; for the British the figure was just 31%; and only 19% had favorable attitudes towards the Soviet Union.

The most striking conclusion to be derived from a survey of these public opinion data, however, is that they are highly unstable over time and almost certainly represent short-term reactions to highly visible current events. In 1968, for example, at a time when Spanish-British tensions over Gibraltar were high, 75% of those polled by the CIS had unfavorable opinions towards Great Britain; by 1985 only 25% expressed such negative sentiments. Similarly, in 1984, when French farmers were setting Spanish vegetable trucks on fire and dumping carloads of Spanish wine into the sea, 47% of Spaniards expressed dislike of the French; yet just one year later (when France was collaborating for the first time in arresting ETA leaders in exile) the level of anti-French hostility had fallen to 24%. (Attitudes towards the US during these same periods of time were relatively favorable: in 1968 only 17% had “unfavorable” opinions, and in 1984 only 33% claimed to dislike the US.)

In short, none but a handful of foreign policy issues are salient for most Spaniards, and none except the “special relationship” towards Latin America is sufficiently central a belief as to constitute a stable feature of Spanish political culture.

Another way in which foreign policy attitudes may become stable is if they are anchored in social-structural or institutional relationships which persist over time. It is likely that Spanish membership in the EEC and NATO, and more extensive integration with other European societies and economies will reinforce the tendency of Spaniards to regard themselves as Europeans first, and a bridge (to Latin America or the Arab world) second — if at all.


This interesting collection of lectures examines (from an historical and literary viewpoint) the changing images and stereotypes associated with Spain since the 16th century.


Although it gives excessive credence to regional- and national-character stereotypes, and is a bit too uncritical of the parties and politicians of the left during the Second Republic, this classic study still provides valuable insights into the subcultures and partisan forces which plunged into the Civil War. Particularly good are the explorations of anarchism, anarcho-syndicalism and Carlism.


This book provides us with the most thorough analysis available of the backgrounds of ETA and its clandestine "insurgents." While the reader may occasionally feel uncomfortable with the author's sympathetic stance regarding ETA terrorism (a term which he scrupulously avoids using) and his hostility towards the Spanish state (both under Franco and the current democracy), this must be regarded as an important study.


FOESSA. 1976 (and other years). Estudios Sociológicos sobre la Situación Social de España. Madrid: Euramerica. These superb volumes are compendia of studies by Spain's best social scientists into a seemingly exhaustive array of social characteristics of Spain at various intervals before, during and after the transition to democracy. They represent invaluable resources for social science research.


This book provides the best overview and analysis to date of the process of transition to the current democratic regime. The author’s partisan biases (pro-Christian Democratic), however, seriously weaken his analysis of the UCD.


Jiménez Blanco, José. 1977. La Conciencia Regional en España. Madrid: CIS.


Linz, Juan J. 1972a. Tradition and Modernity in Spain. Unpublished. This is the most brilliant analysis I have read concerning the impact of elites on the evolution of culture. Sadly, only a small segment (Linz, 1977) has been published.


Linz, Juan J., with Manuel Gómez-Reino, Francisco Orizo and Darío Vila. 1986. Conflicto en Euskadi. Madrid: Espasa Calpe. Almost overwhelming in its magnitude, this is certainly the most exhaustive study of the dynamics of partisan competition and the origins of political violence in Euskadi.


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Payne, Stanley G. 1984. Spanish Catholicism: An Historical Overview. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. This is the most complete overview of the evolution of Spanish Catholicism in the English language.


Notes

1. Derived from Ayala, 1986; Bennassar, 1975; Brenan, 1974; Caro Baroja, 1970; Díaz-Plaja, 1986; Vicens-Vives, 1967; and popular American literature such as Michener, 1968; and Hemingway, 1954 and 1968.

2. Also see Bennassar, 1975; Vicens-Vives, 1967; and Brenan, 1974.


5. Classic studies of this kind include Deutsch, 1953; Lerner, 1958; Lipset, 1960; and Inkeles and Smith, 1974.

6. Orizo describes this important feature of contemporary Spanish culture:

“The old consensus disappears; new normative codes emerge which enter into conflict with or are shared with the old. Behaviors which yesterday could be regarded as deviant, marginal or contrary to established behaviors, are today practiced by sizable minorities, and are accepted by the majority... This is social change. This crossing of normative codes, still without firm loyalties, is what we see in Spain during these years of transition” (1983:26-27).

