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SOCIAL CLEAVAGES IN THE 1964 ELECTION*

Philip E. Converse

It is our purpose in this paper to provide a brief account of some of the more interesting lines of social cleavage in the American electorate as illuminated by voting behavior in the 1964 presidential election.^{1/}

We shall proceed toward this end, however, in somewhat heterodox fashion. Although our primary focus is indeed upon sociological cleavages emerging in the vote, we shall only rarely be examining that vote division in its "raw" form. Instead, we shall deal with two analytic components of the actual presidential vote. First, we shall consider the few interesting aspects of that portion of the variance in 1964 voting that may be directly traced to "traditional" or habitual partisan cleavages between social groupings in the country. This long-term component by definition has roots deep in time past, and is scarcely to be explained by any peculiarities of the 1964 election situation. Secondly, we shall turn our attention to a residual or "short-term" component of the same vote, expressed as departures or deviations of that actual vote in either a more Republican or Democratic direction than the long-term partisan component would have

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predicted by itself. As we shall see, extraction of this component yields a lively new variable, only partially visible in the actual vote, and one which reflects very directly social reactions to the immediate circumstances of the 1964 presidential race.

The theoretical rationale for such a treatment of election data has become increasingly apparent as our sequence of studies has taken on greater temporal depth. For it has turned out that the distribution of underlying party loyalties within most sociologically-defined groupings has remained remarkably inert over the past twenty years, which is to say the complete period for which reliable national sample survey materials have been available. Thus, for example, while American Catholics have shown a normally-varied voting trend over this time span, their expressions of more general party loyalty or identification showed them to be almost two-thirds Democratic nationally in 1944, and the same figure stands at the same point in 1965. Moreover, Catholic partisanship has scarcely strayed beyond sampling error limits of that figure in more than a dozen "readings" scattered across the intervening years.^{2/} For this period, then, the basic party loyalties of Catholics have, to all intents and purposes, remained constant in a net sense, despite a small margin of gross but compensating individual turnover. Even the candidacy and subsequent glory of John F. Kennedy as the nation's first Catholic president was not sufficient to touch off any systematic shift in these traditional loyalties among Catholics, although of course the short-term component of

²The only shifts appearing at all systematic follow closely the lines of slight national undulations in partisanship: a faint trend in a Democratic direction since 1952, reversed momentarily in the Eisenhower period. If Catholic partisanship is adjusted for these national tides, as we might want to do for many purposes, then Catholic party loyalties have been constant within very narrow sampling error limits throughout the period.

their 1960 presidential vote swung very impressively indeed in the Democratic direction.

While exceptions to this striking rule of inertia do exist, they are few indeed. Hence if the discussion of any given election in this period were restricted in advance to a description of the long-term component of the vote, as opposed to the short-term residual, then virtually every election since World War II could be exhaustively covered by the phrase, "Again, no real change...." In 1964 for the first time, however, the signs of partisan change of a more enduring or realigning character have emerged. While this change will surprise no one, we shall consider it briefly before turning our attention to materials on the short-term component of the vote.

UNDERLYING PARTISAN CHANGE IN 1964

The sole prominent exception to this rule of inertia is the very recent case of the Negro. Throughout most of the 1950's, the division of loyalties among both Southern and non-Southern Negroes moved in a fairly characteristic range, although due to small case numbers (typically, 60-80 cases per data point), a higher sampling variability must be kept in mind. Since 1960, however, as Figure 1 makes evident, there has been a marked shift in these underlying loyalties toward the Democratic Party for Negroes of both regions. This shift was, of course, greatly stimulated by the circumstances of the 1964 election, which saw a much sharper party differentiation offered to Negroes on the civil rights issue than has been common in the past, and saw Negroes casting a presidential vote that was nearly unanimous for President Johnson.

