

The American Public's View of U.S. Policy Toward China

*A Report Prepared for the
Council on Foreign Relations by the
Survey Research Center
University of Michigan*

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Price: \$1

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Officers and Directors

John J. McCloy, *Chairman of the Board*
Henry M. Wriston, *Honorary President*
Grayson L. Kirk, *President*
Frank Altschul, *Vice-President & Secretary*
David Rockefeller, *Vice-President*
Gabriel Hauge, *Treasurer*
George S. Franklin, Jr., *Executive Director*

Hamilton Fish Armstrong	Caryl P. Haskins
Elliott V. Bell	Joseph E. Johnson
William P. Bundy	Walter H. Mallory
William A. M. Burden	James A. Perkins
Arthur H. Dean	Philip D. Reed
Allen W. Dulles	Whitney H. Shepardson
Thomas K. Finletter	Charles M. Spofford
William C. Foster	Carroll L. Wilson

Committee on Studies

Henry M. Wriston, <i>Chairman</i>	Caryl P. Haskins
Hamilton Fish Armstrong	Joseph E. Johnson
Charles F. Barber	Grayson L. Kirk
Byron Dexter	Alfred C. Neal
John S. Dickey	James A. Perkins

Studies Program

John C. Campbell	William Diebold, Jr.
W. Phillips Davison	Richard P. Stebbins

Senior Research Fellows

David W. MacEachron, *Director of Program*

The Council on Foreign Relations is a non-profit institution devoted to study of the international aspects of American political, economic and strategic problems. It takes no stand, expressed or implied, on American policy.

The authors of books published under the auspices of the Council are responsible for their statements of fact and expressions of opinion. The Council is responsible only for determining that they should be presented to the public.

For a list of Council publications see inside back cover.

THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA IN WORLD AFFAIRS

The American Public's View of U.S. Policy Toward China

*A Report Prepared for the
Council on Foreign Relations by the
Survey Research Center
University of Michigan*

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

58 East 68th Street
New York, N.Y. 10021

THE AMERICAN PUBLIC'S VIEW OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD CHINA

Copyright, © 1964, by Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.

All rights reserved, including the right to reproduce this book or any portion thereof in any form.

For information, address Council on Foreign Relations.

58 East 68th Street, New York, N.Y. 10021

Printed in the United States of America

PREFACE

Since the summer of 1962 the Council on Foreign Relations, under a grant from the Ford Foundation, has been conducting a three-year program of studies on the general subject of The United States and China in World Affairs. Attention is centered on U. S. relations with China, including both the Nationalist and Communist governments, and the implications for U. S. policy of developments in China and Chinese activities abroad. A number of individual studies have been commissioned, and for each one an advisory group has been set up to meet from time to time with the author in order to give him the benefit of a diversity of informed views.

One of these studies deals with American public attitudes toward China. It is now being completed by its author, A. T. Steele, and is expected to be published in mid-1965. In order to complement Mr. Steele's work the Council on Foreign Relations invited the Survey Research Center, Institute of Social Research, University of Michigan, to conduct in the late spring of 1964 a nationwide survey of American public attitudes toward China.

The report prepared by the Survey Research Center is of such timely interest that it is being issued separately and in its entirety so as to make it available in advance of Mr. Steele's study.

ROBERT BLUM
Director of Studies
The United States and
China in World Affairs

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This survey represents the work of many people. In preparing the questions I had the benefit of general guidance and specific suggestions from Dr. Robert Blum of the Council on Foreign Relations, A. T. Steele, and Dr. Angus Campbell, Director of the Survey Research Center. Selection of the sample to be interviewed, interviewing, coding of responses, and tabulation of the results was done by those sections at the Survey Research Center which are responsible for each of these operations. Clerical and other assistance was provided by Mrs. Alison A. Clark and by Miss Susanna Y. Hubley.

MARTIN PATCHEN
Project Director
Survey Research Center

CONTENTS

List of Tables and Figures	vi
Summary	1
Introduction	4
Awareness of a Communist Government in China	5
Concern About Communist China	6
Perception of American Policy Toward Communist China	8
Awareness of the Nationalist Government	10
On Dealing With the Communist Government	12
On Helping the Nationalists Attack Communist China	19
On U.S. Withdrawal From United Nations If Communist China Is Admitted	22
Willingness To Follow Possible Presidential Initiatives in Dealing With Communist China	25
Information and Opinion About the Fighting in Viet Nam	40
The Relationship of Opinion About Policy Toward China To Opinion About Policy in Viet Nam	50
Appendix A	57
Appendix B	58
Appendix C	60

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

TABLES

1	"First, do you happen to know what kind of government most of China has right now—whether it's democratic, or Communist, or what? [If Answer unclear]: Do you happen to know if there is any Communist government in China now?"	5
2	"Do you think there is any reason for the United States to be concerned about Communist China, or that we should not be too concerned about Communist China?"	6
3	Reason Given Why United States <i>Should</i> Be Concerned about Communist China	7
4	"Now Russia and China are both Communist countries. Do you happen to know whether the United States has been treating Russia and China the same up to now, or whether we've been treating them differently? In what ways would you say we've been treating them differently (the same)?"	8
5	"What reason do you think the United States has had for treating Communist China in the way we have?"	9
6	"Have you happened to hear anything about another Chinese government besides the Communist one? [If respondent has not mentioned one of the following— <i>Nationalists, Republic of China, Chiang Kai-Shek, Formosa, or Taiwan</i> —go on]: Do you happen to remember anything about this other Chinese government—like what it is called or who its leaders is, or where it is located?"	11
7	"Some people say we should deal with Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government on Formosa as the government of all China, and have nothing to do with Communist China. Other people say we should support the Nationalists as the government of Formosa, but should deal with the Communists as the government of the rest of China. Do you have an opinion about this or not? [If yes]: How do you feel about this?"	14
8	Reasons Given Why United States <i>Should</i> Deal With Communists as Government of Most of China	18
9	Reasons Given Why United States <i>Should Not</i> Deal with Communist Government But Only With Nationalists	18
10	"Some people say we should give the Nationalists all the help they need to attack the Communists on the mainland of China. Other people say we should protect the Nationalists from a Communist attack, but should not help them to attack the Communists. Do you have an opinion about this or not? [If YES]: How do you feel about this?"	19
11	Reasons Given Why United States <i>Should Not</i> Help Nationalists to Attack Communists	20

12	Reasons Given Why United States <i>Should</i> Help Nationalists to Attack Communists	21
13	"Some people say that if Communist China gets into the United Nations, we ought to get out of the United Nations. Other people say that if Communist China gets into the United Nations, we should stay in and make the best of it. Do you have an opinion about this or not? [If yes]: How do you feel about this?"	23
14	Reasons Given Why United States Should <i>Stay In</i> United Nations If Communist China Is Admitted	24
15	Reasons Given Why United States Should <i>Get Out of</i> United Nations If Communist China Is Admitted	24
16	"Now the President of the United States might decide that it was in our best interests to take certain new actions with regard to Communist China. For each thing I mention, would you tell me how you would feel about it if the President suggested that action?"	29
17	Reactions to Possible Presidential Initiatives, for Persons of Different Ages .	30
18	Reactions to Possible Presidential Initiatives, for Persons with Different Levels of Education	32
19	Reactions to Possible Presidential Initiatives, for Persons with Different Levels of Information about China	33
20	Reactions to Possible Presidential Initiatives, for Persons in Different Regions of the United States	35
21	Reactions to Possible Presidential Initiatives, for Persons of Different Political Affiliation	36
22	Reactions to Possible Presidential Initiatives, for Persons with Different Previously Expressed Opinions on Whether United States Should Deal with Communist China	38
23	"Have you happened to hear anything about the fighting in Viet Nam?" ..	42
24	"Now as you may know, the United States has been helping the South Viet Nam government, while Communist China has been helping the Communist rebels in that country. I'm going to mention a number of things that the United States might do about the situation in Viet Nam. For each thing I mention, would you tell me how you feel about it? First, if you have no opinion, just tell me that. If you do have an opinion, choose one of the answers on this card.	43
25	Reactions to Possible U. S. Actions in Viet Nam, for Persons with Different Levels of Education	44
26	Reactions to Possible U. S. Actions in Viet Nam, for Persons with Different Levels of Information about China	46
27	Reactions to Possible U. S. Actions in Viet Nam, for Persons of Different Ages	47

28	Reactions to Possible U. S. Actions in Viet Nam, for Persons of Different Political Affiliations	48
29	Reactions to Possible U. S. Actions in Viet Nam, for Persons in Different Regions of the United States.	49
30	Reactions to Two Possible U. S. Actions in Viet Nam, As Related to General Willingness to Deal with Communist China	53
A	Approximate Sampling Errors of Percentages	57
B	Sampling Errors of Differences	58
C	Breakdown of Sample	60

FIGURES

1	Reactions to the Idea of a Compromise Agreement in Viet Nam, As Related to Willingness to Follow Presidential Suggestions for Contact with China for Persons of Different Educational Levels	55
2	Reactions to the Idea of Using American Forces in Viet Nam. As Related to Willingness to Follow Presidential Suggestions for Contact with China for Persons of Different Age Groups	56

The American Public's View of U.S. Policy Toward China

S U M M A R Y

This report presents results of a national survey of American opinion on the subject of Communist China and Viet Nam. The survey was conducted in May and June 1964.

More than one-fourth of the public is not even aware that mainland China is now ruled by a Communist government. But of those who know there is a Communist China, a large majority think there is reason for the United States to be concerned about it. Reasons given for such concern reveal a widespread fear among Americans that Communist China may attack the United States or may try to rule the whole world.

Most Americans who know what kind of government mainland China has also recognize that the United States has recently had more dealings with Russia than with Communist China. Asked about their understanding of the reasons why we have had little to do with Communist China, Americans most often mention either aggression or unfriendliness by the Chinese.

A sizable proportion of those interviewed were not able to think of any Chinese government other than the Communist one. These data indicate that the presence of the Nationalists as an alternative Chinese government is not a salient reality for most Americans.

Those who are aware of both Chinese governments were asked whether they feel we should deal only with the Nationalist government or deal with both governments. A majority of those expressing a direct opinion favor dealing with the Communists as well as with the Nationalists, but a large minority favor dealing only with the Nationalists. Of those who favor dealing with the Communists, most justify such a policy as fitting the reality that the Communists actually rule most of China. Those who oppose dealing with the Communist government give such reasons as our commitment to the Nationalists and aggressive actions by the Communists. Support for a

policy of dealing with the Communists as the government of most of China is strongest among those with more education, among younger people, among women, and among those who are Independent or moderately Democratic in their politics.

An overwhelming majority of Americans oppose the idea that we help the Chinese Nationalists to attack the Chinese Communists. The most common ground for this opposition is the fear that such action would involve us in war—either with Communist China or on a grander scale.

On the question of what the United States should do if Communist China is admitted to the United Nations, there is almost unanimous agreement (only five per cent dissenting) that we should stay in the United Nations rather than withdraw. Among the many reasons offered for this viewpoint, the advantage of our retaining a voice in the United Nations and support for the United Nations as an organization are prominent.

An attempt was made to assess the willingness of the public to follow possible Presidential initiatives aimed at improving relations with Communist China. A large majority say they would favor following a Presidential suggestion that there be visits between Americans and people from Communist China—such as newspapermen from each country visiting the other. A possible Presidential suggestion that we talk over Asian problems with Communist China and try to come to some agreements with it likewise draws a favorable reaction from a large majority of those interviewed. A third possible Presidential initiative, to which a majority react favorably, is the suggestion that we exchange ambassadors with Communist China.