7. One superficial indicator of this change can be seen in a comparison of the most common forms of address today and in the past. Until quite recently it was standard for individuals to be addressed using the honorary title “Don” or “Doña,” as well as the last names of both father and mother: hence, “Don Felipe González Marquez.” Nowadays, much more familiar forms of address have become de rigueur: hence, “Felipe González” or even “Felipe” (see Díaz Plaja, 1986:31-34).

8. Only in Euskadi can one find politically significant anti-system parties (Herri Batasuna), parties which adopt semi-loyal or highly ambiguous stands vis-à-vis the current regime (Eusko Alkartasuna and, until recently, the Partido Nacionalista Vasco), and partisan polarization and fragmentation (e.g., the breakup of the original Euskadiko Ezkerra coalition in 1978 and the PNV in 1986).

9. In the 9-country study undertaken by Stoetzel, et al. (1982), Spain’s composite “urbanization” score (188, of a maximum possible score of 300)
was quite close to the West European average (195). And Spain was more urbanized than Belgium (169), The Netherlands (172), and Italy (182).


12. Guy Hermet, for example, reports that 65% of the citizens of Old Castile and León attended Sunday mass in the late 1970s, while in Andalucía, Sunday mass attendance was only 22% (Hermet, 1980, p. 309).


14. Distinctive features of these decision-making processes which are indicative of an absence of coercive resources include the following: the regime's most powerful and authoritative figure (Franco) rarely intervened in policy deliberations; the Movimiento was by that time a lifeless bureaucratic hulk; there existed no authoritative ideology which could generate guidelines for policy deliberation; there was no ministerial responsibility to the Cortes or an electorate; and the mobilization of organizational resources was explicitly prohibited.

15. See Gunther, 1980, chapters eight and nine; also see de Miguel, 1975:89, and Linz and de Miguel, 1966.

16. In a contextual analysis of values and beliefs, Linz found that Spaniards residing in economically developed provinces much more frequently expected to be treated equally in official matters, such as traffic violations, than those residing in less developed areas, even when controls are imposed for occupational status. He also found that, as you move from underdeveloped to developed provinces, the proportion of respondents believing that success in life is largely attributable to particularistic factors (such as "luck" and "acquaintance with influential people") declines markedly, while the number of respondents opting for universalistic explanations of success such as "hard work" and "intelligence" increases.

17. Multiple responses were permitted in our 1979 survey, but not in the 1968 Linz and de Miguel study. Thus, responses in the 1979 survey total 113% (not 100%, as is the case with the 1968 data), and some care must be taken in comparing the two sets of results. Nevertheless, the decline in the percentage of respondents selecting particularistic contacts from 61% to 41% (despite the possibility of multiple responses in the latter survey) gives clear evidence of significant change.

18. Behavioral measures of religiosity reveal the same pattern of decline: between 1973 and 1985, the percentage of Spaniards who claimed to attend church "Sundays and/or various days during the week" or "almost every Sunday" declined from 78% to 28%, while those who said "never" increased from 13% to 37% (Montero, 1986:136).

19. An examination of our 1979 and 1982 survey data shows that during the three-year interval between these two studies, there was no apparent decline in religiosity among those in the oldest age group (those over 55). But religiosity declined significantly in each of the younger age groups. 22% of those age 18-24 described themselves as "very good Catholics" or "practicing Catholics" in 1979, but in 1982 only 18% did so. The decline in religiosity among the middle age groups was much steeper: among those age 40-54 the number of "practicing" or "very good" Catholics fell from 48% to 43%; and within the 25-39 age group, the decline was from 32% to 23%.

20. Christian (1972) points out that religion plays fundamentally different functions in small villages, where worship is a community activity which draws together virtually all persons, and urban society, where it does not necessarily have this social integration function.

21. By 1984 over 10% of those age 55-64 were still illiterate; and the illiteracy rate among those over 65 exceeded 21% (Gunther, 1980:67-70; and Tezanos, 1984:53-56).

22. Source: unpublished data collected in June 1985 by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, study #1461.

23. Data collected by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas generally confirm this impression, although they indicate that the overall level of political involvement of Spaniards is lower than that reflected in the Barnes, et al. survey. In May, 1986, for example, only 26% of those interviewed said that they paid much or some attention to political news in the press, while 42% said that they paid much or some attention to politics as reported on television (CIS study #1531, unpublished).