Why the Negro provides this exception to the inertia rule is entirely

Figure 1. Partisanship of Negroes South and Non-South, 1952-64





Figure 2. Status Polarization of Party Identification in the South, 1952-64



obvious in the light of the intense civil rights ferment of the period. Less close to the surface, however, is another level at which this exception deserves to be understood as well. Although party identification is in general remarkably stable in the individual longitudinal sense, it has become clear in all of our observations that it is least stable among those members of the electorate--usually the young or poorly educated--who are most marginal to the political process in the conventional sense. This is fully as true of Whites as it has been of Negroes. Chronic non-voters, for example, account for a very disproportionate share of such instability as party identification shows at a national level. During the 1950's, the largely disfranchised Southern Negro provided us with the perennial limiting case of labile response to measures of party loyalty. Customarily in this period, 25-40 percent of Southern Negroes made clear that they could not relate themselves meaningfully to either of the major parties at all, and were coded as "apolitical." Thus whereas Southern Negroes made up only about 5-6 percent of the adult citizenry, they provided nearly half of the "apoliticals" in the national electorate. Moreover, in a four-year longitudinal study of the national electorate conducted between 1956 and 1960, a period over which party identifications showed correlations in the .70's, .80's and .90's among Whites with varying degrees of political involvement, the comparable four-year individual correlations among non-Southern Negroes was .61, and among Southern Negroes, a meager .36!

Two competing explanations might be advanced for this instability of partisanship among Negroes, as it made itself manifest in the 1950's. The differences between them are important for any rational guesses as to the likely evolution of Negro partisanship after 1964. The first interpretation

would hold that the Negro case did not represent the lability of apathy, but rather "watchful waiting" as to which of the two parties was most likely to provide the most rapid short-term gains for the Negro community. From this point of view, the high rates of individual change in partisanship would merely reflect changes of estimate in this intense calculus--changes quite to be expected in a period when Negroes had relatively little clear ground on which to choose between the major national parties. Given this interpretation, the swing toward the Democrats in the early 1960's in expressions of party loyalty as well as in the short-term component of the vote would be lent the most limited and tentative meaning. Were the Republicans to offer more dramatic concessions to the Negro in coming years than the Democrats could muster, then this view would expect the Negro vote to shift as widely and effortlessly to the Republican side as it moved to the Democrats in the early 1960's.

The second interpretation would assume that the instability of Negro partisanship in the 1950's was less a matter of watchful waiting than ignorance of and apathy toward the conventional party system. From this point of view, the Negro data of this period would be of the same cloth as data drawn from equally uneducated, chronically non-voting Whites. Hence the Negro vote in the early 1960's would be seen as attaining for the first time some degree of meaningful crystallization. Yet this crystallization would in itself have portent for the partisan maneuverability of the Negro vote in the future. That is, were the Republicans subsequently able to offer more handsome gains than the Democrats, it would undoubtedly have visible effects in Negro voting. But the more meaningful loyalties crystallized in the early 1960's would have their effects in creating a new "drag" or resistance to partisan change which was not present in the

original motion from "nothing" to "something," where "something" was the Democratic camp. In such a case, the Republican gains to be won for the same amount of effort or attractiveness of alternatives offered would be very much smaller than they might have been in the late 1950's, when the Negro vote still lay predominantly in a labile, uncrystallized state.

While our data give no unequivocal grounds for choosing between these alternatives, the presumptive evidence strongly favors the second interpretation. This is not to deny that there were Negroes whose political behavior in the 1950's showed the partisan instability of an intense "watchful waiting." Negro respondents fitting this description are apparent even in our longitudinal study of that period. However, they were certainly a tiny handful in the Negro community at that time: the very few who were well-educated and politically involved.

For 90-95 percent of Southern Negroes, and a good half of non-Southern Negroes in the 1950's, partisan instability seems certainly to have been that of near-total inattention to the conventional political process, much as it was for chronic non-voters among Whites. One of the more striking pieces of evidence comes as late as 1960, where Southern Negroes are concerned. In that year we reinterviewed respondents after an average interval of about six weeks in the period surrounding the presidential election. With so short an interval, any repetition of measurements approximates a test-retest reliability situation. For the sample as a whole, the correlation coefficient where our measure of party identification was concerned approached .9. For the set of Southern Negroes, however, the comparable coefficient barely reached .6. Since the brief interval between measurements included no outstanding developments in the area of civil rights, it is difficult to argue that this amount of turnover comes from delicate

readjustments of partisanship to fit a changing political environment. These data, or a simple reading of the interviews for that matter, make clear that many of the responses are haphazard and politically disoriented.