However, a clear majority say they would oppose any Presidential suggestion that we let Communist China join the United Nations. A possible suggestion from the President that we sell things like wheat to Communist China draws a mixed reaction. A slight majority of those with opinions oppose this idea.

Willingness to follow Presidential proposals on some issues is shown by many who had previously expressed a general opposition to dealing with China. On the other hand, some of those who are generally willing to increase our dealings with China stop short of accepting several specific Presidential suggestions—such as admitting Communist China to the United Nations. Reaction to possible Presidential suggestions aimed at increasing contact with China is more favorable among younger people, is somewhat more favorable among those with better education, is somewhat less favorable in the South, and tends to be less favorable among Republicans.

As with knowledge of the government of China, about one-fourth of those interviewed say they have not heard anything about the fighting in Viet Nam. Those who say they have heard something about the fighting were asked their feelings about four possible actions that the United States might take. A large majority oppose complete U. S. withdrawal from Viet Nam and favor continued military aid to the South Viet Nam government. The suggestion that American forces be used in Viet Nam if the Communists are winning evokes an approximately equal split in opinion. However, the idea of making a compromise agreement with Communist China on this problem, such as making all Viet Nam neutral, draws a favorable response from a majority of those questioned. As with other opinions, views about policy in Viet Nam vary according to education, level of information, age, political party affiliation, and region. The use of American forces if necessary is most likely to be favored by those with more education, by those with more information about the Far East, and by younger people. The most highly educated, the better informed, and strong Republicans are more likely to oppose a compromise such as neutralization of Viet Nam—though this proposal draws a large measure of support from all portions of the population.

Both those who favor increased contact with Communist China and those who oppose such contact are equally opposed to U.S. withdrawal from Viet Nam. Similarly, regardless of their opinions about dealing with Communist China, most Americans are in favor of continued military aid to South Viet Nam.

However, people who favor increased contact with Communist China are generally more likely than others to oppose the use of American forces in Viet Nam. Also, those people who favor contact with Communist China are generally more likely than others to be willing to make some compromise agreement with China on the issue of Viet Nam. These data indicate that a general willingness to deal with Communist China is usually accompanied by a preference for a non-military solution in Viet Nam.

The general tendency of these attitudes to go together, however, is counter-balanced by the effect of education and age, both of which tend to produce a different pattern of attitudes. Better educated and younger people are somewhat more likely than others to favor increased contact with Communist China at the same time that they approve of a relatively militant policy in Viet Nam.

INTRODUCTION

At the time of this writing, in mid-1964, the American public has ample reason to be interested in Communist China and in our policy toward China. The United States effort to support South Viet Nam has brought us close to another *direct confrontation with China in Southeast Asia*. Moscow and Peking have publicly debated the merits of trying to "co-exist" with the United States; in this debate China has favored a "hard" policy. And the question of what the United States should do if Communist China is admitted to the United Nations has threatened to become a Presidential campaign issue. In the context of these events, what view does the American public take of Communist China, of our policy toward China, and of our policy in Viet Nam, where United States and Chinese interests clash? The annual Spring survey conducted by the Survey Research Center of The University of Michigan in May and June of 1964 provided an opportunity to obtain some information on this subject.

The survey sample consisted of 1,501 persons, almost all of whom are heads of households and wives of heads of households.¹ The specific persons to be interviewed were chosen by advanced methods of probability selection.² The sample of persons interviewed is generally representative of the adult American population.³

¹ The universe sampled was all families living in households in conterminous United States (exclusive of Alaska and Hawaii). Persons living on military reservations or in group quarters such as rooming houses or institutions were not included in the sample.

² Appendix A provides estimates of the probable margin of error in the percentages reported above as the result of sampling error.

³ See Appendix C for a description of the sample.

AWARENESS OF A COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT IN CHINA

First we asked people if they knew what kind of government China now has. It turns out that a sizable proportion of Americans—28 per cent—is not aware that most of China is now ruled by a Communist government. The proportion of those who are aware of this fact rises, as we might expect, with educational level (see Table 1). Also, men are more likely to be informed about the existence of a Communist China than are women (Table 1). Age is not generally related to such knowledge except for a drop in knowledge among the oldest age group, 65 and over.

TABLE 1

"First, do you happen to know what kind of government most of China has right now—whether it's democratic, or Communist, or what? [If answer unclear]: Do you happen to know if there is any Communist government in China now?"

(Read rows across)

	<i>Know Com- munist Govern- ment Controls Most of China</i>	<i>Do Not Know^a</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Number of Persons</i>
<i>By Education</i>				
Grade school	46%	54%	100%	(396)
Some high school	61	39	100	(242)
Completed high school	83	17	100	(497)
Some college	94	6	100	(179)
College degree	97	3	100	(167)
<i>By Sex</i>				
Men	81	19	100	(647)
Women	66	34	100	(854)
Total Sample ^b	72%	28%	100%	(1501)

^a Includes for the total sample 24 per cent who said they did not know and 4 per cent whose answers indicated they did not know.

^b Includes 11 persons whose education was not ascertained.

CONCERN ABOUT COMMUNIST CHINA

Of those Americans who are aware of Communist China's existence, an overwhelming majority (86 per cent) feel that the United States should be concerned about Communist China (see Table 2).

A large proportion of people mention aggressive intentions of China as a reason to be concerned (see Table 3). Only a few thought of possible attack on such neighbors of China as India and Viet Nam. A much larger number of Americans are afraid that China might want to attack the United States or to rule the whole world or picture Communist China as warlike in general terms without specifying whom she might attack. For example, a housewife in Chicago said: "I think they are one of our most potent enemies and even more dangerous than Russia. They seem bent on annihilating this country." A man in San Diego explained his concern by saying: "Communist China is out to run the whole world if it can."

Many Americans speak of the present or potential strength of China as reasons for concern. An Air Force man living in Alabama pointed to "their population and industrial resources" as reasons for concern. "They are becoming a nuclear power now," a truck driver in Los Angeles commented.

Other reasons for concern frequently given include the very fact that China is Communist, the fear that China may help spread communism to other (usually unspecified) countries, and negative or dangerous qualities of the Chinese such as unconcern for human life.

TABLE 2
"Do you think there is any reason for the United States to be concerned about Communist China, or that we should not be too concerned about Communist China?"

(Asked only of those who are aware of Communist government)	
Should be concerned	86%
Should not be concerned	7
Don't know	6
Not ascertained	1
Total	100%
(Number of persons, 1088)	

Among the small proportion of people who say we need not be concerned about Communist China, the most frequently given reason is that China is too weak now to harm us. Other reasons given by this small group of people include the idea that we should pay more attention to the United States than to foreign countries and that China's troubles with Russia will keep her too occupied to become a problem for us.

TABLE 3
*Reasons Given Why the United States Should be Concerned about
Communist China^a*

Aggressive intentions of China suspected:			
Toward the United States or the whole world	21%	}	40%
Toward specific countries other than United States	3		
Target unspecified	16		
China's strength or bigness:			
Present strength	18	}	30
Potential strength	12		
Communism anywhere is bad; bad features of how China is governed			14
China may help spread communism to other countries			8
Negative or dangerous qualities or values of Chinese people or leaders (unconcern for human life, don't believe in God, etc.)			8
Have to keep informed about events in China as a part of the world			2
Other reasons			5
No reason given for concern			18
			<hr/>
			^b
(Number of persons, 1088)			

^a All persons who know about Communist China, regardless of whether they said we should be concerned about China or not, are included in this table. Some persons who said we should not be concerned nevertheless indicated some reasons for concern when questioned further.

^b Total adds to more than 100 per cent because each respondent could give more than one answer.

PERCEPTION OF AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD COMMUNIST CHINA

Of those Americans who realize that China is ruled by a Communist government, a majority (60 per cent) are aware that the United States has been more willing to have dealings with Russia than with Communist China (see Table 4). Those who are aware of this difference mention such specifics as our having diplomatic relations with Russia but not with China; trade, such as selling wheat to Russia; talks with Russia; and the presence of Russia, but not China, in the United Nations.

A small proportion—less than 10 per cent—see the United States as treating both Russia and China pretty much the same. Of these people, the largest number give general, non-specific answers. Some say that we have tried to get along equally with both, and some say that we have kept aloof from or been firm with both.

TABLE 4

"Now Russia and China are both Communist countries. Do you happen to know whether the United States has been treating Russia and China the same up to now, or whether we've been treating them differently? In what ways would you say we've been treating them differently (the same)?"

(Asked only of those who know China is ruled by Communist government)

Treating Russia and China the same	9%
Closer or friendlier to Russia	60
Closer or friendlier to China	1
Treating them differently, nature of difference is unclear; or other difference; or not ascertained	5
Don't know	24
Not ascertained	1
Total	100%
(Number of persons, 1088)	

Almost one-fourth of those asked this question do not know whether we have treated Russia and China differently or the same.

Those who are aware that the United States has had more to do with Russia than with Communist China give a variety of explanations for U. S. policy toward China (see Table 5). The reasons most often given are that Communist China is aggressive, that we have preferred to support the Nationalists, and that it is China (rather than the United States) which has been unfriendly. No single reason is, however, given by as many as one-fifth of those asked this question. Almost one person in five says he does not know why the United States has treated China in the way we have.

TABLE 5
"What reasons do you think the United States has had for treating Communist China in the way we have?"
 (For those who are aware that United States has been closer to Russia than to Communist China)

China has made aggressive actions or plans	19%
U.S. support of Nationalists or non-legitimacy of Communist government in China	16
China has been unfriendly or uncooperative	16
Different or bad qualities of Chinese or Chinese government other than communism or aggression: race, religion, untrustworthy, etc.	12
China is Communist; Communist ideology or way of life	9
Fear of Chinese motives or expansion; wish to keep China from expanding	6
China is weaker; we're more afraid of Russia	6
U.S. unfriendliness, errors, or stupidity	2
Don't know	18
Other	5
No reason given	5
	— ^a
(Number of persons, 653)	

^a Total adds to more than 100 per cent because each respondent could give more than one answer.

AWARENESS OF THE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT

Those people who know that most of China is ruled by a Communist government were asked whether they have heard of another Chinese government besides the Communist one. Only 60 per cent were able to think of the name, or the leader, or the location of the "other Chinese" (Nationalist) government.

As with knowledge of the Communist government, there is no general relation between age and knowledge about the Nationalists; however, there is an indication that knowledge of the existence of the Nationalists is less widespread among the youngest age groups (18-24) than among other age groups. As with awareness of the Communist government, awareness of the Nationalists increases sharply with educational level, and men are better informed than are women (see Table 6).

If we assume that all of those who are not aware of the existence of the Communist government also do not know about the Nationalist government, then only 43 per cent of the total sample can be classified as knowing about the Nationalists. It may be that some of those who did not know "what kind of government most of China has now" would, nevertheless, have mentioned the Nationalist government if asked about the subject. It is likely, also, that some persons who could not think of the name, leader, or location of "another Chinese government" would have recognized names such as Chiang Kai-shek or Nationalists if they had been asked directly about them. However, these data do indicate that for only a relatively small portion of the American public—probably under 50 per cent—is the existence of the Nationalist government a salient reality.

TABLE 6

"Have you happened to hear anything about another Chinese government besides the Communist one? [If respondent has not mentioned one of the following—Nationalists, Republic of China, Chiang Kai-shek, Formosa, or Taiwan—go on]: Do you happen to remember anything about this other Chinese government—like what it is called or who its leader is, or where it is located?"