24. Surveys by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas have found that 5% of Spaniards were very interested in politics in 1971, 3% in 1973, 11% in 1976, 8% in 1979, 8% in 1980, 6% in 1981, 7% in 1982, 4% in 1985, and 4% in 1986. Disinterest in politics reached a peak in 1973, but the percentage of Spaniards who professed to have no interest in politics whatsoever has remained surprisingly high: 51% in 1971, 62% in 1973, 55% in 1976, 36% in 1979, 43% in 1980, 45% in 1981, 45% in 1982, 37% in 1985, and 43% in 1986. These levels of disinterest are substantially higher than those found in most other European countries, such as the United Kingdom (28%), France (26%) and West Germany (14%). Once again, only Italians (50%) surpass Spaniards in their lack of interest in the politics of their country (López Pintor and Wert, 1982:22; López Pintor, ...
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25. Only 31% of Spaniards belonged to organizations of any kind, as compared with a West European average of 40%. Again, this feature of political culture appears to be shared with other Latin countries: France (27%) and Italy (26%) are actually lower in affiliation with voluntary associations than Spain; and these are well below the levels reported for Belgium (42%), West Germany (50%), the UK (52%), Ireland (53%), Denmark (65%) and the Netherlands (62%) (Stoitzel, 1982, p. 337).

26. Linz, as well as Amando de Miguel (1975), also pointed out that by the 1960s flamboyant or potentially charismatic personalities were systematically shunted aside as candidates for ministerial posts, and the government was increasingly led by grey technocrats.

27. Since it was not possible for the press to deal directly with political issues such as democratization, the reemergence of political parties, and the replacement of the Head of State or prime minister, newspapers and magazines used coverage of partisan political developments in other countries to make thinly-veiled allusions to domestic politics. Thus, well-educated readers could be drawn into a vicarious involvement in partisan politics. While only a small proportion of the population was sophisticated enough to be able to decode these messages, this practice served as an important source of political attitudes and information for future elites and semi-elites. Juan Linz has suggested, for example, that such basic concepts as left-right designations and political families (social democratic, liberal, etc.) were conveyed to significant sectors of the population by this means.


29. As Payne reminds us, "Traditionally, the Church had been the chief provider of charity and welfare... The elimination of much of the Church's endowment income made it impossible to continue many of these, or required that they function on a reduced scale" (1984, p. 118). Brenan (1974) adds that in addition to its financial dependence on the state, Church officials shifted their sympathies towards the propertied classes, and abandoned their former defense of the poor. Thus, in addition to middle-class liberalis, the Church became increasingly alienated from the landless agricultural workers of the south and from the expanding urban working classes.

30. Linz summarizes the position of the Church at the birth of the Second Republic: "A decadent Church, dependent on the government and the rich, largely out of tune with intellectual currents emerging among European Catholics, led by a clergy of rural extraction and low intellectual level, dedicated to the preaching of a bourgeois morality centered on the family and sex, appeared as inadequate to a modern world... The presence of corporatist, neo-traditional currents of thought in European Catholicism, reinforced by the rise of fascism and the Action Francaise, sealed the fate of a modern Catholicism" (Linz, 1972, p. 52). Payne argues that by this time "the middle classes were more convinced than ever that Catholicism was the bulwark of authoritarianism and reaction, and hence the main obstacle to progress and enlightenment. In somewhat parallel fashion, urban workers and the southern rural proletariat saw the Church as the cultural and moral support of the possessing classes, the principal dike against revolution" (Payne, 1984, p. 148).

31. For descriptions of its provisions and the decision-making process that led to their inclusion in the Constitution, see Gunther and Blough, 1981; Meer Lecha-Marzo, 1975; Vidarte, 1976; and Alcalá-Zamora, 1977.


33. A poll of the Spanish clergy undertaken by the Joint Assembly of Bishops and Priests in 1971 clearly revealed the extent of this change. In that survey of over 15,000 priests (about 85% of the total Spanish clergy), the political preference that received the greatest support was "socialism" (25% of those polled), while "workers' movements" followed in third place (13%) (Payne, 1984, p. 203; and Heubel, 1977, p. 135). This change from the Church's past political conservatism occurred largely along generational lines: 47% of the youngest priests most highly favored "socialism," while among the oldest priests in this sample only 4% expressed such a preference. At that same assembly, motions were passed that called for a significant revision of the existing relationship between the Church and the Franquist state in the direction of greater institutional autonomy and independence and the progressive elimination of "every real or apparent situation of mutual concession of privileges (Heubel, 1977, p. 135).