Thus while the Negro provides the only noteworthy exception to the rule of partisan inertia for the past two decades, it should also be clear that this is an exception only in a rather limited sense. That is, only a portion of the partisan change registered can be traced to actual transfers of loyalty from one political party to the other. In the 1950's much of the Republican element among the more crystallized of Negro partisans was located in the older generation, for whom the Republican Party was "the party of Lincoln."^{3/} Therefore a portion of the partisan change culminating in 1964 can be traced to the dying out of these age cohorts. More important numerically, however, is the portion of apparent partisan change due directly to the development of partisan commitments where none existed before. This is overwhelmingly evident for the Southern Negro, where the portion of Republican identifiers remaining in 1964 was not enormously reduced relative to earlier studies. The major change had occurred instead among the erstwhile "apoliticals." About one-third of Southern Negroes had typically been coded in this category in the studies of the 1950's. In 1964, only 5 percent identified themselves in such a way as to be considered "apolitical." The very large remainder had begun to identify with the Democratic Party, thereby accounting for a lion's share of the net partisan

³ This older generation provides an excellent example of what we mean by the "drag" or resistance created by party identification once any real commitment is crystallized. Many of these Negro elders continued to hew to their early Republican commitments for decades after Negro leadership had made clear that the party of Franklin D. Roosevelt had become the more appropriate home for the Negro, the Southern Democratic wing notwithstanding.

change of Figure 1. A similar pattern, although on a much less dramatic scale, contributes to the change among non-Southern Negroes as well.

It is in this sense, then, that the marked shift in Negro partisanship yields but a limited exception to the expectation of partisan inertia. We take for granted that major exceptions have occurred in the past, with sudden and large-scale realignments of party loyalties developing within social groups, and we are impatient to learn more about the conditions under which such change can occur. However, to examine such phenomena empirically, we must have instances in hand, and aside from the Negro none have offered themselves since World War II. Hence it is ironic that this sole exception provides such a marginal illustration, for the Negro prior to 1960 represented the only major sociological grouping in the population with weakly crystallized allegiances to one or the other of the major parties.

Other exceptions to the rule of partisan inertia are extremely few and extremely faint in this period. They typically involve slow secular trends in party loyalties, occurring at what can only be described as a "glacial pace." They are important theoretically, despite the feeble rate of change, for they are slowly changing some of the more familiar sociopolitical parameters of the American scene. A good example, to which the Negro change in partisanship has made some contribution, is the development of a status polarization between the Republican and Democratic parties in the South which by 1964 departed quite widely from that which we originally found in 1952. This change, summarized in Figure 2, shows that as late as the early 1950's, middle-class elements in Southern society were more devotedly Democratic than were their status subordinates, a mirror image of the relationship pertaining in other parts of the country. In the intervening period,

however, this situation in the South has slowly reversed itself, and by 1964 has closely approached the customary non-Southern norm. This evolution is one of the most rapid we have found, and might appear to belie the rule of partisan inertia in a noteworthy way. However, it becomes clear upon that a very fair share of the change represented--although by no means all--springs from the migration of well-to-do, elderly people or young business executives from the North--all heavily Republican in partisanship and high in status--to Florida and other parts of the South attractive for retirement or new industries. Indeed, in our 1964 sample almost one-quarter of college graduates residing in the South reported having grown up in some other region of the country, a fact which will become quite important for us at a later point in this paper. In general, however, we shall dismiss these few slow trends in partisanship, both because they have relatively little to do with the immediate circumstances of the 1964 election, and because they are being analyzed closely elsewhere.^{4/} Instead we shall turn our attention to the short-term component of the 1964 vote, setting aside henceforth that portion of the variance attributable to these more permanent divisions.

THE SHORT-TERM COMPONENT IN 1964 PRESIDENTIAL VOTING

The operations used to "partial out" the effects of abiding party loyalties depend on a number of recurrent regularities in the association between partisanship and voting decisions, and have been described in abundant detail in another publication.^{5/} In effect, an "expected" vote division may be calculated for any population grouping on the basis of the

⁴Such analyses will appear in a volume on Stability and Change, in preparation.

⁵See A. Campbell, P. Converse, W. Miller and D. Stokes, Elections and the Political Order. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965.

distribution in direction and strength of its partisan commitments. The short-term component then represents the deviation of any actual vote in a particular election, either in a pro-Republican or a pro-Democratic direction from this norm. It is convenient to express this deviation in terms of a percentage metric.

In these terms, a value of +10 percent would mean that the actual vote cast by the grouping in question departed from its expected vote by 10 percent in a Democratic direction; a -10 percent means a deviation of 10 percent toward the Republicans. Occasionally it is of interest to introduce a slight transformation on this expression, where the zero-point is shifted from the expected vote for the group to the point of deviation that characterized the national electorate as a whole in that election.