(Asked only of those who know that most of China is ruled by Communist government)
(Read rows across)

	<i>Know about Nationalist Govern- ment</i>	<i>Don't Know about Nationalist Govern- ment^a</i>	<i>Not Ascertained</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Number of Persons</i>
<i>By Education</i>					
Grade school	49%	51%	0%	100%	(183)
Some high school	48	52	0	100	(148)
Completed high school	56	43	1	100	(415)
Some college	67	32	1	100	(169)
College degree	86	14	0	100	(162)
<i>By Sex</i>					
Men	71%	29%	0%	100%	(520)
Women	50	49	1	100	(567)
<i>Total Sample^b</i>	60%	39%	1%	100%	(1088)

^a Persons who had mentioned the Nationalists, or Chiang Kai-shek, or Formosa in a previous part of the interview were automatically credited with knowledge of the Nationalist government.

^b Total includes several persons whose education was not ascertained.

ON DEALING WITH THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT

Among those Americans who are aware of both Chinese governments, there is a considerable division of opinion about whether we should deal with the Nationalists as the government of all China or whether we should deal with the Communist government as well as with the Nationalists (see Table 7).

About one person in three advocates dealing with the Communist government as well as with the Nationalists. The most common reason given for this position (see Table 8) is that it fits the reality of the situation we face. For example, a retired Army officer in California commented: "None of these things will go away if we close our eyes. . . . We have to deal with communism. It's there and will not vanish or go away." A supervisor in a manufacturing company in Missouri said: "We will have to deal with them both as separate governments. We can't ignore those people for they are there and will not stand still to be ignored." Other reasons mentioned for dealing with the Communist government include the importance of Communist China and the possibility that such dealings may lead to increased cooperation or an easing of tensions.

One person in four who is aware of both Chinese governments is against our having any dealings with the Communist government and in favor of dealing with the Nationalist government only. Some of those who take this position mention our commitment to the Nationalist government, virtues of the Nationalist government, or advantages of supporting the Nationalists. A ferryboat captain in California said: "We should deal with Chiang Kai-shek as the government of China. I think they are more for the free world than the Reds." A housewife in Chicago said: "I think we have more respect for the Nationalists and should just deal with them."

Some who oppose dealing with Communist China give as reasons their opposition to dealing with a Communist government. A distillery worker in Detroit said: "We're committed against communism in any form and I just can't see recognizing a nation we're committed against."

Other reasons given for not dealing with Communist China include perceived aggressive attitudes by Communist China and negative qualities of the Communist Chinese—such as lack of respect for religion and for human life.

Eight per cent of those who are aware of both Chinese governments

emphasize their wish for United States support of the Nationalist government but do not directly indicate opposition to dealing with the Communist government. A small number of persons—2 per cent—express opposition to the Nationalists or to their leader Chiang Kai-shek but do not indicate directly that we should deal with the Communist government.

A large number of persons who are aware of both Chinese governments—more than one in five—say they have no opinion about whether we should deal with the Communist government.

Opinion about whether the United States should deal with the Chinese Communist government varies considerably among different segments of the American population—depending on education, age, sex, region, and political affiliation (see Table 7).

Willingness to deal with the Communists as the government of most of China increases sharply as education increases. Among those with a grade school education or with some high school, a clear majority of almost two to one (of those with opinions) is against dealing with Communist China. At the other end of the educational scale, there is a similar majority of about two to one in favor of dealing with the Communist government.

There is a progressive decline in willingness to deal with the Communist Chinese as the age of respondents increases. Among those groups aged 44 and under, a clear majority favors dealing with the Communists. Opinion becomes almost equally divided in the age group of 45-54. In the age groups of 55 and above, a majority is opposed to dealing with the Communists as the government of most of China.

About an equal proportion of men and women—one in three—favors dealing with the Communists, but a much smaller percentage of women than men—17 per cent compared to 31 per cent—directly opposes dealing with the Communists. Also, more women than men express no opinion on this question.

Regional differences are not large, but there is a tendency for the West to be the most favorable toward dealing with the Communist Chinese government and for the South to be the least.

When those with different political affiliations are compared, the Independents and those who are Democrats, but not strongly so, indicate the greatest support for dealing with Communist China. Those who express a strong tie to either major party, especially to the Democrats, are less likely to support dealings with the Communists. Those who are Republicans, but not strongly so, tend to resemble the strong Republican group in their

opinions more than they resemble the Independents and less strong Democrats.

In general, then, dealing with the Communists as the government of most of China is more likely to be favored by those with high education, by younger people, by women, to a slight degree by those living in the West, and by those who are Independent or moderately Democratic in politics.

TABLE 7

"Some people say we should deal with Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government on Formosa as the government of all China, and have nothing to do with Communist China. Other people say we should support the Nationalists as the government of Formosa, but should deal with the Communists as the government of the rest of China. Do you have an opinion about this or not? [If yes]: How do you feel about this?"

(Asked only of persons who are aware of the existence of both Chinese governments)

	A. By Education					
	Some Completed					Total Sample*
	Grade School	High School	High School	Some College	College Degree	
Against having anything to do with Communist China; in favor of dealing with Nationalists only	30%	40%	22%	21%	23%	25%
In favor of supporting the Nationalists; no direct statement on dealing with Communist China	8	6	9	6	6	8
In favor of dealing with Communist government as government of most of China	21	20	31	43	48	34
Against supporting Nationalists; no direct statement on dealing with Communist China	2	0	3	2	3	2
No opinion	30	27	25	19	11	22
Other; it depends	4	3	4	2	2	3
Not ascertained	5	4	6	7	7	6
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of persons	(90)	(70)	(235)	(114)	(140)	(656)

* Total sample includes persons whose education was not ascertained.

TABLE 7 (Continued)

B. By Age						C. By Sex		
<i>34 and under</i>	<i>35-44</i>	<i>45-54</i>	<i>55-64</i>	<i>65 and over</i>	<i>Total Sample^b</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Total Sample</i>
21%	20%	24%	36%	34%	25%	31%	17%	25%
7	9	8	3	11	8	6	9	8
44	39	29	27	18	34	35	33	34
2	2	2	2	2	2	3	1	2
15	21	27	22	30	22	18	27	22
5	3	2	3	2	3	4	3	3
6	6	8	7	3	6	3	10	6
100% (185)	100% (163)	100% (126)	100% (98)	100% (83)	100% (656)	100% (370)	100% (286)	100% (656)

^b Total sample includes persons whose age was not ascertained.

TABLE 7 (continued)

<i>D. By Region*</i>					
	<i>Northeast</i>	<i>North Central</i>	<i>South</i>	<i>West</i>	<i>Total Sample</i>
Against having anything to do with Communist China; in favor of dealing with Nationalists only	26%	24%	29%	21%	25%
In favor of supporting the Nationalists; no direct statement on dealing with Communist China	7	8	9	5	8
In favor of dealing with Communist government as government of most of China	35	33	28	39	34
Against supporting Nationalists; no direct statement on dealing with Communist China	2	1	3	3	2
No opinion	22	22	10	26	22
Other; it depends	3	5	2	3	3
Not ascertained	5	7	10	3	6
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of persons	(192)	(178)	(154)	(132)	(656)

* Northeast: Conn., Del., Maine, Mass., N.H., N.J., N.Y., Pa., R.I., Vt.

North Central: Ill., Ind., Iowa, Kansas, Mich., Minn., Mo., Neb., N. Dakota, Ohio, S. Dakota, Wis.

South: Ala., Ark., D.C., Fla., Ga., Ky., La., Maryland, Miss., N.C., Okla., S.C., Tenn., Va., W. Va.

West: Ariz., Calif., Col., Idaho, Mont., Nev., N. M., Oregon, Utah, Wash., Wyoming,

TABLE 7 (continued)

<i>E. By Political Affiliation^a</i>					
<i>Democrat, Strong</i>	<i>Democrat, Not Strong</i>	<i>Independent^a</i>	<i>Republican, Not Strong</i>	<i>Republican, Strong</i>	<i>Total Sample^c</i>
34%	19%	20%	28%	33%	25%
7	5	8	8	10	8
25	37	39	34	33	34
0	2	4	3	2	2
28	23	18	19	17	22
1	4	3	5	4	3
5	10	8	3	1	6
100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
(134)	(135)	(169)	(116)	(88)	(656)

^a The question was: "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what? [If Republican or Democrat]: Would you call yourself a strong Republican (Democrat) or a not very strong Republican (Democrat)? [If Independent or other]: Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party?"

^b Includes persons who said they are closer to one of the major parties as well as those who did not indicate any leaning.

^c Total sample includes persons whose political affiliation was other or not ascertained.

TABLE 8
*Reasons Given Why United States Should Deal With Communists as
Government of Most of China*

Facing reality; Communists are the real government of most of China; Nationalists don't represent Chinese people	67%
Importance of Communist China	15
May lead to cooperation with Communist China; may ease tensions	7
Permanence of Communist government; will control China for indefinite future; Nationalists can't regain control	5
To know what's going on in Communist China	4
China is Communist like Russia, and we deal with Russia	2
Other	5
No reason given	8
	— ^a
(Number of persons, 222)	

^a Total adds to more than 100 per cent because each respondent could give more than one answer.

TABLE 9
*Reasons Given Why United States Should Not Deal With Communist
Government, But Only With Nationalists*

Our commitment to Nationalists; virtues of Nationalists; advantages of supporting Nationalists	32%
We should oppose Communist governments	27
Present or future aggressive attitudes or intentions of Communist China	15
Negative or dangerous qualities or values of Chinese people or leaders	5
We wouldn't gain anything by dealing with Communist China	5
Dealing with Communist China means giving into them	4
Don't know	1
Other	8
No reason given	9
	— ^a
(Number of persons, 165)	

^a Total adds to more than 100 per cent because each respondent could give more than one answer.

ON HELPING THE NATIONALISTS ATTACK COMMUNIST CHINA

Those people who are aware of the existence of both Chinese governments were also asked whether or not they think the United States should help the Chinese Nationalists to attack the Chinese Communists.

An overwhelming majority of those who expressed an opinion on this subject oppose our helping such an attack. Only one person in ten favors our aiding a Nationalist attack, while more than six times that proportion expresses opposition. Fifteen per cent questioned on the subject say they have no opinion (see Table 10).

The most frequently given reasons for opposing such an American action are that it would automatically involve us in war or lead us into war—either with China or with Russia as well as China. For example, an employee of an electronics firm in San Diego said: "I don't think we can help Nationalist China to attack Red China. It would lead to an all-out war. We should simply protect Nationalist China from Red China." A housewife in Chicago said "I think we should protect the Nationalists, but not start a war. We'd be starting a war if we did something like that—it would be another Korea, or lead to another world war."

TABLE 10

"Some people say we should give the Nationalists all the help they need to attack the Communists on the mainland of China. Other people say we should protect the Nationalists from a Communist attack, but should not help them to attack the Communists. Do you have an opinion about this or not? [If yes]: How do you feel about this?"

(Asked only of persons who know about both Chinese governments)

Against helping Nationalists to attack Communists	62%
In favor of helping Nationalists to attack Communists	10
In favor of protecting Nationalists; no indication whether we should help Nationalists to attack Communists	7
No opinion	15
Other; unclear	4
Not ascertained	2
Total	100%
	(Number of persons, 656)

Other reasons given in opposition to helping a Nationalist attack on the Communists include the beliefs that such an attack could not succeed and that it is wrong for the United States to be an aggressor (see Table 11).

The small minority of Americans who favor our helping a Nationalist attack give among their reasons the belief that the United States should help all those who are fighting communism and simply the aim of overthrowing the Communist government (see Table 12).