35. A public opinion poll published in 1984 revealed that 63% of those interviewed rejected the notion that "The Church should support in elections those candidates and political parties which best defend its ideas and interests"; only 17% agreed. Even stronger opposition was expressed when respondents were asked if "The Church should actively participate in politics in order to make public life more moral": 67% disagreed, and only 12% agreed.

36. This disjunction is not just a technicality: it enabled Franco to bypass Juan Carlos' father, Don Juan, the son of Alfonso XIII, who by tradition would have been the rightful heir to the throne, but who had alienated Franco by calling for the end of his authoritarian regime.
37. The association between Juan Carlos and Franquismo in the minds of many Spaniards was strengthened by the fact that Juan Carlos, at Franco's insistence, swore allegiance to the Fundamental Principles of the regime upon being named heir in 1969.

38. One study has shown that "feeling thermometer" evaluations of the King have increased from 6.4 in 1978 to 8.0 (McDonough, Barnes and López Pina, 1986, p. 743). Even more striking evidence of the importance of the King as a unifying symbol of the new regime can be seen in a comparison of data gathered by Linz, et al., shortly after enactment of the Political Reform Law in 1976. When asked, "How important is the role of the King in the transition?", 34% said it was "very important," and another 43% said "quite important." By way of comparison, only 22% of a British sample interviewed by Rose and Kavanagh said that the British monarchy was "very important," with 32% answering "important" (Linz, et al., 1981a, p. 141).

Expressions of support for democratic elections and for democracy in the abstract are also endorsed by overwhelming majorities of respondents in numerous surveys (see Barnes, et al., 1986; Linz, et al., 1981a; and López Pintor and Wert, 1982). Interestingly, support for democracy is stronger among civil servants (often attacked by those on the left on the grounds that they represent an unreformed remnant of the Franquist regime) than it is among the public at large. Sixty per cent of our 1979 sample of Spanish citizens agreed that "Democracy is the best system of government," and 10% disagreed with that statement. (A 1985 survey indicated that the portion of Spaniards agreeing with a similar item ["Democracy is preferable to any other form of government"] had risen to 70%.) Among a sample of civil servants interviewed by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 89% agreed with that statement, and only 4% disagreed. Even among the oldest age cohort (those over 60), who had spent most of their professional lives working within the core of the Franquist state apparatus, support for democracy was stronger than it was among the public at large — 80% agreed with that statement and 9% disagreed. (Sources for 1985 data, unpublished CIS study #146; for civil servants data, "Encuesta a Funcionarios de la Administración Civil del Estado," Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, #23, 1983, pp. 189-206.)

39. Poll results published in Cambio 16 (April 6, 1981) showed that 47% of Spaniards interviewed would have been willing to "defend the democratic system" if the February coup had succeeded, while only 9% of the French interviewed in 1968 expressed a willingness to defend their democratic system. My own interpretation of the "desencanto" polemic of the 1979-1982 period is that it was produced by two phenomena: First, expectations concerning the consequences of democratization were unreasonably high; thus, when many problems remained or (as in the case of the economy) got worse, expressions of disappointment were sometimes focused on the political system. (Some intellectuals, for example, had hoped that democratization would culminate in a great flourishing of artistic expression, and when this failed to occur they criticized the democratic system as responsible [see several of the chapters in Cagigao, et al., 1982].) Second, some socialist politicians and journalists wishing to bring down the UCD government integrated the "desencanto" theme into their partisan attacks, attempting to portray the shortcomings of the incumbent government as so serious as to threaten the new democracy itself.

40. Between 1979 and 1982, the number of our survey respondents who preferred "Republic" over "Monarchy," when asked to choose between the two concepts declined from 26% to 16% of the total. By 1982 only 6% of our respondents disagreed with a statement that "democracy is the best form of government for our country." And between 1977 and 1982, the number of survey respondents who preferred the term "Franquismo" over "Antifranquismo" declined from 29% to 14% (1977 data from Linz, et al., 1981a).

41. See Gunther, 1985; Gunther and Blough, 1981; and Gunther, Sani and Shabad, 1986, chapters 3 and 4.

42. To cite some examples: two prominent Communist leaders (Ramón Lamas and Enrique Curiel) were students of Manuel Fraga (founder of the right-wing Alianza Popular); the parliamentary spokesman for the Catalán centrist party (Josep María Trías de Bes) studied under the prestigious former Communist Deputy Jordi Solé Tura; and the editorial board of the Revista de Estudios Políticos includes prominent leaders of all major political parties: in 1965, these included Fraga, Solé Tura, the Christian democrat Oscar Alzaga, former UCD parliamentary spokesman Miguel Herrero de Miñón, CDS Deputy Raúl Morodo, and the late Socialist mayor of Madrid, Enrique Tierno Galván.