It is important to keep in mind the nature of this measure, for the values it takes can depart quite widely from the actual value of the vote itself. A group deviating widely in a Republican direction may in fact have cast a vote more Democratic in the absolute sense than a group deviating widely in a Democratic direction. It may be of some clarification, and of validation interest as well, to point out that the short-term component of the Catholic vote expressed as a departure from the national deviation, registered essentially zero in each national election from 1952 through 1958. In the 1960 election, with Kennedy as candidate, it bounded to a value of +20 percent. After this sudden spike, it returned rapidly toward zero, showing a value of +6 percent in 1962 congressional voting, and a mere +3 percent by 1964.

Regional Variation in the Short-Term Component. Although the differential impact of the 1964 campaign along regional lines was apparent even in the published voting returns, isolation of the short-term component of the


vote greatly heightens our sense of both the sharpness and the regularity of the sectional cleavage in 1964. The first map of Figure 3 is based on the actual presidential vote returns, aggregated at the level of eight major regions, expressed as deviations from the national vote division. The second map, drawn to the same key, depicts the short-term component of the vote taken alone. Both maps indicate rather clearly a general gradient sloping from New England toward the west, and a much sharper gradient running from New England to the Deep South. However, the data underlying Map B show a much more regular gradient in both directions across the nation than the raw vote. Moreover, although it is not entirely evident from the maps themselves, the short-term component of the vote registers well over twice the variance, as defined on these eight regions, as is present in the raw form of the vote.

At first glance, this state of affairs may not seem unusual. After all, marked sectional divisions in the vote have been the rule in American politics since the beginning of mass elections, although such sectionalism has been on the wane for much of this century. However, it is worth reminding ourselves that most of the regional differentiation in the raw vote in the twentieth century has sprung from the traditional component of the vote, and very little of it from the short-term component. Certainly in the eight presidential elections preceding 1964, regional variation in that short-term component would have been absolutely dwarfed by variation attributable to the more traditional term. And of course it is of some significance that the decline of sectionalism began to show up in short-term reactions to national politics generations before the regional partisan traditions eroded in any noteworthy fashion.


Thus one of the more unique features of the 1964 election was the

Figure 3


a.) Deviations, Raw Vote



KEY



b.) Deviations, Normal Vote



recrudescence on a major scale of sectional cleavages in reactions to the national political scene. It created once again at least a short-term political map akin to the two great sectional axes of partisan dispute of the 19th century: the battle of a rural West against an industrialized Northeast; and the battle of the South against an Abolitionist Northeast. Ironically for both cases, by 1964 the party labels had become directly reversed.

Status Differentiation in the Short-Term Component. Another rather unique feature of the election, this time much less apparent in the voting returns, emerges in analyses of status differentiation in the 1964 vote.

Before the election, expectations concerning reactions of voters at different status levels to the Johnson-Goldwater competition might have been quite mixed. On one hand, Goldwater as the "pure" conservative and the unusual ideological tone of the election might have led naturally to the prediction that the Republican appeal would have drawn more than customarily favorable reactions from upper-status groups, leaving lower-status groups being drawn differentially toward the Democrats, particularly in the short-term component of the vote. Certainly the latter expectation would be bolstered by the obvious reaction among Negroes to Goldwater. On these grounds, then, there was reason to anticipate a strengthening of the status polarization of the vote.

On the other hand, a number of trends seemed to be developing prior to the election which might have led to quite opposite expectations. That is, the Goldwater conservatism seemed sufficiently ~~intemperate~~ to frighten some upper-status groupings more than Johnson did. ~~Furthermore,~~ Goldwater's rather negative positions on civil rights were ~~expected,~~ once beyond the Negro, to have a particular appeal at those lower-status levels in more direct

economic competition with the Negro, in the form of the touted "white backlash." From this point of view, the Goldwater-Johnson race might have been expected not to strengthen the common status-party alignments, but instead to dissolve if not reverse them, particularly where the short-term component of the vote is concerned.

In some respects, both of these expectations are confirmed as we shall see, although quite differentially by region. What is considerably more unexpected is the lines along which these status differences developed in the 1964 voting. Typically the strength of partisan differentiation as a function of social status varies in rather predictable ways according to the particular measure of status chosen. That is, occupation as an index of status shows the strongest relationship, education the next strongest, and income arrives as a very weak third. This pattern has remained so standard over the past 15 years that we have come to take it for granted.