Whereas opinion on whether to deal with the Communists as the government of most of China varies greatly among different segments of the American population, overwhelming opposition to an attack on Communist China is fairly consistent throughout the population. There is a tendency for opposition to an attack to increase among the better educated, but the relation is not strong. Opposition is relatively constant among those with different political affiliations, among both men and women, across all regions of the country, and for all age groups.

TABLE 11
Reasons Given Why United States Should Not Help Nationalists to Attack Communists

Might involve us in a war:		
With Communist China	6%	} 45%
With Russia as well as China; world war	10	
General, nonspecific	29	
Attack by Nationalists couldn't succeed; Communist China is too strong		25
Wrong for U. S. to be an aggressor		10
Let the Nationalists fight their own battles		9
We should protect Formosa and the Nationalists		7
Not the right time for an attack now		2
Other		9
Don't know or no reason given		8
		—*
(Number of persons, 407)		

* Total adds to more than 100 per cent because each respondent could give more than one answer.

TABLE 12
Reasons Given Why United States Should Help Nationalists to Attack Communists

Should help those fighting communism	36%
In order to overthrow Communist government	12
To protect ourselves against Communist China	11
Moral superiority of Nationalists or Chiang Kai-shek	8
Bad qualities of Chinese Communists or communism in general	5
Other	15
Don't know or no reason given	17
	— ^a
(Number of persons, 66)	

^a Total adds to more than 100 per cent because each respondent could give more than one answer.

ON U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM UNITED NATIONS IF COMMUNIST CHINA IS ADMITTED

We asked our sample of Americans whether, if Communist China gets into the United Nations, the United States should stay in or get out of the world organization. This question was asked of all persons who know that most of China is ruled by a Communist government.

Three out of every four persons say that the United States should remain in the United Nations, even if Communist China is admitted (see Table 13). Only one American in 20 favors our withdrawal from the United Nations in the event of China's admission. Fourteen per cent say they have no opinion on the matter.

Among the vast majority who favor our staying in the United Nations with Communist China, many persons give as a reason the idea that staying in would enable us to retain some influence on what goes on in the United Nations (see Table 14). The wife of a salesman in Ohio said: "I don't think we ought to get out because all the other countries would be in and we wouldn't be able to vote on anything." A man in South Carolina, an employee of an electric utility company, commented: "We've got to try to keep things going. China and Russia both, they'd like to rule the world and we sure don't want that."

Others who favor our staying in the United Nations give as reasons their support of the United Nations as an organization. A woman in New Jersey, the wife of the head of a small manufacturing company, explained her feeling that we should stay in the United Nations by commenting: "At the present time the United Nations is an organization which tries to deal effectively with world problems or coordinate things among the nations of the world." Others spoke of the United Nations as "mankind's best hope."

Some of the great majority who favor staying in the United Nations if Communist China is admitted say that we'd be worse off outside the United Nations than inside—e.g., that we'd be isolated or wouldn't know what's going on. Among other reasons given for staying in the United Nations are that it wouldn't accomplish anything to get out and that withdrawal would constitute an admission of defeat for the United States.

Among the small minority who favor United States withdrawal from the United Nations if Communist China is admitted, the most frequent explanation given is in terms of general hostility to the United Nations unrelated to

Communist China's admission (see Table 15). A Missouri man, who works as a supervisor in a manufacturing firm, commented: "That United Nations is not worth a thing to us. It's just a waste of time and manpower; it never has served its purpose." This view appears, however, to be that of a very small minority.

The overwhelming support for our remaining in the United Nations, regardless of whether Communist China also gains admittance, is generally constant among all segments of the American population. The margin of endorsement of our continuing membership is of about the same magnitude among persons of different educational levels, among men and women, across different regions of the country, for persons of different political affiliations, and for persons with different levels of information about China. When different age groups are compared, only the oldest group, those 65 or over, shows any marked deviation from other groups. Withdrawal from the United Nations is favored by 12 per cent of the oldest group as compared to a figure of about 4 per cent in all other groups. However, even in the oldest age group, more than five to one favor remaining in the United Nations if Communist China is admitted.

TABLE 13

"Some people say that if Communist China gets into the United Nations, we ought to get out of the United Nations. Other people say that if Communist China gets into the United Nations, we should stay in and make the best of it. Do you have an opinion about this or not? [If yes]: How do you feel about this?"

(Asked of persons who know that most of China is ruled by Communist government)

In favor of <i>staying in</i> United Nations if Communist China gets in	75%
In favor of <i>getting out</i> of United Nations if Communist China gets in	5
No opinion	14
Other; answer not clear	3
No reason given	3
Total	100%
(Number of persons, 1088)	

TABLE 14
*Reasons Given Why United States Should Stay in United Nations If
Communist China Is Admitted*

To have a voice, influence in United Nations	37%
Support for United Nations as an organization	22
We'd be worse off outside the United Nations; would be isolated; wouldn't know what's going on; etc.	16
Wouldn't accomplish anything to get out	11
Getting out would be a defeat	10
No objection to Communist China being in United Nations; advantages of having Communist China in United Nations	9
Getting out would be letting allies, other countries down	4
Advantages of debate or negotiation by staying in United Nations	2
Other	2
Don't know or no reason given	6
	— ^a
(Number of persons, 821)	

^a Total adds to more than 100 per cent because each respondent could give more than one answer.

TABLE 15
*Reasons Given Why United States Should Get Out of United Nations If
Communist China Is Admitted*

General hostility toward United Nations, unrelated to Communist China's admission	41%
United States would be outvoted, lose our influence	21
United Nations couldn't accomplish anything if Communist China was in it	12
United States shouldn't have anything to do with Communist China	9
Financial problem for United States or United Nations connected with Communist China's admission	9
Other	9
Don't know or no reason given	9
	— ^a
(Number of persons, 56)	

^a Total adds to more than 100 per cent because each respondent could give more than one answer.

WILLINGNESS TO FOLLOW POSSIBLE PRESIDENTIAL INITIATIVES IN DEALING WITH COMMUNIST CHINA

After respondents had a chance to express their own opinions concerning American policy toward Communist China, they were asked how they would feel if the President of the United States suggested several new actions with regard to Communist China. For each possible action mentioned, the person interviewed chose from a card that answer which best showed how he would feel if the President suggested that action. This series of questions was asked both of those who are aware that there are two Chinese governments and of those who are aware of the Communist government but not of the Nationalists. These two groups of whom the questions were asked together constitute 72 per cent of the total original sample.

A large majority of those questioned—73 per cent—favors following a Presidential suggestion that there be visits between Americans and people from Communist China—such as newspapermen from each country visiting the other. Only 16 per cent oppose this idea (see Table 16).

Americans also appear overwhelmingly ready to endorse any Presidential proposal that we talk over Asian problems with Communist China and try to come to some agreements with her. Seventy-one per cent favor following this suggestion, while only 19 per cent indicate opposition.

A third possible Presidential proposal favorably received by a majority of persons is the suggestion that "we exchange ambassadors with Communist China the way we do with other countries." Fifty-one per cent indicate they would be willing to follow the President in such a move, while 34 per cent express opposition. However, the definiteness of opinion among those opposing an exchange of ambassadors appears to be generally greater than among the people who are willing to go along with this suggestion.

The idea of "selling things like wheat to Communist China" evokes an almost even split of opinion. Those opposing such a step are slightly in the majority. As with the proposal to exchange ambassadors, those opposing trade with Communist China generally appear to feel more definitely about this than do those who express a willingness to go along with such a move.

The one possible Presidential initiative which meets with opposition, and usually definite opposition, from a clear majority of Americans is any sug-

gestion that "we let Communist China join the United Nations." Fifty-three per cent oppose this idea, while 31 per cent say they would be willing to follow this suggestion if the President made it.

Reaction to possible proposals for dealing with Communist China is somewhat different among various segments of the American population.

In general, willingness to follow the Presidential initiatives described is greater among younger age groups than among older groups (see Table 17). The relatively greater resistance among older people is particularly noticeable on the subjects of exchanging ambassadors with Communist China and of talking over Asian problems with Communist China.

People of higher education are somewhat more likely than those with less education to favor Presidential initiatives to improve relations with Communist China. The more highly educated are especially likely to favor an exchange of visits—such as those of newspapermen—between Americans and Communist Chinese (see Table 18).

In addition to comparing persons of different education, it is also possible to compare people according to their knowledge about China. People were scored in this instance on the basis of (a) whether they were aware of the Nationalist government and (b) whether they were aware that the United States now has more dealings with Russia than with Communist China. While moves to improve relations with Communist China are somewhat more favored by the better educated, those with more information about China and our policy toward China do not consistently favor such initiatives (see Table 19). The better informed are more likely to favor visits between the two countries. However, these better informed people are also somewhat more likely to oppose meetings with Communist China on Asian problems, to oppose an exchange of ambassadors with Communist China, and to oppose letting Communist China into the United Nations. The differing effects of education and of level of information suggest that the tendency of the better educated to follow Presidential initiatives is not primarily a result of their being better informed. Of course, the measure of information about China used is a very rough one. It is not possible from these data to tell whether, among those we classified as well-informed, further differences in information affect attitudes toward Presidential initiatives and, if so, in what direction this effect operates.

Differences according to geographical regions in willingness to follow Presidential initiatives are generally quite small (see Table 20). Southerners as a group show more opposition to several possible Presidential initiatives

aimed at improving relations with Communist China. Most notably, they are less likely than those in other regions to go along with the ideas of exchanging ambassadors with Communist China and of selling her wheat.

Since any President is not only a national leader but a political party leader as well, it is especially relevant to see whether political affiliation is related to willingness to follow policy suggestions made by the President. (The President in office was Lyndon Johnson, a Democrat, although the questions referred only to "the President.") In general, differences between Republicans, Democrats, and Independents are small (see Table 21). Republicans tend to be less likely to follow the possible Presidential suggestions mentioned—but this attitude is consistent with their relatively low willingness to have dealings with Communist China as expressed in answer to a previous question. A somewhat less consistent picture is shown by strong Democrats. In expressing their own opinions in answer to a previous question, strong Democrats resemble strong Republicans in their degree of opposition to dealing with Communist China. However, strong Democrats generally express as much willingness to follow Presidential suggestions aimed at improving relations with Communist China as do other Democrats and Independents. This attitude may reflect the fact that strong Democrats react to the President, at least in part, as a party leader.

Finally, in comparing different segments of the population, we find no notable differences between men and women in their willingness to follow the Presidential initiatives described.

One additional comparison of interest concerns people who differ in their own general viewpoint about how to treat Communist China. In answer to a previous question, some persons expressed opposition to dealing with the Communists as the government of most of China, while others favored dealing with the Communist government as well as with the Nationalist government. It is revealing to examine the reactions of each of these groups to possible Presidential suggestions aimed at improving relations with Communist China (see Table 22).

Among those who had previously indicated opposition to dealing with Communist China, a clear majority is, nevertheless, willing to follow two Presidential suggestions—that visits between the two countries be arranged and that talks to discuss Asian problems be held. A large majority in this "no-dealings" group opposes the ideas of selling wheat to Communist China and of exchanging ambassadors with her—although almost 30 per cent of it is willing to follow each of these possible Presidential suggestions. The idea

of admitting China to the United Nations evokes the clearest opposition in the "no-dealings" group. Only 10 per cent of it is willing to follow a Presidential suggestion of this kind.

Among those persons who had previously indicated approval of dealing with the Chinese Communist government, the overwhelming majority expresses willingness to follow Presidential suggestions that we exchange visits with the Chinese Communists and that we discuss Asian problems with them. A large majority of this "deal-with-Communist-China" group is also willing to follow suggestions that we exchange ambassadors with Communist China. On the two other possible steps mentioned—selling wheat and admitting Red China to the United Nations—a majority of the "deal-with-Red-China" group is willing to follow such Presidential suggestions, but a sizable minority is not ready to go that far in establishing relations with China.