43. Linz, 1972: pp. 36-43. Amando de Miguel implies that this concept may be better regarded as "ascribed achievement," insofar as access to university education (the basis of this elitism) was sharply restricted to persons of upper class social backgrounds until quite recently (de Miguel, 1975, p. 39).

44. An excellent example of this can be seen among the descendent of José Calvo Sotelo, the right-wing politician whose murder in July 1936 triggered the outbreak of the Civil War. His descendants include Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo (conservative, who served as UCD prime minister 1981-1982), Carlos Bustelo (social democrat, served in UCD cabinets), Carlota Bustelo (feminist leader within the PSOE) and Francisco Bustelo (former leader of the left-wing critics within the PSOE, who strongly opposed the party's shift away from maximalist socialism).

45. Both the anarchosyndicalist union and the Socialist UGT had about 2 million members (Alba, 1983).
46. As Preston has written of Gil Robles, "On his own admission he was always pushing his audiences towards escalatory conflicts with the authorities. He claimed to be training them to defend their rights in the streets" (Preston, 1970, p. 380).

47. Linz points out that Azaña based his claim that "Spain has ceased to be Catholic" on the fact that its intellectual life was not. "The fact that many Spaniards were still believers, he admitted, was for him irrelevant" (Linz, 1972, p. 52).

48. He quotes Maura: "I once asked him the reason for his mania of wounding simply in order to wound, of never losing an opportunity to pour scorn on the opposition, and he replied, 'I do it because it amuses me'" (Payne, 1970, p. 91).

49. At its peak during the democratic era it elected only 15 deputies to the Cortes out of a total of 263.

50. Liberal democracy, in his view, is not anchored in any firm respect for morality; it is purely relativistic: "There exists no certainty about what is truth or error, about what is good or bad in the sphere of social life. Everything is a question of opinions... Whatever the people want is legitimate. It is the doctrine of the absolutism of the popular will, characteristic of extreme liberalism, that has been expressly condemned by the Catholic Church" (pp. 121 and 30).

51. Anecdotal evidence of the cynicism with which most Spaniards regarded the Fundamental Principles of the National Movement can be seen in the political careers of two of the last secretaries general of the Movement — Torcuato Fernández-Miranda (author of the "civics textbook" quoted above) and Adolfo Suárez — two of the three persons (along with the King) who played the most decisive roles in dismantling the regime.

52. A total of 12% placed themselves in the four most extreme positions on a ten-point scale; and only 4% placed themselves at the two extreme points of the scale. There has been a gradual shift towards the left since the mid-1970s, but most of this movement has been from the center and right to the center-left.

53. In 1975, 42% agreed with the statement that "It is not enough to eliminate private property and nationalize factories and land, those who work should personally direct businesses"; only 21% disagreed (Linz, et al., 1981, p. 9).

54. In both our 1979 and 1982 surveys over 70% agreed with the statement that "the distribution of wealth in this country is totally unjust."

55. See Montero, 1987b; Gunther, Sani and Shabad, 1986; and Gunther, 1986e.


57. The percentages of respondents in Madrid and Catalunya describing themselves as "very good Catholics" or "practicing Catholics" were only 25% and 29%, respectively. Levels of religiosity were much higher in Castilla-La Mancha (55%), Extremadura (54%), Asturias (47%), Castilla-León (45%), Galicia (43%) and Euskadi (44%). Andalucía (35%) and Valencia (32%) were near the lower end of the scale.

58. The García Ferrando study found that 55% of Catalan speakers living in Barcelona in 1979 used the regional language on the job; and the percentage of Catalans residing in other parts of the region who used Catalan in the workplace increased from 35% in 1976 to 68% in 1979 (García Ferrando, 1982, p. 436).

59. The percentages of regional language speakers using the regional language on the job was only 38% in Valencia, 37% in Galicia, and 17% in Euskadi (García Ferrando, 1982, pp. 318, 366 and 536).