In 1964, however, this typical pattern was upset. The correlation between the raw vote and level of education turned out to be visibly stronger at the gross national level than the parallel correlation with occupation status. This result is the more surprising because of the role of the Negro in the election. In general, it is clear that the great revulsion of the Negro for the Goldwater candidacy must have strengthened the correlation between status and the vote, in view of the extremely low position of the Negro in the American social structure. However, that position is less abysmally low with respect to education as a criterion of status than it is with respect to either income or occupation. Hence the role of the Negro should have strengthened the relationship of the vote to both income and occupation more than it served to strengthen the relationship with education. And indeed, if we examine that relationship among Whites, the relative

strength of the relationship with education, compared to other status criteria, does advance even further. Therefore it becomes apparent that Goldwater had what was relatively his strongest appeal among high-status groups, but in particular, has this appeal most clearly among people of more advanced education. It is this latter clause that constitutes the primary surprise.


EDUCATION AND REACTIONS TO THE 1964 CAMPAIGN

From this point on, then, we shall devote our attention to a closer probing of the relationship between education and the short-term component of the vote. Typically, we shall be setting aside the Negro portion of the sample, looking at differential reactions to the 1964 campaign primarily among Whites.

Regional Variation. This relationship may first be clarified simply by partitioning the sample once again along regional lines. As Figure 4 indicates, the nature of the relationship between education and the short-term component of the vote varied in 1964 rather radically in different sectors of the nation. In particular, the direction of this movement in the Northeast turns out to have been a mirror image of that displayed by the rest of the nation, for in this region alone the well-educated voters reacted more strongly against Goldwater, or more strongly in favor of Johnson, than did those of lesser educational attainments.

In point of fact, since we have already seen that the regional axis of cleavage--and most notably, that between the Northeast and the South--was one of the primary dimensions of conflict in the campaign, we can now go on to note that where Whites alone were concerned, this cleavage was most intense between the well-educated residents of the two regions. In terms of the percentage metric, the differentials in the short-term components at the college level were nearly twice those at grade school levels. The differences

Figure 4. Short-Term Component of the Vote, By Region and Education



KEY

- College
- High School
- Grade School

as measured here are the more striking because in one important sense they underestimate the full force of the divergence. That is, as we have mentioned above, a rather surprising proportion of college-level residents of the South are migrants from other regions of the country (nearly one-quarter). These individuals are included as "Southerners" in Figure 4. However, closer examination makes clear that these outlanders tended to react to the 1964 situation not like Southerners, but much as did the non-Southerners of their respective regions of origin. Hence their location in Figure 4 acts to attenuate the full strength of the pro-Goldwater education differentials in the South.

In any event, it seems that both models of forces in the election that we initially proposed may have been accurate, although for different regions. Over most of the country, Goldwater's appeal to upper-status groups did lead to a vote that showed an enhanced polarization in the customary direction between upper and lower status levels. In the Northeast, however, reactions to the 1964 election went in the opposite direction, weakening this polarization. This second pattern was our expectation for the "civil rights" model, whereby "backlash" developed favoring Goldwater at lower status levels. We can check the data further, then, to see whether or not reactions to the problem of the Negro and civil rights did indeed have more impact on the short-term component of the vote among Whites in the Northeast than it did in the other regions.

Reactions to the Civil Rights Movement. We shall take as our measure of reactions to the civil rights controversy a crude index formed on the basis of the following two items:

"Some say that the civil rights people have been trying to push too fast. Others feel they haven't pushed fast enough. How about you? Do you think that civil rights leaders are trying to push too fast, are going too slowly, or are they moving about the right speed?"

"Are you in favor of desegregation, strict segregation, or something in between?"

Although only two items are involved, they stand in somewhat cumulative relationship to one another. They are highly intercorrelated, and with the bulk of the White population refraining on the one hand from endorsing strict segregation, yet quite willing on the other to say that the civil rights movement was attempting to proceed too rapidly.

A brief word is in order as to the properties and behavior of this measure. Quite naturally, Negroes and Whites have markedly different mean values on the index. If we make the racial partition, about 13 percent of the variance in the measure is thereby "explained." Further partition by major region (Northeast, Midwest, Far West and South) accounts for another 9 percent of the variance. Once again, the regional factor would account for still more of the variance were it "purified" by taking into consideration not only current residence but also the region where respondents reported having grown up, for the mean values on the civil rights index of these displaced persons look typically more like those of their region of origin than their region of residence.