In summary, willingness to follow Presidential suggestions aimed at improving relations with Communist China increases as one moves into younger age groups; increases somewhat as education improves; is inconsistent, but generally decreases, when persons have some information about China; decreases somewhat in the South; tends to decrease among Republicans; and is about the same regardless of sex. A majority of those who previously expressed opposition to dealing with the Chinese Communist government is, nevertheless, willing to go along with some specific Presidential suggestions, while a sizable minority of those generally in favor of dealing with the Communist government balks at following some specific Presidential suggestion.

TABLE 16

"Now the President of the United States might decide that it was in our best interests to take certain new actions with regard to Communist China. For each thing I mention, would you tell me how you would feel about it if the President suggested that action?"

(Asked only of persons who know that most of China is ruled by a Communist government)

"Suppose the President suggested visits between Americans and people from Communist China—like newspapermen from each country visiting the other?"

Definitely in favor	41%	}	73%
Probably in favor	32		
Probably against	6	}	16
Definitely against	10		
No opinion			10
Not ascertained			1
Total			100%

(Number of persons, 1088)

"Suppose the President suggested that we exchange ambassadors with Communist China the way we do with other countries?"

Definitely in favor	24%	}	51%
Probably in favor	27		
Probably against	11	}	34
Definitely against	23		
No opinion			14
Not ascertained			1
Total			100%

(Number of persons, 1088)

"Suppose the President suggested that we talk over problems of Asia with Communist China and try to come to some agreements with them?"

Definitely in favor	37%	}	71%
Probably in favor	34		
Probably against	7	}	19
Definitely against	12		
No opinion			9
Not ascertained			1
Total			100%

(Number of persons, 1088)

TABLE 16 (Continued)

<i>"Suppose the President suggested selling things like wheat to Communist China?"</i>			
Definitely in favor	19%	}	43%
Probably in favor	24		
Probably against	14	}	47
Definitely against	33		
No opinion			9
Not ascertained			1
Total			100%
(Number of persons, 1088)			
<i>"Suppose the President suggested that we let Communist China join the United Nations?"</i>			
Definitely in favor	13%	}	31%
Probably in favor	18		
Probably against	13	}	53
Definitely against	40		
No opinion			15
Not ascertained			1
Total			100%
(Number of persons, 1088)			

TABLE 17

Reactions to Possible Presidential Initiatives, for Persons of Different Ages

<i>Possible Presidential Suggestions</i>	<i>Age</i>					
	<i>18-24</i>	<i>25-34</i>	<i>35-44</i>	<i>45-54</i>	<i>55-64</i>	<i>65 and Over</i>
<i>Visits between Americans and Communist Chinese</i>						
In favor	78%	78%	76%	71%	67%	61%
Against	15	13	15	16	19	23
No opinion	6	7	8	12	14	15
Not ascertained	1	2	1	1	0	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Willingness To Follow Possible Presidential Initiatives in Dealing with

TABLE 17 (Continued)

Possible Presidential Suggestions	Age					
	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65 and Over
<i>Sale of Things Like Wheat to Communist China</i>						
In favor	40%	45%	42%	46%	47%	34%
Against	51	45	46	45	45	54
No opinion	8	8	11	8	8	12
Not ascertained	1	2	1	1	0	0
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Discussion of Asian Problems with Communist China</i>						
In favor	75%	72%	78%	69%	70%	58%
Against	12	17	16	20	21	27
No opinion	11	9	5	10	9	14
Not ascertained	2	2	1	1	0	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Exchange of ambassadors with Communist China</i>						
In favor	61%	55%	55%	47%	50%	39%
Against	27	31	32	37	32	42
No opinion	11	13	12	15	18	18
Not ascertained	1	1	1	1	0	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Agreement to let Communist China into United Nations</i>						
In favor	30%	34%	37%	30%	29%	18%
Against	51	47	47	59	57	66
No opinion	18	17	15	10	13	15
Not ascertained	1	2	1	1	1	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of persons	(89)	(243)	(258)	(201)	(155)	(140)

TABLE 18
Reactions to Possible Presidential Initiatives, for Persons With Different Levels of Education

<i>Possible Presidential Suggestions</i>	<i>Education</i>				
	<i>Grade School</i>	<i>Some High School</i>	<i>Completed High School</i>	<i>Some College</i>	<i>College Degree</i>
<i>Visits between Americans and Communist Chinese</i>					
In favor	59%	62%	79%	76%	82%
Against	24	19	12	17	14
No opinion	17	19	8	5	4
Not ascertained	0	0	1	2	0
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Sale of things like wheat to Communist China</i>					
In favor	41%	38%	41%	43%	54%
Against	50	49	46	48	43
No opinion	8	12	12	7	3
Not ascertained	1	1	1	2	0
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Discussion of Asian Problems with Communist China</i>					
In favor	59%	70%	75%	73%	72%
Against	25	18	15	19	22
No opinion	15	12	9	6	6
Not ascertained	1	0	1	2	0
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Exchange of ambassadors with Communist China</i>					
In favor	44%	46%	55%	50%	55%
Against	39	29	29	39	38
No opinion	16	25	15	10	7
Not ascertained	1	0	1	1	0
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 18 (Continued)

Possible Presidential Suggestions	Education				
	Grade School	Some High School	Completed High School	Some College	College Degree
<i>Agreement to let Communist China into United Nations</i>					
In favor	25%	24%	32%	36%	38%
Against	58	54	51	53	53
No opinion	16	21	16	10	9
Not ascertained	1	1	1	1	0
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of persons	(183)	(148)	(415)	(169)	(162)

TABLE 19
Reactions to Possible Presidential Initiatives, for Persons With Different Levels of Information About China

Possible Presidential Suggestions	Information Score*		
	(Low) 1	2	(High) 3
<i>Visits between Americans and Communist Chinese</i>			
In favor	64%	72%	78%
Against	17	16	16
No opinion	18	11	6
Not ascertained	1	1	0
Total	100%	100%	100%
<i>Sale of things like wheat to Communist China</i>			
In favor	41%	36%	48%
Against	44	52	47
No opinion	14	12	5
Not ascertained	1	0	0
Total	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 19 (Continued)

Possible Presidential Suggestions	Information Score ^a		
	(Low) 1	2	(High) 3
<i>Discussion of Asian Problems with Communist China</i>			
In favor	71%	72%	71%
Against	12	17	24
No opinion	16	10	5
Not ascertained	1	1	0
Total	100%	100%	100%
<i>Exchange of ambassadors with Communist China</i>			
In favor	49%	52%	51%
Against	24	32	40
No opinion	26	16	9
Not ascertained	1	0	0
Total	100%	100%	100%
<i>Agreement to let Communist China into United Nations</i>			
In favor	30%	26%	34%
Against	45	56	58
No opinion	24	18	8
Not ascertained	1	0	0
Total	100%	100%	100%
Number of persons	(264)	(279)	(505)

^a The level of information score indicates how many of the following pieces of information the person knew: (1) most of China is ruled by a Communist government; (2) there is a Chinese government—identified by name of government, name of leader, or location—other than the Communist one; (3) the United States has had more dealings with Russia than with Communist China recently.

TABLE 20
*Reactions to Possible Presidential Initiatives, for Persons in Different
Regions of the United States*

Possible Presidential Suggestions	Region*			
	Northeast	North Central	South	West
<i>Visits between Americans and Communist Chinese</i>				
In favor	73%	77%	67%	72%
Against	15	13	21	17
No opinion	12	9	11	9
Not ascertained	0	1	1	2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Sale of things like wheat to Communist China</i>				
In favor	48%	46%	34%	42%
Against	40	45	55	48
No opinion	12	8	9	8
Not ascertained	0	1	2	2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Discussion of Asian Problems with Communist China</i>				
In favor	69%	75%	69%	69%
Against	21	15	19	23
No opinion	10	9	11	6
Not ascertained	0	1	1	2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Exchange of ambassadors with Communist China</i>				
In favor	51%	58%	40%	56%
Against	35	27	41	32
No opinion	14	15	18	10
Not ascertained	0	0	1	2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 20 (Continued)

<i>Possible Presidential Suggestions</i>	<i>Region*</i>			
	<i>Northeast</i>	<i>North Central</i>	<i>South</i>	<i>West</i>
<i>Agreement to Let Communist China into United Nations</i>				
In favor	32%	34%	26%	32%
Against	52	50	59	55
No opinion	16	16	13	11
Not ascertained	0	0	2	2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of persons	(292)	(317)	(272)	(207)

* For a listing of the states included in each region, see Table 7, note c.

TABLE 21
*Reactions to Possible Presidential Initiatives, for Persons of Different
Political Affiliation*

<i>Possible Presidential Suggestions</i>	<i>Political Affiliation*</i>				
	<i>Demo- crat, Strong</i>	<i>Demo- crat, Not Strong</i>	<i>Indepen- dent</i>	<i>Repub- lican, Not Strong</i>	<i>Repub- lican, Strong</i>
<i>Visits between Americans and Communist Chinese</i>					
In favor	69%	74%	77%	75%	65%
Against	19	15	13	14	26
No opinion	12	11	9	11	9
Not ascertained	0	0	1	0	0
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 21 (Continued)

Possible Presidential Suggestions	Political Affiliation ^a				
	Demo- crat, Strong	Demo- crat, Not Strong	Indepen- dent	Repub- lican, Not Strong	Repub- lican, Strong
<i>Sale of things like wheat to Communist China</i>					
In favor	48%	42%	48%	34%	40%
Against	45	45	44	52	55
No opinion	6	13	7	14	4
Not ascertained	1	0	1	0	0
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Discussion of Asian problems with Communist China</i>					
In favor	73%	75%	71%	67%	67%
Against	18	14	18	22	26
No opinion	8	10	10	11	7
Not ascertained	1	1	1	0	0
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Exchange of ambassadors with Communist China</i>					
In favor	50%	55%	57%	47%	42%
Against	34	27	31	37	44
No opinion	15	17	11	16	14
Not ascertained	1	1	1	0	0
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Agreement to let Communist China into United Nations</i>					
In favor	33%	28%	39%	24%	29%
Against	56	51	43	63	62
No opinion	10	21	17	13	9
Not ascertained	1	0	1	0	0
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of persons	(244)	(240)	(255)	(187)	(133)

^a For the questions used to assess political affiliation, see Table 7, note d.

TABLE 22
*Reactions to Possible Presidential Initiatives, for Persons With Different
 Previously Expressed Opinions on Whether United States Should Deal with
 Communist China*

<i>Possible Presidential Suggestions</i>	<i>Previously Expressed Viewpoint*</i>		
	<i>Should Deal Only with Nationalists, Not with Communists</i>	<i>Should Deal with Both Communists and Nationalists</i>	<i>No Opinion</i>
<i>Visits between Americans and Communist Chinese</i>			
In favor	63%	91%	86%
Against	30	6	14
No opinion	7	3	0
Not ascertained	0	0	0
Total	100%	100%	100%
<i>Sale of things like wheat to Communist China</i>			
In favor	29%	65%	36%
Against	67	30	48
No opinion	4	5	16
Not ascertained	0	0	0
Total	100%	100%	100%
<i>Discussion of Asian problems with Communist China</i>			
In favor	58%	87%	68%
Against	38	9	18
No opinion	4	4	14
Not ascertained	0	0	0
Total	100%	100%	100%
<i>Exchange of ambassadors with Communist China</i>			
In favor	28%	75%	41%
Against	65	19	37
No opinion	7	6	22
Not ascertained	0	0	0
Total	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 22 (Continued)

<i>Possible Presidential Suggestions</i>	<i>Previously Expressed Viewpoint*</i>		
	<i>Should Deal Only with Nationalists Not with Communists</i>	<i>Should Deal with Both Communists and Nationalists</i>	<i>No Opinion</i>
<i>Agreement to let Communist China into United Nations</i>			
In favor	10%	58%	24%
Against	87	34	54
No opinion	3	8	22
Not ascertained	0	0	0
Total	100%	100%	100%
Number of persons	(165)	(222)	(144)

* For the previous question, see Table 7.