60. It should be noted that the strength of such exclusionary identifications is lower when calculated as a percentage of the total population of the region (i.e., including immigrants from other parts of Spain). In 1979, 34% of the total population identified themselves as "Basque" only; while in Catalunya, 14% of all inhabitants opted for that exclusionary identification.

61. Even a nationalist leader who advocated a shift throughout the region to the use of Catalán as a single official language nonetheless believed that such a policy would be compatible with loyal citizenship within Spain: he regarded Switzerland as a model society in this respect.


63. As Payne, paraphrasing Sabino de Arana, describes it, "It was not necessary for Basques to become 'separatists,' for they had never been really joined
with Spain. It was impossible to separate that which had never been united; Basques need only reassert their fundamental independence” (Payne, 1975, p. 75).

64. The percentage of Basque respondents stating that they identified with a social class increased from 48% in our 1979 survey to 63% in 1982, which is the highest level of any region in Spain.

65. Our survey data indicate that between 1979 and 1982 the percentage of Basques identifying ETA as “common criminals” increased from 10% to 29%, and that negative evaluations of ETA as measured by “feeling thermometers” increased from 53% to 83%. On the other hand, the number of Basques describing ETA as “nationalists” remained constant during this period. García Ferrando (1982) reports that preferences for independence rose from 11% of Basques interviewed in 1976 to 26% in 1979. Our survey data reveal that support for independence remained roughly constant at about 25% over the following three-year period.

66. A 1984 DATA study of Spanish young people, for example, found that in Euskadi fully 44% of those interviewed said that the use of violence was an acceptable means of defending Basque national interests, while only 16% said that the use of violence was not justified. In Catalunya, by way of contrast, these opinions were endorsed by 22% and 36%, respectively; in Valencia, by 23% vs. 37%; and in Galicia, 22% said violence was acceptable, while 48% said that it was not justified. It is also important to note that young Basques’ expressed willingness to endorse violence has spread into other policy areas as well: 48% said that it was a legitimate means of addressing labor disputes, with only 12% denying its acceptability; and 46% of young Basques said that violence was an acceptable means of opposing NATO membership. Again, tolerance of violence was much lower in the other regions studied. (Source: Orizo, et al., 1984: p. 406.)

67. Only 25% of the respondents in that same study (CIS study #1207, December, 1979) believed that there was a “special relationship” between Spain and Arab countries.

68. See the large volume of data published in the Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, #29, January-March, 1985. The only variations in this overwhelming public support appear to have been the result of increasing skepticism over the actual benefits to Spain of membership, as the harshness of some of the terms of entry were made public in the course of negotiations. Support remained overwhelming among the electorates of all political parties, ranging from 60% among UCD supporters to 73% among Communist voters, according to a 1983 poll (p. 367).

69. When asked in a 1980 poll to choose one among six economic and political integration options (with Arab countries, with Eastern bloc countries, with the EEC, with Portugal, with Latin America, or with none), 44% choose the EEC, and only 6% selected closer integration with Latin America (don’t know and no answer totaled 40% of the sample). (Source: CIS Study #1224, March, 1980.)

70. Only 19% of Spaniards interviewed in 1979 (CIS study #1207), for example, believed that Spain would be able to stay out of a Third World War, as it had on two previous occasions.

71. In December, 1979, for example, many more Spaniards (34%) regarded the USSR as the greatest threat to world peace than believed the US was (22%). In should be noted that the 1979 data are derived from an open-ended item, which was somewhat different from the forced-choice item used in later waves. In addition, the figures for the Soviets includes “USSR” and “the Communists,” and the American figure is the combined total of the “US” and “the CIA.” Despite these slight differences, however, these items are quite similar, and clearly reveal that a substantial shift in Spanish public opinion took place after 1980. (Sources: CIS studies #1207 and #1467, both unpublished.) Further evidence that the increase in negative attitudes towards the US in the 1980s was primarily a reflection of anti-Reagan sentiment can be seen in the fact that only 13% of Spaniards wanted Reagan to be reelected in 1984 (CIS study #1436, October 1984, unpublished).

72. These data were derived from CIS studies #1036, October 1968, and #1381, January 1984, both unpublished. Many other data could be presented which further substantiate my contention that anti-American sentiments are neither permanent nor disturbingly high. A June 1983 CIS study (#1360), for example, asked about “the degree of confidence inspired by different peoples.” Only 44% said that Americans inspired “little” or “no confidence”, this compares favorably with the Russians (52%), the British (59%) and the French (61%).
A NOTE ON THE AUTHOR

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