With both racial and regional differences controlled, years of formal education account for almost another 5 percent of the variance (a partial correlation of $-.21$), with the direction of the relationship as expected: antagonism to the civil rights movement is less for both Negroes and Whites where education is more advanced. This pooled estimate is made ignoring some visible differences in the nature of the correlation by region. That is, the relationship tends to be at its strongest in the South, somewhat weaker in the Northeast, and weakest of all in the Midwest and Far West. As Table 1 indicates, these regional differences might be reduced if we were

Table 1

CIVIL RIGHTS INDEX AMONG WHITES, BY EDUCATION AND REGION

R Grew Up and Currently Resides in:

	<u>THE NORTHEAST</u>				<u>MIDWEST & FAR WEST</u>				<u>THE SOUTH</u>			
	<u>Comp.</u> <u>Coll.</u>	<u>Some</u> <u>Coll.</u>	<u>High</u> <u>School</u>	<u>Grade</u> <u>School</u>	<u>Comp.</u> <u>Coll.</u>	<u>Some</u> <u>Coll.</u>	<u>High</u> <u>School</u>	<u>Grade</u> <u>School</u>	<u>Comp.</u> <u>Coll.</u>	<u>Some</u> <u>Coll.</u>	<u>High</u> <u>School</u>	<u>Grade</u> <u>School</u>
Pro Civil Rights	61%	37%	33%	37%	48%	37%	30%	24%	22%	11%	10%	2%
Medium	39	53	53	47	50	55	53	52	46	47	36	28
Anti Civil Rights	<u>0</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>24</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>42</u>	<u>54</u>	<u>70</u>
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	38	30	168	64	62	92	318	112	37	38	137	100

to develop some non-linear prediction from years of formal education to the civil rights index outside the South. While there are fairly large differences in civil rights attitudes at each successive level of education among Whites in the South, the differences in response elsewhere are much greater with small increments of education at higher levels than at lower. People with college degrees show much more favorable attitudes when compared with those of incomplete college experience than do the high school educated when compared with the grade school contingent. Furthermore, as we shall see subsequently, even within the set of people who have completed four years of college, further large differences in response to the civil rights movement emerge when we take into account such facts as postgraduate education and its quality.

We shall now use this measure to test whether or not civil rights had any unusual impact on the short-term component of the vote in the Northeast which might help to illuminate the "reverse" patterns of reaction to the 1964 election by education in that region. One of the simpler methods of making this assessment is to examine the degree of rank-order correlation (γ_b) between our measure of the short-term component of the vote and responses to the civil rights index. In inspecting these coefficients within region, we should point out that they are generally smaller than they might otherwise be due to the fact that we are not including the Negroes in the sample. Since Negroes take very extreme values on both the civil rights index and on any measure of the short-term component of the vote, this disposition somewhat weakens the apparent effect of civil rights.

Table 2 does indeed confirm the expectation that the civil rights issue had greater influence on the short-term behavior of White voters in the Northeast than it did even in the South, and much more than for the

Table 2

IMPACT OF CIVIL RIGHTS ON THE SHORT-TERM COMPONENT,
BY REGION

<u>Region of Current Residence</u> (Whites only)	<u>r_b, Civil Rights Index & Short-Term Component</u>	<u>N</u>
Northeast	.15	320
South	.08	374
Midwest & Far West	.04	695

other regions. Closer examination shows that the weak relationships outside of the Northeast are due in part to the absence of any relationships between civil rights and the short-term component at lower educational levels. This is especially true of the South, where the correlations are +.02 only among the grade-school-educated Whites, rise to +.11 for high school people, and to +.24 for the college-educated. In the Midwest and Far West there is something of the same gradient, although at a much milder level. However, such relationships as exist in these two regions can be directly traced to those migrants from the South and Northeast; when these newer arrivals are removed, the coefficients for the Midwest/Far West fall essentially to zero at all educational levels. It is in the Northeast alone that the relationship remains substantial across the educational "board." People of grade school education in the Northeast show a coefficient of +.25 (N of 67).

Hence these data give a rather coherent picture as to why the Northeast shows such a different pattern of relationship by education, and why (in view of the general relation between education and acceptance of civil rights) the more educated in that region moved farther away from Goldwater than did the less well educated. However, they give little clue as to what was at stake

in the regions that did not follow the civil rights pattern. And in particular, they leave several mysteries about the South. While it is true that college-educated people in the South showed as sharp a response to civil rights as did people in the Northeast, the lack of apparent impact at lower educational levels there seems perplexing. Furthermore, in view of the fact that college people in the South are less extremely hostile to desegregation than their less well educated countrymen, why should they then swing more sharply to Goldwater?