INFORMATION AND OPINION ABOUT THE FIGHTING IN VIET NAM

We asked everyone interviewed, regardless of whether he knew that China is ruled by a Communist government, whether he had heard anything about the fighting in Viet Nam. About three persons out of four say they have heard something about the fighting, but—despite the wide publicity given to the Viet Nam conflict over a long period of time—one American out of every four says that he has not heard anything about it.

As with information about China (discussed earlier), the presence of a minimal amount of information about fighting in Viet Nam increases sharply with educational level and is somewhat more widespread among men than among women (see Table 23).

Among those who have heard about the Viet Nam fighting, a majority expresses opposition, usually strong opposition, to the idea of "the U. S. getting out of the Viet Nam war completely," (see Table 24). However, about one person in four favors such withdrawal.

Among the proposals mentioned, strongest endorsement is given to "our continuing to give arms and training to the Viet Nam troops fighting the Communist rebels." Seventy-five per cent of those asked this question favor this policy—most of them strongly, while only 12 per cent expressed opposition.

The idea of "using American forces in Viet Nam if the Communist rebels are winning, even if this means our risking war with Communist China" evokes an approximately even split between those in favor and those opposed. The strength of feeling of those opposing use of American forces appears to be somewhat stronger than the strength of feeling of those favoring this idea.

The fourth possible action mentioned, "trying to make some compromise agreement with Communist China on this—like making all Viet Nam neutral," draws a favorable response from a majority of those with an opinion—usually strongly favorable. The sizable minority opposing this idea almost uniformly expresses strong opposition. Those expressing no opinion—a fairly sizable group for all possible actions mentioned—number almost one person in four with respect to a possible compromise agreement with Communist China.

As with opinion concerning policy toward Communist China, opinion

about U. S. policy in Viet Nam varies considerably among different segments of the American population.

As level of formal education increases, there is a sharp parallel increase in opposition to American withdrawal from Viet Nam (see Table 25). The better educated are more likely to favor our continuing to supply arms and training to South Viet Nam forces and are more likely to favor use of American forces if these are needed. While favoring these kinds of American involvement in Viet Nam, the best educated groups are more likely than others to oppose a settlement like neutralization.

While we did not assess the amount of information respondents had about the situation in Viet Nam, opinion among groups with differing amounts of information can be compared according to an indirect measure of information—that concerning China. With respect to opinions about Viet Nam policy, the effect of amount of information is parallel to the effect of education (see Table 26). The more information, the greater the opposition to withdrawal from Viet Nam; the greater the support for giving arms and training to the Vietnamese; the greater the willingness to use American forces if necessary; and the greater the opposition to a compromise agreement like neutralization of Viet Nam.

When the views of different age groups are compared, older people are seen to be less likely than younger people to oppose U. S. withdrawal from Viet Nam (see Table 27). Moreover, as age increases, there is somewhat less support, though still a clear favorable majority, for aiding the Vietnamese with arms and training. A striking reversal of opinion among age groups occurs on the idea of using American forces in Viet Nam if necessary. A clear majority of the youngest age group supports this suggestion, but as one moves successively to older age groups, the proportion favoring such a move steadily declines until for the oldest age group there is a heavy majority in opposition. With regard to the last suggestion of making Viet Nam neutral, the association of age and policy preference is not consistent.

With respect to political affiliation, those who identify themselves as strong Republicans are even more likely than others to oppose U. S. withdrawal from Viet Nam (see Table 28). Furthermore, whereas Democrats, Independents, and even less strong Republicans generally favor a compromise agreement like neutralization of Viet Nam, strong Republicans are likely to oppose the proposal for such a settlement. On another policy question concerning Viet Nam, strong Republicans are slightly more in favor of giving arms and training to the Vietnamese than other groups are.

In general, men are somewhat more militant than women in their commitment to the Viet Nam war—but the differences between sexes are modest. Men are more likely than women to oppose withdrawal from Viet Nam. Men are slightly more favorable to giving arms and training to the Vietnamese and somewhat more in favor of using American forces if necessary. Men are somewhat more likely to oppose a compromise agreement like neutralization, while a greater proportion of women than men express no opinion on this question.

Some differences in policy preferences also appear on the basis of geographical regions of the country (see Table 29). While a majority in all regions opposes withdrawal from Viet Nam, opposition to such a move is strongest in the West. And while there is little difference among regions on the question of providing arms and training to South Viet Nam, a majority of those living in the Northeast opposes using American forces, while a majority of those in the West favors such a move if necessary. Opinion on use of American forces is about evenly divided in the North Central and Southern states. With regard to the idea of a compromise agreement like neutralization, the South is about evenly split, while a majority in other regions favors such a settlement.

TABLE 23

"Have you happened to hear anything about the fighting in Viet Nam?"
(Read rows across)

	Yes	No	Not Ascertained	Total	Number of Persons
<i>By Education</i>					
Grade school	50%	49%	1%	100%	(396)
Some high school	64	36	0	100	(242)
Completed high school	85	14	1	100	(497)
Some college	94	5	1	100	(179)
College degree	96	4	0	100	(167)
<i>By Sex</i>					
Men	80	20	0	100	(645)
Women	70	29	1	100	(845)
<i>Total Sample*</i>	74%	25%	1%	100%	(1501)

* Total sample includes persons whose education or sex was not recorded.

TABLE 24

"Now as you may know, the United States has been helping the South Viet Nam government, while Communist China has been helping the Communist rebels in that country. I'm going to mention a number of things that the United States might do about the situation in Viet Nam. For each thing I mention, would you tell me how you feel about it? First, if you have no opinion, just tell me that. If you do have an opinion, choose one of the other answers on this card."

(Asked only of persons who have heard about the fighting in Viet Nam)

<i>"How about the United States getting out of the Viet Nam war completely?"</i>			
Definitely in favor	18%	}	28%
Probably in favor	10		
Probably against	16	}	53
Definitely against	37		
No opinion			18
Not ascertained			1
Total			100%
(Number of persons, 1127)			
<i>"How about our continuing to give arms and training to South Viet Nam troops fighting against the Communist rebels?"</i>			
Definitely in favor	51%	}	75%
Probably in favor	24		
Probably against	5	}	12
Definitely against	7		
No opinion			11
Not ascertained			2
Total			100%
(Number of persons, 1127)			
<i>"How about using American forces in Viet Nam if the Communist rebels are winning, even if this means our risking war with Communist China?"</i>			
Definitely in favor	24%	}	41%
Probably in favor	17		
Probably against	10	}	42
Definitely against	32		
No opinion			16
Not ascertained			1
Total			100%
(Number of persons, 1127)			

TABLE 24 (Continued)

"How about trying to make some compromise agreement with Communist China on this—like making all Viet Nam neutral?"

Definitely in favor	28%	}	46%
Probably in favor	18		
Probably against	6	}	29
Definitely against	23		
No opinion			23
Not ascertained			2
Total			100%

(Number of persons, 1127)

TABLE 25
Reactions to Possible U. S. Actions in Viet Nam, for Persons with Different Levels of Education

<i>Possible Actions</i>	<i>Education</i>				
	<i>Grade School</i>	<i>Some High School</i>	<i>Completed High School</i>	<i>Some College</i>	<i>College Degree</i>
<i>Complete withdrawal from Viet Nam war</i>					
In favor	34%	31%	28%	24%	19%
Against	38	43	55	55	75
No opinion	24	25	16	19	5
Not ascertained	4	1	1	2	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 25 (Continued)

<i>Possible Actions</i>	<i>Education</i>				
	<i>Grade School</i>	<i>Some High School</i>	<i>Completed High School</i>	<i>Some College</i>	<i>College Degree</i>
<i>Continued military aid to South Viet Nam</i>					
In favor	61%	71%	76%	82%	86%
Against	15	10	13	9	11
No opinion	21	17	10	8	2
Not ascertained	3	2	1	1	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Use of American forces in Viet Nam if necessary</i>					
In favor	33%	35%	41%	40%	53%
Against	41	44	42	43	37
No opinion	22	19	16	16	9
Not ascertained	4	2	1	1	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Compromise agreement with Communist China—neutralization of Viet Nam</i>					
In favor	44%	46%	51%	42%	39%
Against	20	24	25	38	47
No opinion	32	28	23	19	14
Not ascertained	4	2	1	1	0
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of persons	(201)	(155)	(428)	(170)	(161)

TABLE 26
Reactions to Possible U. S. Actions in Viet Nam, for Persons with Different Levels of Information About China

<i>Possible Actions</i>	<i>Level of Information Score*</i>			
	(Low) 0	1	2	(High) 3
<i>Complete withdrawal from Viet Nam war</i>				
In favor	32%	32%	28%	24%
Against	16	46	53	67
No opinion	45	22	18	8
Not ascertained	7	0	1	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Continued military aid to South Viet Nam</i>				
In favor	45%	72%	75%	86%
Against	12	10	16	10
No opinion	35	17	9	4
Not ascertained	8	1	0	0
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Use of American Forces in Viet Nam if necessary</i>				
In favor	22%	39%	38%	49%
Against	38	41	44	42
No opinion	32	19	18	9
Not ascertained	8	1	0	0
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Compromise agreement with Communist China—neutralization of Viet Nam</i>				
In favor	35%	51%	53%	45%
Against	10	18	23	42
No opinion	46	31	23	13
Not ascertained	9	0	1	0
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of persons	(152)	(202)	(244)	(495)

* For an explanation of level of information scores, see Table 19.

TABLE 27
Reactions to Possible U. S. Actions in Viet Nam, for Persons of Different Ages

Possible Actions	Age					
	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65 and over
<i>Complete withdrawal from Viet Nam war</i>						
In favor	25%	20%	25%	32%	38%	32%
Against	65	63	57	46	41	40
No opinion	10	16	15	21	19	26
Not ascertained	0	1	3	1	2	2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Continued military aid to South Viet Nam</i>						
In favor	84%	80%	78%	72%	67%	67%
Against	10	8	11	12	17	16
No opinion	6	10	8	16	15	14
Not ascertained	0	2	3	0	1	3
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Use of American Forces in Viet Nam if necessary</i>						
In favor	55%	50%	43%	36%	29%	28%
Against	31	34	41	47	49	49
No opinion	14	15	14	16	21	20
Not ascertained	0	1	2	1	1	3
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Compromise agreement with Communist China—neutralization of Viet Nam</i>						
In favor	49%	46%	44%	47%	57%	37%
Against	34	30	36	25	15	31
No opinion	17	23	17	27	27	29
Not ascertained	0	1	3	1	1	3
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of Persons	(92)	(260)	(256)	(225)	(150)	(142)

TABLE 28
Reactions to Possible U. S. Actions in Viet Nam, for Persons of Different Political Affiliations

Possible Actions	Political Affiliation*				
	Demo- crat, Strong	Demo- crat, Not Strong	Indepen- dent	Repub- lican, Not Strong	Repub- lican, Strong
<i>Complete withdrawal from Viet Nam war</i>					
In favor	28%	29%	28%	29%	22%
Against	47	53	56	51	62
No opinion	22	17	14	19	16
Not ascertained	3	1	2	1	0
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Continued military aid to South Viet Nam</i>					
In favor	71%	76%	78%	68%	84%
Against	13	11	11	16	8
No opinion	12	12	9	16	8
Not ascertained	4	1	2	0	0
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Use of American forces if necessary</i>					
In favor	37%	36%	46%	38%	45%
Against	45	44	37	41	45
No opinion	15	19	15	20	10
Not ascertained	3	1	2	1	0
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Compromise agreement with Communist China—neutralization of Viet Nam</i>					
In favor	47%	47%	45%	49%	39%
Against	24	27	31	29	41
No opinion	25	25	22	21	20
Not ascertained	4	1	2	1	0
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of persons	(258)	(245)	(268)	(192)	(135)

* For question concerning political affiliation, see Table 7, note d.

TABLE 29
Reactions to Possible U. S. Actions in Viet Nam, for Persons in Different
Regions of the United States

Possible Actions	Region ^a			
	Northeast	North Central	South	West
<i>Complete withdrawal from Viet Nam war</i>				
In favor	31%	30%	27%	20%
Against	54	49	49	63
No opinion	14	20	20	16
Not ascertained	1	1	4	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Continued military aid to South Viet Nam</i>				
In favor	77%	72%	73%	80%
Against	13	14	11	8
No opinion	9	14	12	11
Not ascertained	1	0	4	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Use of American forces in Viet Nam if necessary</i>				
In favor	34%	42%	39%	48%
Against	50	41	36	39
No opinion	15	16	21	12
Not ascertained	1	1	4	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
<i>Compromise agreement with Communist China— neutralization of Viet Nam</i>				
In favor	47%	51%	36%	50%
Against	25	25	34	34
No opinion	27	23	27	14
Not ascertained	1	1	3	2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Number of persons	(295)	(336)	(286)	(210)

^a For states included in each region, see Table 7, note c.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF OPINION ABOUT POLICY TOWARD CHINA TO OPINION ABOUT POLICY IN VIET NAM

Since actual American policy in Viet Nam is related to our policy toward Communist China, it is of interest to see what relation exists between public opinion on these two subjects.

It should be noted first that our questions about Viet Nam explicitly related the subject of Viet Nam to that of Communist China. For some people this connection is one that they would not readily have made themselves. We may therefore have encouraged people to answer questions about Viet Nam with somewhat more attention to Communist China than they would normally give.

The data show, first, that people who favor our dealing with Communist China are no more likely than others to want us to withdraw completely from Viet Nam. Those who favor various amicable contacts with Communist China are also just as likely as others to favor continued military aid to South Viet Nam. Willingness to deal with China is, then, no reflection of a desire to have the United States end its involvement in the Far East.

There are, however, general differences between those who favor contacts with Communist China and those who oppose such contacts. These differences concern two possible actions in Viet Nam: (a) "using American forces in Viet Nam if the Communist rebels are winning, even if this means risking war with Communist China" and (b) "trying to make some compromise agreement with Communist China on this—like making all Viet Nam neutral."

Those who favor contacts with Communist China are, in general, more likely than others to *oppose* using American forces in Viet Nam. They are more likely than others to *favor* a compromise agreement with China on Viet Nam (see Table 30).

This relationship is seen first by comparing the opinions about Viet Nam policy of people who favor dealing with the Communists as the government of most of China with the opinions about Viet Nam of those who feel we should deal only with the Nationalist government. Those who favor dealing with the Communist government, as well as with the Nationalists, are more likely to oppose using American forces in Viet Nam and also more likely to favor a compromise agreement. However, this relationship between

opinion about dealing with the Communists as the government of China and opinion about Viet Nam policy is not a strong one.

A stronger association is found between opinions about Viet Nam policy and willingness to follow possible Presidential initiatives for closer contact with China. Those who say they would favor various Presidential suggestions of this type—such as selling wheat to Communist China and exchanging ambassadors with her—are more likely than others to oppose use of American forces in Viet Nam and to favor the alternative of a compromise agreement like neutralization. Conversely, those who said they would be against suggestions for greater contact with Communist China are more likely to favor the use of American forces and more likely to oppose a compromise settlement.

The relation between these two sets of opinions is shown most clearly when we give people an index score based on their reaction to all five possible Presidential suggestions for closer contact with China. Of those whose score shows the greatest willingness to follow such Presidential initiatives, only one out of three favors possible use of American forces in Viet Nam, while almost two out of three favor a compromise agreement in Viet Nam. At the other extreme, among those who are most opposed to Presidential initiatives for contact with China, the proportions favoring the two alternatives in Viet Nam are reversed. Almost two out of three favor the use of American forces if the war is being lost, while fewer than one in three favors a compromise like neutralization of Viet Nam. In general, then, willingness to have amicable contacts with Communist China and preference for a non-military solution in Viet Nam go together.

However, data presented earlier in the report indicate that a different pattern of attitudes exists among certain segments of the population. Better educated people are likely to welcome contact with Communist China, but they are also likely to oppose a compromise like neutralization in Viet Nam. Younger persons are likely to favor contact with Communist China but tend to favor the use of American forces to prevent loss of the war in Viet Nam. In other words, more education and younger age tend to produce both willingness for contact with Communist China and preference for a relatively militant policy in Viet Nam. At first, these facts may seem to be inconsistent with the general tendency for willingness to accept contact with Communist China to accompany non-militant attitudes concerning Viet Nam. To clarify these results, it is useful to examine the pattern of attitudes within various educational and age groups.

As Figure 1 shows, those who favor following suggestions for increased contact with China are also more likely to favor a compromise settlement like neutralization in Viet Nam, regardless of their educational level. But Figure 1 also shows that the general level of support for such a compromise in Viet Nam is lower for those of better education. Among those with any given degree of willingness to have contact with Communist China, a smaller proportion of the well-educated than of others favor a compromise in Viet Nam. The result is that even though well educated persons are somewhat more likely than others to favor contact with Communist China, they are, as a group, more opposed than others to a compromise like neutralization in Viet Nam.

The pattern of attitudes for different age groups is similar. As Figure 2 shows, within any age group those who favor contact with Communist China are more likely than others to oppose the use of American forces in Viet Nam. But the total level of support for using American forces is higher among younger people than among older people. Among those with any given degree of willingness to have contact with Communist China, a greater proportion of younger people than of older people favor use of American troops in Viet Nam. The result is that while younger people as a group are more likely than others to favor contacts with Communist China, they are also more likely to favor the use of American forces to prevent loss of the Viet Nam war.

The general picture that emerges from the data is that there are different forces which tend to produce different patterns of attitudes concerning American policy in Asia. On the one hand, there are forces which produce both willingness for amicable contact with China and preference for a non-military solution in Viet Nam. This attitude pattern appears to reflect a general orientation of non-militancy as opposed to militancy in foreign policy. Several social characteristics discussed in previous sections, such as geographical location and political affiliation, sometimes appear to contribute to consistently militant or non-militant orientations. On the other hand, some social characteristics, principally education and age, appear to work toward producing a different pattern of attitudes—one in which approval of contact with China is accompanied by preference for a relatively militant policy in Viet Nam and vice versa. It is possible that this second pattern of opinions reflects another general policy orientation, perhaps the degree of willingness to see the United States actively involved in Far Eastern affairs. For the present, however, the reasons behind the opinion patterns found must remain largely a matter of speculation.

TABLE 30
*Reactions to Two Possible U. S. Actions in Viet Nam, as Related to General
 Willingness to Deal with Communist China*

(Read rows across)

<i>Reaction to Possible United States Actions in Viet Nam*</i>										
	<i>Use of American Forces if Necessary</i>					<i>Compromise Agreement with Communist China— Neutralization of Viet Nam</i>				
	<i>Favor</i>	<i>Against</i>	<i>No Opinion^b</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>Favor</i>	<i>Against</i>	<i>No Opinion^b</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>N</i>
<i>Willingness to deal with Communist government^c</i>										
Favor	42%	48%	10%	100%	(216)	54%	32%	14%	100%	(216)
Against	53	39	8	100	(159)	39	49	12	100	(159)
<i>Reactions to possible suggestions by President^d</i>										
<i>Index Score^e</i>										
Most favorable 5-7	33%	55%	12%	100%	(115)	64%	21%	15%	100%	(115)
8-10	44	44	12	100	(163)	58	26	16	100	(163)
11-13	55	36	9	100	(153)	45	43	12	100	(153)
14-16	50	44	6	100	(134)	43	48	9	100	(134)
Least favorable 17-20	62	26	12	100	(95)	31	60	9	100	(95)
<i>Visits between Americans and Communist Chinese</i>										
Definitely favor	42%	46%	12%	100%	(407)	54%	32%	14%	100%	(407)
Probably favor	44	42	14	100	(312)	47	30	23	100	(312)
Probably against	55	36	9	100	(64)	39	50	11	100	(64)
Definitely against	51	35	14	100	(97)	39	43	18	100	(97)
<i>Sale of things like wheat to Communist China</i>										
Definitely favor	33%	54%	13%	100%	(185)	55%	31%	14%	100%	(185)
Probably favor	42	44	14	100	(243)	55	26	19	100	(243)
Probably against	46	43	11	100	(139)	54	28	18	100	(139)
Definitely against	52	35	13	100	(319)	38	43	19	100	(319)

TABLE 30 (Continued)

	Use of American Forces if Necessary				Compromise Agreement with Communist China— Neutralization of Viet Nam			
	Favor	Against	No Opinion ^b	Total N	Favor	Against	No Opinion ^b	Total N
<i>Discussion of Asian problems with Communist China</i>								
Definitely favor	40%	47%	13%	100% (366)	62%	24%	14%	100% (366)
Probably favor	42	43	15	100 (339)	49	28	23	100 (339)
Probably against	49	47	4	100 (72)	39	44	17	100 (72)
Definitely against	57	30	13	100 (112)	23	68	9	100 (112)
<i>Exchange of ambassadors with Communist China</i>								
Definitely favor	36%	49%	15%	100% (239)	59%	27%	14%	100% (239)
Probably favor	45	44	11	100 (270)	56	24	20	100 (270)
Probably against	46	43	11	100 (102)	38	36	26	100 (102)
Definitely against	54	35	11	100 (231)	37	51	12	100 (231)
<i>Agreement to Let Communist China into the United Nations</i>								
Definitely favor	38%	54%	8%	100% (132)	62%	28%	10%	100% (132)
Probably favor	44	39	17	100 (174)	52	27	21	100 (174)
Probably against	47	43	10	100 (124)	51	33	16	100 (124)
Definitely against	48	38	14	100 (409)	42	40	18	100 (409)

^a The wording of these questions is given in Table 24. They were asked of all those who said they had heard about the fighting in Viet Nam.

^b Persons for whom a response was not ascertained are included in this category.


^c The wording of this question is given in Table 7. It was asked only of those who were aware that there are two Chinese governments. Persons who did not indicate clear support for or opposition to dealing with the Chinese Communist Government are omitted from table.

^d The wording of these questions is given in Table 16. They were asked of those who are aware that most of China has a Communist government. Persons not expressing an opinion on a question are omitted from the table.

^e The index score was computed by assigning a score of 1 to the response "definitely favor," a score of 2 to "probably favor," a score of 3 to "probably be against," and a score of 4 to "definitely be against." An index score was computed for respondents who expressed an opinion on all five questions.