At least part of the answer can be deduced from the data in Table 1. Whereas it is true that native Southerners of college background are not as unanimously hostile to civil rights as other Southerners, this is hardly to say that they are not on balance quite negative, some reports to the contrary notwithstanding. Table 1 shows them to display a more hostile distribution than even people of grade school education in other parts of the country. Hence the impact of civil rights attitudes on their 1964 votes led generally toward Goldwater, and if they moved more widely in this direction than did other Southerners, it appears to have been the case among other things that civil rights simply had less influence on the vote at lower levels.

The Appeal of Conservatism. Nevertheless, there were other elements at stake in the 1964 election, one of the most important for our current purposes being the Goldwater socio-economic conservatism. Therefore we may briefly consider the role that this appeal had by educational level across the several regions of the country, in much the same form that we have dealt with the impact of civil rights.

Here we shall use a somewhat different summary measure. During the course of the interview respondents were asked to indicate generalized affect

(cold-warm feelings) toward a number of politically-relevant group labels, such as "Southerners," "Negroes," "Republicans" and "Big Business." Included in the set were the terms "Conservatives" and "Liberals." The measure we shall employ here involves the simple differences in scores on the rating scale given to the latter two stimuli.^{6/}

Once again, a word is in order about the behavior of this measure, and particularly about its empirical relationship to responses on the civil rights index. In the Northeast, Midwest and Far West, there is a significant correlation between the two measures for college people, dwindling away fairly rapidly for the less well educated. Taken as a whole, the correlation between the two falls short of .10 outside the South. In the South, however, the correlation exceeds .30. Clearly the terms "conservative" and "liberal" have strong racial connotations in this region. This fact is underscored when we note that the intercorrelations do not decline directly with education, as is the common experience. Instead, the correlation soars to a .49 among the Southern grade-school voters.

With this background in mind, Table 3 shows the relationships between this measure of conservatism and the short-term component of the vote, in a format exactly parallel to Table 2, save for the fact that the table is restricted to those who not only reside currently in, but also grew up in the region in question. It is readily seen that there is a fair

⁶This kind of measure, which really asks no more than "which to your mind are the good guys and the bad guys?", avoids the problem of defining a liberal-conservative ideology, that typically turns out in a mass sample to hinge on extremely feeble and often reversed correlations. Furthermore, it sweeps in a somewhat wider set of people than can be included if one levies any criteria as to the meaningfulness of the terms to the user. Some people know that in their milieu a "conservative" or a "liberal" is a "bad guy," with precious little further content. Indeed, even with the general affect question, about 60 percent of grade-school voters attempt to make no affective discrimination between the terms.

Table 3

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LIBERALISM-CONSERVATISM AND
THE SHORT-TERM VOTE COMPONENT, BY REGION

<u>R Resides and Grew Up in:</u> (Whites only)	γ_b , Liberal- Conservative Scale & Short- Term Component	<u>N</u>
Northeast	.05	267
South	.19	303
Midwest & Far West	.14	548

complementarity between the two tables, with significant values appearing in one table where something of a vacuum existed in the other. Indeed, in an impressionistic way, the two tables put together would appear to account for about the same proportion of variance in the short-term component in each region, particularly when we recognize that there is significant overlap between the civil rights measure and the conservatism measure only in the South. Within that region, as with the Northeast where civil rights was concerned, the association between the conservatism measure and the short-term component holds up across all levels of education. In the Northeast and the Midwest-Far West, the relationship is substantial only for the college-educated (γ_b of +.22 and +.19, respectively) and in familiar fashion fades away as we retreat down the educational ladder.

THE QUALITY OF ADVANCED EDUCATION AND THE REACTION TO GOLDWATER

Whereas it is true in a gross sense that outside of the Northeast there was a positive relationship between the advancement of an individual's education and the degree of favor with which he responded to Goldwater's campaign, such a gross relationship turns out to be at least some little

bit misleading. For if we subdivide in a more detailed fashion those respondents who have completed a college education according to the quality of that education, it becomes clear that this gross relationship conceals a curvilinear trend at the upper extreme.

As a measure of the quality of a college graduate's education, we have scored each graduate according to the most common rating given by the American Association of University Professors in recent years to the college from which he received his most advanced degree, on the basis of salary levels. It must be made clear that this scoring has many faults, including the fact that the ratings are only available beginning in the late 1950's, and many of the college graduates in the sample received their degrees decades before that. Nevertheless, with some exceptions it seems reasonable to presume a basic stability over this century in the rankings of major and minor colleges and universities.

Whatever its shortcomings, this measure proves to be quite discriminating at the most global level with respect to differential reactions among college graduates to the Goldwater candidacy. One of the more impressive bodies of data is presented in Table 4. Respondents had been asked in October, 1964, who their personal preference had been for the Republican nomination. Among those who had some preference, the minority choosing Goldwater were asked how pleased they were that he had won, or if they might have been about as satisfied with some alternative candidate. Among those who chose some other aspirant than Goldwater, the probe had to do with whether the respondent was "particularly unhappy" that Goldwater won, or felt that he was about as good as their original choice.

Provocative though Table 4 may be, it will naturally occur that it may be reflecting variation from other sources than simply the quality of

Table 4

REACTIONS TO GOLDWATER'S CANDIDACY, BY QUALITY
OF COLLEGE EDUCATION*

Republican Convention & <u>Preference</u>	Reaction to the <u>Choice</u>	<u>COLLEGE GRADUATES</u>				NOT COLLEGE <u>GRADUATES</u>
		A.A.U.P. Rating of College:				
		<u>A & B</u>	<u>C</u>	<u>D</u>	<u>E, F & G</u>	
Other than Goldwater	Particularly unhappy	59%	44%	57%	19%	49%
Other than Goldwater	Not dis- satisfied	32	31	17	19	36
Goldwater	Others all right	0	6	9	5	2
Goldwater	Happy	<u>9</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>57</u>	<u>13</u>
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N		34	16	23	21	752

*Table is limited to White Respondents having reported some specific preference as to the outcome of the Republican nominating convention.

the individual's college experience. Most notably, we might point out the fact that many of the most highly rated schools are in the Northeast, while many of the colleges least favored in the ratings are in the South. Hence the table may simply recapitulate much of the ground we have already covered in this paper.

The counterfactuals suggested here are indeed true, and moreover a fair portion of the strength of relationship represented in the table washes away as we begin to add regional and other controls. Also, case numbers become a problem. Among college graduates in the Northeast, the large majority come from the first class of schools, and there was almost complete unanimity as to the undesirability of the Goldwater candidacy. Hence there is precious

little variation, not to mention covariation, with which to work, although the stray case or two giving any possibility of covariation fall in the appropriate cells. Among residents of the Midwest and Far West, much richer variation is available, and the correlation holds up quite well (r_b of +.15). A fair portion of the variation in school quality is attributable in this case to Midwesterners and Far Westerners who had travelled to college in the South, and dropping these cases lowers the correlation sharply (to +.05). Among Southern residents, the correlation is very substantial (+.39). Dropping those cases where the respondent went to college outside the South removes all instances of attendance at schools of ranks A and B. Nevertheless, the correlation which remains is still rather strongly positive (+.33, N of 22). Hence where the relationship can be examined at all closely, some life seems to remain, and serves to raise the question as to whether regional controls may not in this instance represent "overcontrols."

Scores on the civil rights index show a substantial correlation with college ratings, and this association remains very clear despite regional controls. There is also some general positive association between school quality, so measured, and the estimate of liberal location, although it is not as strong and bears up less well with regional controls.

Finally, we may consider the possibility of an association between the college ratings and the short-term component of the vote, since the latter measure rather stringently partials out any traditional link between college conservatism and Republican voting, focusing instead on departures from customary partisan choice evoked by the 1964 competition. Here again, the Northeast offers little possibility of evaluation for lack of sufficient "native" variation. There is some positive association in the Midwest and

Far West, although not strong enough to achieve significance. In the South, however, the association is of astonishing magnitude, a r_b of +.49 (N of 37), the highest generated at all with the short-term component, despite the fact that we are working here with what might appear to be a relatively homogeneous set of college graduates. Once again, of course, the coefficient may seem somewhat inflated by virtue of the fact that some of these White Southern residents went to school in other regions of the nation. Removing such cases again leaves a coefficient between the short-term component and the now-truncated college ratings (only ranks C-G present) of +.28 (N of 29), which still seems thoroughly remarkable.

By way of summary, then, we have examined patterns of variation in the short-term component of the vote associated with variations in education. In the Northeast, there was violent movement away from Goldwater, particularly at the highest educational levels, and the patterns seem to have depended in the first instance on reactions to civil rights, and in a lesser degree on the relatively liberal conservatism of the region. Elsewhere in the country, the movement of the well-educated was toward Goldwater, although this shift became striking only in the South. However, in the latter region, the general association between education and a favorable response to Goldwater seems clearly localized somewhere short of the upper end of the education continuum, primarily among the products of the smaller colleges of the region, who resist more strongly the advance of desegregation in the South.