FIGURE 1

*Reactions to the Idea of a Compromise Agreement in Viet Nam as Related to Willingness to Follow Presidential Suggestions for Contact with China, for Persons of Different Educational Levels**



* This figure is based on an N of 590 persons who gave an opinion about five possible Presidential initiatives and about a compromise agreement in Viet Nam.

FIGURE 2
*Reactions to the Idea of Using American Forces in Viet Nam, as Related to
 Willingness to Follow Presidential Suggestions for Contact with China, for
 Persons of Different Age Groups**



* This figure based on an N of 593 persons who gave an opinion about five possible Presidential initiatives and about using American forces in Viet Nam.

APPENDIX A

Approximate Sampling Errors of Percentages Reported

Since the percentages reported in the tables of this report are based on a sample of the American population, these percentages are subject to sampling variability—*i.e.*, the variations that might occur by chance because only a sample, rather than the whole population, is surveyed. The table below presents estimates of the amount of error which might be expected in the percentages reported. Consider, for example, the case where the number of interviews is 1,000 and the reported percentage is 50. The entry in the table for this case is 3.8. This figure indicates that the chances are 95 in 100 that the true percentage value figure in the population is within 3.8 per cent (plus or minus) of the sample percentage reported.

TABLE A
Approximate Sampling Errors of Percentages
(Expressed in Percentages)

<i>Reported percentage</i>	<i>Number of Interviews</i>							
	3,000	1,000	700	500	400	300	200	100
50	2.2	3.8	4.6	5.4	6.0	7.0	2.3	12.0
30 or 70	2.0	3.5	4.2	4.9	5.5	6.4	7.8	11.1
20 or 80	1.8	3.0	3.6	4.3	4.8	5.6	6.8	9.5
10 or 90	1.3	2.3	2.8	3.3	3.6	4.2	5.1	7.2
5 or 95	1.0	1.7	2.0	2.3	2.2	3.0	3.7	

APPENDIX B

Approximate Sampling Errors of Differences Between Subgroups

Some tables of this report compare subgroups of the entire sample—e.g., groups with different levels of education—with respect to their responses to a question. Since differences between subgroups may be due simply to sampling error, we wish to estimate the probability that a difference as large as the one observed could occur by chance alone. To illustrate the use of this table, let us consider the case where the size of group A is 1,000, the size of group B is also 1,000, and the percentages for these groups are in the range of 35 to 65 per cent. The entry in the table for this case is 5.4. It indicates that a difference of 5.4 per cent or greater, in either direction, could occur by chance in less than 5 cases out of 100. That is, in this instance, a difference of 5.4 per cent or more between the subgroups would be considered as real and not the result of sampling error.

TABLE B
Sampling Errors of Differences
(Expressed as percentages)

Size of sample or group	Size of sample or group						
	1,000	700	500	400	300	200	100
<i>For percentages from about 35 per cent to 65 per cent</i>							
1,000	5.4	5.9	6.6	7.1	7.9	9.4	12.5
700		6.4	7.1	7.6	8.3	9.5	13.0
500			7.6	8.1	8.7	10.2	13.0
400				8.5	9.3	10.4	13.1
300					9.6	11.1	13.5
200						12.0	14.5
100							17.0
<i>For percentages around 20 per cent and 80 per cent</i>							
1,000	4.3	4.7	5.3	5.7	6.4	7.5	10.2
700		5.2	5.7	6.0	6.6	7.7	10.3
500			6.1	6.5	7.0	8.1	10.4
400				6.8	7.4	8.3	10.9
300					7.8	8.6	11.1
200						9.8	11.9
100							14.0

TABLE B (Continued)

Size of sample or group	Size of sample or group						
	1,000	700	500	400	300	200	100
<i>For percentages around 10 per cent and 90 per cent</i>							
1,000	3.3	3.4	4.0	4.3	4.8	5.6	
700		3.9	4.2	4.6	5.0	5.8	
500			4.6	4.8	5.3	6.0	
400				5.1	5.6	6.3	
300					5.9	6.6	
200						7.1	
<i>For percentages around 5 per cent and 95 per cent</i>							
1,000	2.3	2.6	2.9	3.3	3.5	4.0	
700		2.8	3.3	3.3	3.7	4.2	
500			3.4	3.5	3.9	4.4	
400				3.7	4.0	4.4	
300					4.3	4.8	

APPENDIX C

Description of Sample Used in Survey

TABLE C
Breakdown of Sample

<i>Survey Research Center (SRC) Sample</i>		<i>U.S. Census Data</i>	
REGION^a			
1. Northeast	24.4%	1. Northeast	25.0%
2. North Central	28.0	2. North Central	28.9
3. South	30.9	3. South	30.8
4. West	16.7	4. West	15.2
AGE			
1. 18-24	7.7%	1. 20-24	9.7%
2. 25-34	20.7	2. 25-34	20.7
3. 35-44	22.5	3. 35-44	21.9
4. 45-54	19.3	4. 45-54	18.6
5. 55-64	13.7	5. 55-64	14.1
6. 65 and over	15.9	6. 65 and over	14.9
7. Not ascertained	0.2		
EDUCATION			
1. Grade school or less	26.4%	1. Grade school or less	32.4%
2. Some high school	13.1	2. Some high school (1-3 years)	18.6
3. Some high school plus non-academic	3.0	3. High school (4 years)	30.4
4. Completed high school	20.7	4. Some college (1-3 years)	10.3
5. Complete high school plus non-academic	12.4	5. College (4 or more years)	8.3
6. Some college	11.9		
7. Has college degree	11.1		
8. Not ascertained	1.4		
SEX^b			
1. Men	43.0%	1. Men	49.2%
2. Women	57.0	2. Women	50.8

^a The region classifications in the SRC sample and the U.S. Census differ only in that the SRC sample includes Delaware with the Northeast and the Census includes it in the South.

^b The smaller proportion of males in the SRC sample is probably due largely to the fact that the SRC sample is limited to adults in dwelling units and excludes persons in military reservations, large rooming houses, transient hotels, and similar places which have a higher proportion of males.

OCCUPATION OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD*

	SRC	U.S. Census
1. Professional, technical, and kindred workers	14.7%	9.7%
2. Non self-employed managers and officials	6.8	7.0
3. Self-employed businessmen, artisans, craftsmen, works for corporation of which he is substantial owner	7.4	5.3
4. Clerical, sales, and kindred workers	11.6	10.2
5. Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers	15.1	15.3
6. Operatives and kindred workers (factory, mill, mine workers, etc.)	16.0	15.2
7. Laborers (unskilled and farm) and service workers (cooks, barbers, practical nurses, etc.)	12.0	11.6
8. Farmers and farm managers	6.0	4.3
9. Housewives (if female is head), retired, students, or military on-base	10.4	—
10. Housewives (if female is head), retired, students, military on- and off-base, and unemployed	—	21.4

POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATION

	Present SRC Sample	Fall 1962 SRC Sample
1. Strong Democrat	23.9%	22.9%
2. Not very strong Democrat	21.9	23.1
3. Independent closer to Democrats	7.0	7.1
4. Independent	9.9	7.7
5. Independent closer to Republicans	4.7	6.1
6. Not very strong Republican	17.0	16.1
7. Strong Republican	10.7	12.2
8. Other minor political party, apolitical, won't say	3.7	3.9
9. Not ascertained	1.2	.9

* Unemployed persons were coded by SRC according to their usual occupation.

Sources:

Region: U.S. Bureau of Census, *Current Population Report*, February 7, 1963.

Age: U.S. Bureau of Census, *U.S. Census of Population: 1960, General Social and Economic Characteristics, U.S. Summary*, Final Report PC(1)-1C.

Education: U.S. Bureau of Census, *Current Population Report*, series P120, no. 121.

Sex: U.S. Bureau of Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1963* (84th edition).

Occupation of Head of Household: U.S. Bureau of Census, *Current Population Report*, series P60, no. 41.

Publications of the
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

- Foreign Affairs* (quarterly), edited by Hamilton Fish Armstrong.
- The United States in World Affairs* (annual). Volumes for 1931, 1932 and 1933, by Walter Lippmann and William O. Scroggs; for 1934-1935, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939 and 1940, by Whitney H. Shepardson and William O. Scroggs; for 1945-1947, 1947-1948 and 1948-1949, by John C. Campbell; for 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1953 and 1954, by Richard P. Stebbins; for 1955, by Hollis W. Barber; for 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962 and 1963, by Richard P. Stebbins.
- Documents on American Foreign Relations* (annuals). Volume for 1952 edited by Clarence W. Baier and Richard P. Stebbins; for 1953 and 1954, edited by Peter V. Curl; for 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958 and 1959, edited by Paul E. Zinner; for 1960, 1961, 1962 and 1963 edited by Richard P. Stebbins.
- Political Handbook and Atlas of the World* (annual), edited by Walter H. Mallory.
- American Agencies Interested in International Affairs*, 5th Edition, compiled by Donald Wasson.
- Foreign Affairs Bibliography, 1952-1962*, by Henry L. Roberts.
- Japan and the United States in World Trade*, by Warren S. Hunsberger.
- The Dollar in World Affairs*, by Henry G. Aubrey.
- On Dealing with the Communist World*, by George F. Kennan.
- Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy*, by Edward S. Mason.
- The Scientific Revolution and World Politics*, by Caryl P. Haskins.
- Africa: A Foreign Affairs Reader*, edited by Philip W. Quigg.
- The Philippines and the United States: Problems of Partnership*, by George E. Taylor.
- Southeast Asia in United States Policy*, by Russell H. Fifield.
- UNESCO: Assessment and Promise*, by George N. Shuster.
- The Peaceful Atom in Foreign Policy*, by Arnold Kramish.
- The Arabs and the World: Nasser's Arab Nationalist Policy*, by Charles D. Cremeans.
- Toward an Atlantic Community*, by Christian A. Herter.
- The Soviet Union, 1922-1962: A Foreign Affairs Reader*, edited by Philip E. Mosely.
- The Politics of Foreign Aid: American Experience in Southeast Asia*, by John D. Montgomery.
- Spearheads of Democracy: Labor in the Developing Countries*, by George C. Lodge.
- Latin America—Diplomacy and Reality*, by Adolf A. Berle.
- The Organization of American States and the Hemisphere Crisis*, by John C. Dreier.
- The United Nations: Structure for Peace*, by Ernest A. Gross.
- The Long Polar Watch: Canada and the Defense of North America*, by Melvin Conant.
- Arms and Politics in Latin America* (Revised Edition), by Edwin Lieuwen.
- The Future of Underdeveloped Countries: Political Implications of Economic Development* (Revised Edition), by Eugene Staley.
- Spain and Defense of the West: Ally and Liability*, by Arthur P. Whitaker.
- Social Change in Latin America Today: Its Implications for United States Policy*, by Richard N. Adams, John P. Gillin, Allan R. Holmberg, Oscar Lewis, Richard W. Patch, and Charles W. Wagley.
- Foreign Policy: The Next Phase: The 1960s* (Revised Edition), by Thomas K. Finletter.
- Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy* (Revised Edition), by John C. Campbell.
- Communist China and Asia: Challenge to American Policy*, by A. Doak Barnett.
- France, Troubled Ally: De Gaulle's Heritage and Prospects*, by Edgar S. Furniss, Jr.
- The Schuman Plan: A Study in Economic Cooperation, 1950-1959*, by William Diebold, Jr.
- Soviet Economic Aid: The New Aid and Trade Policy in Underdeveloped Countries*, by Joseph S. Berliner.
- Raw Materials: A Study of American Policy*, by Percy W. Bidwell.
- NATO and the Future of Europe*, by Ben T. Moore.
- India and America: A Study of Their Relations*, by Phillips Talbot and S. L. Poplai.